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An analysis of voice in performance and literary theory reveals a paradox: 
while voice is generally thought of as the vehicle through which one expresses 
individual subjectivity, in theoretical discourse it operates as a placeholder for 
superimposed content, a storage container for acquired material that can 
render the subjective voice silent and ineffectual.  In grammatical terms, voice 
expresses the desire or anxiety of the third rather than first person, and as 
such can be constitutive of both identity and alterity.  In historical discourse, 
music operates similarly, absorbing and expressing cultural excess.  One 
historical instance of this paradox can be seen in the case of Sigmund Freud, 
whose infamous trouble with music has less to do with aesthetic properties of 
the musical art form than with cultural anxieties surrounding him, in which 
music becomes a trope for differences feared to potentially “haunt” the public 
sphere.  As a cultural trope, music gets mixed up in a highly charged dialectic 
between theatricality and anti-theatricality that emerges at the Viennese fin-
de-Siècle, a dialectic that continues to shape both German historiography and 
the construction of modernity in contemporary scholarship.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
The habits of a lifetime when everything else had to come before writing are not easily 
broken, even when circumstances now often make it possible for writing to be first; 
habits of years—response to others, distractibility, responsibility for daily matters—
stay with you, mark you, become you.  The cost of “discontinuity” (that pattern still 
imposed on women) is such a weight of things unsaid, an accumulation of material so 
great, that everything starts up something else in me; what should take weeks takes me 
sometimes months to write; what should take months, takes years. 
 
--Tilly Olson 
Silences 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 As the person who developed the art of the talking cure, Sigmund Freud 
provides us every reason to consider him one of the most adept listeners in modern 
history.  At the same time, the art and science of listening that Freud pioneered is 
surrounded by problematic and unexplored boundaries.  One key area, often 
mentioned but never explored in depth, concerns Freud’s assertion that he is unable to 
enjoy and to understand music.  In light of this assertion, it is curious that he sought the 
contribution and expertise of key musical figures during the early, formative years of 
psychoanalysis.  Given the importance of musical culture during fin-de-Siècle Vienna, 
Freud knew that by including Max Graf and David Josef Bach as two of the first 
members of the Psychoanalytic Wednesday Society, he was engaging with core 
participants in this saturated moment of cultural conflict and modernism.  Did he 
assemble these musical personalities in his early circle to task them to listen for him, 
and thus to help him understand the potential role of music in both his psychological 
and metapsychological arguments?  Since Freud forever changed the way that we 
listen, what do we hear when we listen for Freud--in psychoanalysis, in music, and in 
the historical as well as the theoretical dimensions of their interrelation?   
 In this study, I analyze how sound, voice, and music circulate both in modern 
history and in contemporary theoretical discourse.  The first half of this work maps out 
methodological considerations central to working on the resonant dimension of opera 
studies and media studies in the field of German intellectual history.1  My primary 
                                                 
1 With the exception of Chapter 2, when I employ the phrase “opera studies,” I 
am thinking of opera as a particular type of media, and thus, as particular branch of 
media studies.  Opera’s status as a type of media is especially relevant after Wagner, 
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intervention is to address resonance as material, and to expose methods for identifying 
and articulating the material effects of its presence given its paradoxical status as an 
ephemeral object.  Temporality emerges as a key problem: how does one negotiate the 
presence of sound given Heidegger’s caution against the “metaphysics of presence” that 
has formidably shaped theoretical discourses of modernity?  And how does one resolve 
the problem that text, a silent medium, is the primary archive of sounds from the past?   
 The second half of this study contextualizes Freud’s early work as embedded in 
the Wagnerian Cultural Politics that dominated fin-de-Siècle Vienna.  I argue that 
Freud’s trouble with music has less to do with aesthetic properties of the musical art 
form than with cultural anxieties that transform sound and music into a trope for 
theatricality, alive with the “dangers” of alterity seen to “haunt” the European public 
sphere.  On one hand, Freud’s orientation around Aristotle (and Plato) is a political 
move meant to distance himself from an anti-Semitic chain of association between 
“music,” “theatricality,” and “the Jew” in modern culture.  On the other hand, Aristotle 
(and Plato) provides Freud with an alternative, holistic model for the role of theatrical 
representation in modern culture.  I demonstrate that the vision of culture Freud begins 
to articulate in the first decade of the twentieth-century is largely a concerned response 
to Richard Wagner’s pervasive influence--both in the theater and in the theatrical 
constellation of the body politic.      
 
                                                 
whose Gesamtkunstwerk is both a work of art, and a type of mass media hugely 
influential upon the medial innovations such as radio and film that begin to emerge 
around the turn of the century, and later upon the “new media”.  See, for instance, 
Norbert Bolz’s Theorie der neuen Medien, München: Rabin Verlag, 1993, and Matthew 
Wilson Smith’s more recent, The Total Work of Art: From Bayreuth to Cyberspace, New 
York: Routledge, 2007,   
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 This project began when I learned that Sigmund Freud’s famous patient, “der 
kleine Hans,” was Herbert Graf (1904-1973), stage director at the Metropolitan Opera 
from 1936-1960 and director of the Grand Theatre in Geneva from 1965 until his death 
in 1973.  Known throughout the opera world, he staged productions for the Salzburg 
Festival with Wilhelm Furtwängler, Dimitri Metropoulos, and Georg Solti, and for 
Maria Callas at the Teatro alla Scala and the Arena di Verona.2   Published in 1909, 
Freud’s Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben (Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year old 
Boy), was the first case study to provide evidence that supported Freud’s theory of 
infantile sexuality published four years earlier, Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie 
(Three Essays on a Theory of Sexuality, 1905).  Though Herbert Graf’s development from a 
phobic boy to a well-known figure in the international opera world possibly had little to 
do with his early psychoanalytic treatment, it was a coincidence of Freudian 
proportions that made me start to ponder Freud’s relationship to music and to opera.  
 As is well known, Freud performed the treatment of little Hans only secondarily.  
Hans’s father, Max Graf, who was an early member of the Psychological Wednesday 
Society, consulted closely with Freud in long conversations about the boy and became 
Freud’s therapist surrogate.  The elder Graf was also musically inclined as a composer 
and prominent Viennese music critic.  He studied with Eduard Hanslick at the 
University of Vienna and with Anton Bruckner at the Vienna Conservatory, wrote for a 
number of Viennese periodicals including Die Zeit and the Österreichische Rundschau, 
translated Romain Rolland into German (Paris als Musikstadt, 1904), and was the author 
                                                 
2 In addition to his work in the theater, Herbert Graf wrote about opera for the 
general public.  His works include the following:  The Opera and its Future in America 
(New York: Norton, 1941); Opera for the People (Minneapolis:  U of Minnesota Press, 
1951); Producing Opera for America (Zurich: Atlantis Books, 1961).     
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of numerous books on various musical subjects.3  Hans’s mother, Olga Hoenig, an 
actress, was for over a decade an early patient of Freud’s.  In Max Graf’s words, she was 
“eine sehr interessante, sehr geistvolle und sehr schöne Frau,” but also “zweifellos eine 
Hysterikerin,” which Graf found “anziehend und interessant” (Eissler 19).  It was 
through Hoenig that Max Graf became curious about psychoanalysis.  Hoenig 
eventually led Graf to Freud.   
 Though Graf had been acquainted with Freud since at least 1899, by 1905 he was 
officially listed as a member of the Psychological Wednesday Society.  Freud first 
convened the Wednesday Society in 1902 to discuss cultural topics of potential concern 
to psychoanalysis.4  In addition to Freud, the first five members of the Wednesday 
Society were physicians:  Wilhelm Stekel, Alfred Adler, Max Kahane, Rudolf Reitler, 
and Paul Federn (Rose 15).  Two of the next three members, including Graf, had strong 
musical connections.  David Josef Bach was a boyhood friend of Arnold Schoenberg and 
studied with Ernst Mach at the University of Vienna.  He became music critic of the 
Arbeiter Zeitung in 1904 after the death of Josef Scheu.  In October of 1904, the same year 
he founded the Arbeiter Sinfonie Konzerte, one of his many activities to try to make the 
fine arts accessible to the working class, Bach introduced the readers of the Arbeiter 
Zeitung to Freud’s The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (“Beim Schreiben” 1-3).5 Around 
                                                 
3 During the decade of his acquaintance with Freud, Max Graf published Wagner 
Probleme und andere Studien (1900), Die Musik im Zeitalter der Renaissance (1905), Die 
Innere Werkstatt des Musikers (1910), and Richard Wagner im “Fliegenden Holländer.”  Ein 
Beitrag zur Psychologie Künstlerischen Schaffens (1911).   
 
4 For an interpretation of the work of the Psychological Wednesday Society and 
its members, see Louis Rose, The Freudian Calling: Early Viennese Psychoanalysis and the 
Pursuit of Cultural Science. (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1998). 
 
5 Thanks for Louis Rose for bring this article to my attention.   
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the same time, Federn introduced Eduard Hitschmann to the Wednesday Society.  Like 
Federn, Hitschmann was also a physician, but his wife, Hedwig Schick, was a singer, 
voice teacher, and speech therapist. 
 Given these circumstances, it is curious that Freud’s biographers depict him as 
unmusical, if not averse to music.  Had he been so ill disposed toward music, it is 
indeed curious that he included two prominent musical figures to participate in the 
conversations regarding psychoanalysis and culture during the formative years of 
psychoanalysis.  If at times Freud stubbornly rejected music, all the more reason to 
investigate his incentive for doing so.  This study began, then, as an attempt to better 
discern Freud’s relationship to music, and to understand Freud’s interest in Graf and 
Bach.  I sought to learn what contributions these personalities made to the early 
discussions of the Wednesday Society, what influence their musicality may have had 
upon Freud, and what impact Freud may have had upon the musical circles of Vienna.   
As my work progressed, however, I realized that the work that they undertook in the 
context of the Wednesday Society, their relationship with Freud, and their cultural 
influences were markedly different.  As a journalist and Social Democrat, Bach was 
primarily concerned with the politics of culture and social policy—most notably, the 
Bildung of the working class.  He strongly believed that cultural inheritance should be 
democratic, and thus, that “high art” belonged as much to the working class as to the 
bourgeoisie.  Furthermore, he believed that because Bildung offered the working class 
the opportunity to mature intellectually and spiritually, it was a possible means of 
instigating cultural revolution.  Through research trips to the Arnold Schoenberg Center 
in Vienna, to the Bach Nachlass in Sussex, and to the University Cambridge Library, 
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which received a number of works from Bach’s library, I learned the extent of Bach’s 
vast artistic influence--from literature and the visual arts, theater, and music 
composition--in early twentieth-century Vienna.6  Bach went on to became general 
editor of the fine art and literature section of the Arbeiter Zeitung in 1917, director of the 
Sozialdemokratische Kunststelle in 1919, and general editor of the Kunststelle’s cultural 
newspaper, Kunst und Volk, which he ran until 1934.7 
 Whereas Bach studied psychoanalysis for insights regarding the liberation of 
human potential in a transformative society, Graf focused on psychoanalytic theory as it 
relates to music and the creative process.8  Unlike Bach, who thought about 
                                                 
6 My thanks to Therese Muxeneder at the Arnold Schoenberg Archive in Vienna, 
and to Robert Schoenberg, who learned of my interest in Bach and emailed me 
information about the Bach Nachlass in Sussex.  I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to 
Jared Armstrong, who tirelessly labored to keep Bach and his life’s work in the public 
eye and who generously hosted me during my trip to Crowborough, East Sussex.  
Likewise, I am most thankful to Dr. Philip Marriott, adopted son of David Bach’s 
nephew, Herbert Bach, and his extended family, also in Crowborough, for their many 
kindnesses.  And finally to Caius College, Cambridge, and Dr. Joachim Whaley, Senior 
Lecturer in German, who so kindly hosted me while researching the books from the 
Bach Nachlass that are held at the Cambridge University Library.   
  
7 For information about Bach’s many activities and influences in Vienna, see 
Henriette Kotlan-Werner, Kunst und Volk: David Josef Bach 1874-1947 (Vienna: Europa 
Verlag, 1977) and a special issue of Austrian Studies about Bach’s life and times with 
papers presented at a conference on Bach at the Austrian Cultural Forum, London: 
Austrian Studies: Culture and Politics in Red Vienna. Vol 14, 2006. 
 
8 Although historians have interpreted the artistic efforts of the Social Democrats 
under Bach’s leadership as a naïve attempt to nobilify the working class, I see Bach’s 
efforts as a fairly radical push to dislodge art from bourgeois traditions.  Given the 
staunch resistance of much of the Viennese concert-growing public to new music, 
Bach’s support of premiering new works at the Arbeiter Symphonie Konzerte to an 
audience that had no preconceived notions about musical tradition and propriety was a 
brilliant move.  Given Bach’s achievements, one could question the extent to which 
much of the Viennese new music belongs in the category of “high” art, since that same 
music was far better received by working class audiences.  Bach strongly believed that 
radical tonality offered the working class new possibilities for conceiving of itself and of 
its future--indeed, that it embodied revolutionary potential.  
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psychoanalysis in order to better understand contemporary society, Graf crafted a 
number of applied psychoanalytic studies meant specifically for Freud and the 
Wednesday Society.  A careful look at these essays reveals that Graf worked closely 
alongside Freud, collaborating not only on Herbert Graf’s case, but also on ideas 
regarding the origins of artistic creativity and the representational process of theater.  
Although I remain interested in Bach, I focus here on the relationship between Freud 
and Graf because their collaboration sheds light on the original problem I set out to 
understand: the underlying reasons for Freud’s problematic relationship to music.  
Whereas Bach’s work with Freud was short-lived, Graf’s work with Freud on the 
creative process, theatrical representation, and Richard Wagner explain not only 
Freud’s crisis with music, but also his complicated insight and understanding regarding 
theatricality. 
 The intellectual cooperation between Freud and Graf can be seen in the 
conversations of the Wednesday Society, and the essays both authors produced 
between 1905 and 1910.  As I discuss in chapter four, the fact that Freud gave to Graf his 
most important text on the theater, Psychopathische Personen auf der Buhne, while or 
shortly before Graf was writing “Richard Wagner und das dramatische Schaffens” 
(1906) and “Probleme des dramatischen Schaffens” (1907) suggests that Freud wrote 
this text as a template for Graf’s thinking about representation in theater in general and 
opera in particular.  This is both methodologically and historically significant because it 
alters the vantage point from which to assess Freud’s understanding of theatrical 
representation, shifting focus away from the spoken theater of Shakespeare and toward 
the Gesamtkunstwerk of Wagner.  This is not to say that Freud was a closet Wagnerian; 
                                                 
 
 8 
on the contrary, Freud wrote about representation in theater as a veiled response to the 
Wagnerism of his time, explicitly formulating his theory about theatrical representation 
after Aristotle in an attempt to structure or at least reframe Graf’s thinking about 
modern theater and opera.     
 
 By specializing in opera studies as intellectual history, my focus is not the history 
of opera, but the history of culture as it responds to operatic discourses revealing social 
and cultural concerns about modernity.9  This study is influenced by innovative work 
by historians such as Celia Applegate, Leon Botstein, David B. Dennis, and Michael P. 
Steinberg that has reframed our understanding of German music and opera as cultural 
forms central to discourses about the nation, as well as the (national) subject.10  As this 
                                                 
9 Michael P. Steinberg’s Austria as Theater and Ideology: The Meaning of the Salzburg 
Festival (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000) is the standard bearer of the relationship between 
theatricality and cultural history, not only of the Austrian fin-de-Siècle, but also of 
cultural history in general.  Steinberg’s primary precursors on Austrian cultural and 
intellectual history are Carl Schorske’s Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New 
York: Vintage, 1961), William McGrath’s Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in Vienna 
(New Haven:  Yale UP, 1974), and William Johnson’s The Austrian Mind (Berkeley: U of 
California UP, 1983).  
 
10 See Celia Applegate, "What is German Music? Reflections on the Role of Music 
in the Making of the Nation," German Studies Review (Spring, 1993) and, with Pamela 
Potter, ed., Music and German National Identity. (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2002); 
Leon Botstein, "German Jews and Wagner," In Grey, Thomas. Richard Wagner and His 
World (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009); "Max Weber and Music History," The Musical 
Quarterly 93 (2): 183–191; "The Jewish Question in Music," The Musical Quarterly 94 (4): 
439–53;  "Alban Berg and the Memory of Modernism," In Christopher Hailey, ed., Alban 
Berg and His World (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010); and with Edward Timms and 
Werner Hanak, eds., Quasi una Fantasia: Juden und die Musikstadt Wien, (Vienna:  
Jüdisches Museum Wien, 2003);  Scott Burnham, Beethoven Hero, (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 2000);  David Dennis, Beethoven in German Politics, 1870-1989 (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1996);  Karen Painter, Symphonic Aspirations, German Music and Politics, 1900-1945 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2008);  Pamela Potter, Most German of the Arts: Musicology and 
Society from the Weimar Republic to the End of Hitler’s Reich (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998); 
and Michael P. Steinberg, Austria as Theater and Ideology: The Meaning of the Salzburg 
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body of scholarly material grows, the field of German Studies increasingly recognizes 
the seminal role that music and opera have played in the construction of German and 
Austrian subjectivity.11     
 As a cultural event rather than a purely musical, literary, or theatrical object, 
opera is an art form that combines disciplines, and thus poses challenges to traditional, 
disciplinary methods of inquiry.  By integrating performance studies into my cultural 
analysis, my goal is not to map one disciplinary procedure onto another, but to translate 
concerns among disciplines and to explore the impasses between them.  Exploring the 
margins of disciplinarity proves especially fruitful in the case of opera, as that is the 
location where philosophy has relegated this “special” type of art form.12   
 Performance studies is itself an emerging, interdisciplinary field that began 
development in the 1960s through the converging interests of anthropologist Victor 
Turner and theater theorist Richard Schechner, on the one hand, and the influence of 
                                                 
Festival (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000); Listening to Reason: Culture, Subjectivity, and 
Nineteenth-Century Music (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006); Judaism Musical and Unmusical 
(Chicago:  Chicago UP, 2008).  For a recent overview of various approaches to the 
cultural history of music, see Jane Fulcher, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the New Cultural 
History of Music (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011).  
  
11 See especially the work of David Levin: Richard Wagner, Fritz Lang, and the 
Nibelungen (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999); Unsettling Opera: Staging Mozart, Verdi, 
Wagner, and Zemlinsky (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2010); and his most recent work on 
Wagner, such as “A Picture-Perfect Man? Senta, Absorbtion, and Wagnerian 
Theatricality,” Opera Quarterly 21:3 (2005) 486-495. 
 
12 See Carolyn Abbate, Unsung Voices:  Opera and Musical Narrative in the 
Nineteenth-Century.  (Princeton:  Princeton UP, 1996).  As I discuss in chapter one, 
Abbate has shown that in Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages and Paul de 
Man’s critique thereof, “both writers revert to music at a moment of crisis in the 
argument, a moment when proof fails and the discussion becomes a performance” (18).  
“Music” becomes a refuge for theoretical arguments that have reached a logical 
impasse.  
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speech-act theory and the work of linguists John Austin and John Searle, on the other.  
As a field, performance studies scholarship tends to gravitate toward popular social 
events such as rituals, festivals, parades, etc., rather than toward events traditionally 
thought of as “high” culture such as opera.  My focus on performance directs my 
attention toward opera as a socio-cultural event that reflects, performs, and produces 
meanings in historical context, thinking less about the aesthetic standards of a particular 
work that validate its status as “high” culture and more about the extra-operatic effects 
of a performance.  In Vienna at the fin-de-Siècle, both operatic works and the extra-
operatic are largely concerned with constellations of community, framing insider or 
outsider status through markers indicative of nationality, class, gender, or race through 
musical, linguistic, or performing codes that signal essence and alterity.  An exploration 
of the dialectical relationship between opera and the subject thus reveals a dynamic 
(and resonant) social space where identities take shape.   
 Considering the performance effects of opera in history relies upon close reading, 
although at times, performance becomes the text.  In terms of a “text and context” 
model of intellectual history, this means that primary (operatic) texts (libretto, score, 
etc.) are less my focus than the performances of those texts in the larger context of 
operatic (and thus identity-driven) society and culture.  Engaging with opera as a social 
sphere invites one to question both the history of performance and the performance of 
history, and thus emphasizes critical issues around temporality.  Fluidity between text 
and context, performance and history, invites possibilities for rethinking the status of 
ephemeral events.13   
                                                 
13 For a discussion of “performance remains” and “ephemeral evidence,” see 
Rebecca Schneider, “Archives: Performance Remains,” Performance Research, 6/2 (2001), 
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 Attending to temporality is critical when addressing opera, as opera performance 
relies upon textuality (the libretto, the written score, or instituted performance practices 
such as the theatricalization by the Regie inasmuch as it is not improvised) and upon a 
performance presence that is impermanent and predominantly haptic, such as the aural 
and corporeal realm (the resonant sphere produced by voices and the orchestra and live 
variables on location that shift from performance to performance) and the explicit 
corporeality of bodies that calls attention to the doubling effect of the theater.  Indeed, I 
argue in Chapter one, the tension that is created in opera between the textual (theatrical 
realm) and the haptic (performance realm) is precisely what makes opera such a 
startling, exciting, and potentially “dangerous” and destabilizing art form.  
 Although theatricality and performance are theoretical models that have been 
productively adopted by scholars in many disciplines, both in the humanities and in the 
social sciences, a more precise meaning of theatricality and performance and especially 
the tension between the two concepts has been addressed by scholars in theater and 
performance studies, in part because of the desire to retain a degree of specificity about 
“theater” within the field of theater studies, and in part because those terms indicate 
widely divergent meanings even within disciplines.14  In colloquial usage 
                                                 
100–8; and José Esteban Munoz, “Ephemera as Evidence: Introductory Notes to Queer 
Acts,” Women & Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory, 8/2 (1996). 
 
14 The most important texts in theater studies addressing theatricality are Marvin 
Carlson, “The Resistance to Theatricality,” Sub-stance 31/2-3 (2002); Josette Féral, 
“Theatricality: the Specificity of Theatrical Language,” Sub-stance 31/2-3 (2002) and 
“Performance and Theatricality: The Subject Demystified,” Mimesis, Masochism, and 
Mime: The Politics of Contemporary French Thought, ed. Timothy Murray (Ann Arbor: 
Michigan UP, 1997), 289-300; Erika Fischer-Lichte’s “Theatricality: A Key Concept in 
Theater Studies,” Theatre Research International 20/2 (1995), 85-90; Thomas Postlewait 
and Tracy C Davis, “Theatricality: An Introduction,” Theatriality, ed. Postlewait and 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php
?fbid=465398030177190&set=a.222
893841094278.74548.22277071443
9924&type=1&ref=nf 
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“performance” indicates, as in the Oxford English Dictionary: “an act of staging or 
presenting a play, concert, or other form of entertainment.”  In performance studies, 
however, it indicates a particular dimension of the theatrical performance that I link to 
the operatic.  Josette Féral, who skillfully differentiates theatricality and performance, 
argues that the two registers have independent and at times competing functions.  
Theatricality is the overall organizing framework, in Féral’s words, the “specific 
symbolic structure” that “inscribes the subject in the law and in theatrical codes” (297).  
Performance, on the other hand, refers to particular characteristics of a staging 
developed largely in the avant-garde theater of the twentieth-century that bear affinity 
to the theater of Artaud.15  Here, performance indicates “a theater of cruelty and 
violence, of the body and its drives,” a theater of “displacement and ‘disruption,’” that 
is both non-narrative and non-representational (289).    
 Féral identifies three primary characteristics of performance that help to specify 
the difference between performance and theatricality and thus provides a solid starting 
point for my analysis.  First is the manipulation of an actor’s body in ways that 
underscore its explicit corporeality: “Performance rejects all illusion, in particular 
theatrical illusion originating in the repression of the body’s ‘baser’ elements, and 
attempts instead to call attention to certain aspects of the body--the face, gestural 
mimicry, and the voice--that would normally escape notice” (290).  Performance makes 
the body, the “actor’s canvas,” somehow “conspicuous.”  Repressions are “brought to 
                                                 
Davis, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2003); Samuel Weber, Theatricality as Medium (New 
York: Fordham UP 2004).    
 
15 See Antonin Artaud, The Theatre and its Double.  Trans. Mary Caroline Richards.  
New York: Grove Press, 1958.   
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light, objectified, and represented [. . .] frozen under the gaze of the spectator, who 
appropriates them as a form of knowledge” (290-291).  Second is the manipulation of 
space in ways that call attention to it, “play[ing] with performance space as if it were an 
object” (291).  Like the performing body, “space becomes existential to the point of 
ceasing to exist as a setting and place.  It no longer surrounds and encloses the 
performance, but like the body, becomes part of the performance to such an extent that 
it cannot be distinguished from it (291-292).  Within this space, “time stretches out and 
dissolves,” creating a “continuous present” where meaning disappears and “nothing is 
left but a kinesics of gesture” (292).  Here, meaning is made through “the absence of 
meaning”.  Performance “conscripts [the] subject both as a constituted subject and as a 
social subject in order to dislocate and demystify it” (292).   
 The third aspect of performance that Féral pinpoints is the artist’s relation to his 
own performance, in which “the performer no more plays himself that he represents 
himself.  Instead, he is a source of production and displacement” (293).  This aspect of 
performance “means nothing and aims for no single, specific meaning, but attempts 
instead to reveal places of passage,” attempting “to wake the body--the performer’s and 
the spectator’s--from the threatening anesthesia haunting it” 293).    
 For Féral, theatricality is not simply the counterpart to performance.  Rather, it is 
the product that “arises from the play between these two realities” (297).  Theatricality 
provides a structure all the while that performance destabilizes that very structure: 
“Performance, therefore, appears as a primary process lacking teleology and 
unaccompanied by any secondary process, since performance has nothing to represent 
for anyone.  As a result, performance indicates the theater’s margin [. . .], theater’s 
fringes, something which is never said, but which, although hidden, is necessarily 
present” (297).  Féral’s analysis is relevant not only to the literal theater, but also to the 
 14 
play in the psychoanalytic scene between the speech of the analysand and her body.  
The performing presence of the explicit body undermines her (theatrical) speech 
indicating that all is not well.  Indeed, it seems to me that the very rupture Féral 
describes is a rupture first identified not by Artaud, but by Freud.16   
 While an innovative dramaturgy might underscore the tension between the 
theatrical and the performing in a performance of opera, as I stated, it seems to me that 
the most enthralling operatic moments come precisely when the operatic voice pulls 
itself away from the body of the singer, defying space and time through an explicit 
corporeality, and taking on a resonant life of its own beyond the body of the singer.  
Key here is resonance, the unequivocal sound of the singer’s instrument.  Unlike Féral, I 
call the overall structure that contains the play between the theatrical realm and the 
performing realm operatic.  Replacing theatricality with the operatic demands that the 
space of opera, indeed, the sum of theatricality and performance in any type of 
theatrical space, be conceived of as a resonant sphere.  Sound must be considered as an 
integral part of performance.    
 Since I first began this study, the emergence of sound studies--yet another 
interdisciplinary field--comes largely as a result of innovations in media studies that 
trace the role of sound technology and reproduction, especially in radio and film, but 
                                                 
16 A number of formidable scholars have leveled criticism at Freud’s model of 
theatrical representation, an important topic given my interests here that I revisit in 
Chapter three.  See Jacques Derrida, “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of 
Representation,” and “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” Writing and Difference, trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1978; Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Theatrum 
Analyticum,” Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary 
French Thought, ed. Timothy Murray (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan Press, 1997) 175-196; 
and Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Unconscious as Mise-en-Scène” in Murray (163-174) 
and “Beyond Representation,” trans. Jonathan Culler,  The Lyotard Reader, ed. Andrew 
Benjamin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 
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also in other technologies such as the gramophone, the telephone, the Walkman, the 
synthesizer, and soon likely any other sounding technology excluded from that list.  An 
increasing cooperation between the humanities and the sciences has driven much of this 
research, as has the development of sound and performance art, which interrogates the 
boundaries of the sensory experience.  Historical interest in sound as an organizing 
principle of society and culture, and in listening as an act of subject formation have 
added to this scholarship, and helped to re-conceptualize the formation of (sonic) 
culture in the past and in the present.   
 As a performing medium, opera raises the question (or the problem) of listening.  
Rather than focus on the act of listening, however, my study here attempts to avow 
texts that are non-verbal while struggling to conceptualize the historical and theoretical 
impact of not listening.  I strive to locate meaning both in the space of listening and in 
the act of not listening in order to shine light upon the relationship between aurality 
and the construction of modernity.  In the case of fin-de-Siècle Vienna, one can 
understand neither aesthetics nor politics without listening to the discourses around 
music and opera, and the ways that both are bound up in debates regarding the 
“scandals” of an operatic theatricality. 
 Tending to performance also directs my focus toward the performative aspect of 
texts and the rhetorical power of the voices revealed in them.  Like performative 
language, performative texts do something by saying something, though this action 
may actually disrupt meaning, or point toward meaning other than what is directly 
suggested by a text.  This disruption or dissolution, what I refer to, after Shoshana 
Felman, as a “scandal,” is brought about by the linguistic efficacy of the performative 
utterance, and constitutes bodies (as well as the body politic).  As I argue in Chapters 
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one and three, scandal undoes both the absolute sovereignty of language and the 
absolute intentionality of the speaking, singing (and writing) subject.   
 While reading Freud post-structurally grants agency to multiple registers of 
meaning in the text, listening for Freud considers the body of the subject, and thus 
grants agency to a performance space created by the text (in the broadest meaning of 
the term).  An emphasis upon listening directs attention toward an operatic space, a 
space where the text acts on both a theatrical and a performing level, creating 
potentially multiple registers of meaning.  Naming this resonant space “operatic” runs 
the risk of inviting potentially negative associations, given that opera is sometimes 
viewed as bombastic and over-the-top, a spectacle in the least favorable meaning of the 
term.  But as I explain below, “operatic” as I use it here is meant to open up the 
theatrical space in order to avow sounds and bodies, gestures as well as the corporeality 
of the speaker and the spectator.  A theatrical space that is operatic both acknowledges 
“scandal” and reads it as an undoing that is both inevitable and constitutive.   
 Despite the fact that as a model,  “theatricality” has productively opened up 
numerous modes of analysis, historically, the term invites predominantly negative 
connotations.  In fact, anti-theatricality, described by Jonas Barish as “a prejudice 
against the theater that goes as far back in European history as the theater itself can be 
traced” (1) has enjoyed significantly more scholarly influence than theatricality.  As I 
discuss in Chapter three, the origins of this anti-theatrical prejudice begin with Plato, in 
whose work one finds, “a haunting acknowledgement of the potency of the theater 
leading to an all the more stinging repudiation of it” (Barish 5).  Such repudiation arises 
from the mimetic illusion, or the doubleness between what is originary or “real” and 
the artist’s rendering, which can only ever be an inferior copy that is several times 
removed from the “truth” of the original.   
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 In the Austrian and German context, ideas about theatricality emerge in the 
nineteenth-century, most notably in Marx and Nietzsche (Weber 2).17 In Marx, 
theatricality becomes a helpful model for describing social and cultural formations, and 
in Nietzsche’s Die Geburt der Tragödie tragedy is claimed to be the ultimate art, though, 
of course, Nietzsche later “abandon[s] the theater only to denounce it” (Barish 400).  By 
the time Nietzsche writes Der Fall Wagner (1888) and Nietzsche contra Wagner (1889), he 
“stretches out a hand to the puritanical Plato of the Republic” to charge Wagner with 
“degrad[ing] into mimicry” (Barish 405) and “stand[ing] for everything cheap and 
specious in musical declamation” (Barish 406).  German historiography regarding the 
early twentieth century has adopted this overwhelmingly negative view of theatricality, 
to a large extent because of Theodor Adorno’s reading of Wagner in Versuch über 
Wagner.18  In the context of Vienna, theatricality is generally linked to the baroque and 
the theater of the absolute, which is to say, fascism.  My intention here is not to become 
an apologist for the strains of Wagnerian or the baroque theatricality found in Fascism, 
                                                 
17 Samuel Weber, whose Theatricality as Medium offers, in my view, the most 
rigorous examination of theatricality as a philosophical concept, states that in German 
thought, theatricality “emerges perhaps most significantly in the early part of the 
nineteenth century, in what might be called the ‘aftermath’ of the Hegelian 
philosophical system and the culmination of thought it entails [. . .] and it continues to 
mark the work of many of the most radical writer-thinkers of that century, such as Marx 
and Nietzsche, to name just the most obvious and influential” (2).   
 
18 The history of Adorno’s influence upon readings of Wagner is a fascinating 
subject. As the scholarship on the aesthetics and the politics of Richard Wagner 
continues to drive important intellectual debates—as seen, most recently in Slavoj 
Zizek’s foreword to Theodor Adorno’s recently republished In Search of Wagner, “Why 
is Opera Worth Saving?” and Alain Badiou’s Five Lessons on Wagner, for which Zizek 
penned the afterword, “Wagner, Anti-Semitism and ‘German Ideology,’—it is evident 
that the full impact of the political and libidinal economies of Wagner remain a central 
question.  See Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner, trans. Rodney Livingstone (NY: 
Vergo, 2010) and Alain Badiou, Five Lessons on Wagner, trans. Susan Spitzer (NY: Vergo, 
2010).    
 18 
but to differentiate constellations of theatricality in order to see it as a potentially 
constitutive sphere.  Freudian theatricality, in other words, is radically different from 
Wagnerian theatricality. 
 Despite Nietzsche’s profound ambivalence toward Richard Wagner, by the late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century, Wagner’s dramatic reforms had made it 
impossible for modernist thinkers to avoid thinking about theatricality (Puchner 32).19  
Whether artists loved or loathed Wagner, his innovations made attention to theater and 
theatricality a fundamental question of modernist work.  In Viennese cultural aesthetics, 
Wagner’s influence cannot be overstated.  After Wagner, composers emphatically 
sought new models of both harmonic and theatrical innovation.  The beginning of 
“Operatic Modernism,” which Michael Steinberg dates to directly after Wagner’s death, 
“seeks emancipation from the hold of Wagner, Wagnerism, and its nationalist 
mythology” (Steinberg 2006 631).  Operatic modernism is post-national, “European, 
international, and emancipatory,” in response to the  “historical and political referents 
[that, for Wagner, were] German, nationalistic, and hegemonic ” (Steinberg 2006 632).  
What makes German and other European opera post-Wagnerian, specifically, is how it 
comes to terms with Wagnerian theatricality.     
 
                                                 
19 In Stage Fright: Modernism, Anti-Theatricality, and Drama, comparatist Martin 
Puchner convincingly argues that Wagner’s reforms make theatricality a central concern 
for modernism writ large.  He states, “Wagner’s pivotal role with respect to modernism 
was transforming the concept of theatricality from a description of the theater as an art 
form--defining what happens onstage--into a value that must be either rejected or 
embraced.  With slight exaggeration one could claim that after Wagner it was no longer 
possible to take a neutral position with respect to the theater; after Wagner one had to 
declare one’s allegiance to the theater or come forward with a critique of its value.  Thus 
Wagner can be said to have polarized the cultural field of the later nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in Europe, and even outside Europe, around theatricality (32).” 
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 As I stated at the outset, this study is divided into two sections.  Chapters one 
and two discuss methodological considerations for thinking about voice in opera and 
sound in literature.  The second half discusses Freud’s relationship to music and his 
views on representation in the theater.  Chapter one addresses the materiality of voice 
in opera production, proposing a shift away from methodological models that posit 
voice as silent and disembodied towards one in which the body figures central.  I 
explain how in most theoretical models, voice inhabits the space of either excess or lack, 
and thus resides along side various forms of alterity at the margins of philosophy.  
Comparing the voice in opera with the voice of the performative utterance, I assess the 
relevance of performativity to opera studies, distinguishing between Derrida’s critique, 
after Heidegger, of the “metaphysics of presence” and the presence of performance.  
This leads to a discussion of the “force” of the vocal utterance and its relationship to the 
real via Shoshana Felman’s The Scandal of the Speaking Body.  My central argument is that 
voice upsets the model of distanced reason upon which enlightened subjectivity 
depends. 
 Although media studies has been a driving force behind much recent scholarship 
in the area of sound studies, in chapter two, I revisit the issue of sound and textuality 
vis-à-vis a critique of an expedition led by Friedrich Kittler to the coast of Italy to 
acoustically “verify” a sonic trace of Homer’s Sirens.  My critique of post-
structuralism’s over-attachment to the text takes a different turn here, in that I explore 
how sound can be present in a (silent) literary text; my intervention is thus a 
recuperation of textuality and the sonic remains therein.  Part of this intervention is a 
commentary on the fondness of media theory to fetishize technology, as though the text 
(or the song) itself is not a technological medium.  The other part of this intervention 
has to do with the sexual politics of media theory, which, at least in this case, lapses into 
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an unreflective masculine discourse in which “knowledge” emanates from the domain 
of the (male) theorist rather than the text.   
 My discussion of the Sirens episode in Homer’s Odyssey explores what a close 
reading of the text reveals about the textual status of sonic phenomena in general, and 
considers the temptation to embellish the absence of (live) resonance with a fiercely 
exaggerated iconography written after the fact.  Taking up Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
reading of the Sirens in The Dialectic of Enlightenment, this chapter attempts to articulate 
and to bridge the untenable divide between nature and culture.  Turning to Kafka’s Das 
Schweigen die Sirenen, I suggest that the tension between listening and reasoning is 
driven less by the silence in a text than in the politics of power and possession. 
   In chapter three, I turn to Freud’s “problem” with music, and to the text in which 
Freud states that he is “almost incapable” of enjoying music, “The Moses of 
Michelangelo.”  I argue that Freud’s problem with music is far more a problem with 
cultural anxieties around theatricality, and that Freud intentionally depicts himself as 
an ideal Platonic subject who, like Michaelangelo’s Moses, distances himself from the 
scandal of theatricality in order to demonstrate discipline and self-restraint.  By 
contextualizing Freud’s disavowal of music in the context of fin-de-Siècle Vienna, this 
chapter contends that the stakes of Freud’s self-representation as a textual thinker 
signals his distance from noise, sound, and music, which are coded as “dangerous,” 
“noisy,” and “Jewish.”  Freud’s self-fashioning as a rational scientist thus distances him 
from a line of thinking that Gregory Moore calls “chains of associations linking hysteria, 
histrionics and the Jew” in which both “modern music” and “theatricality” are highly 
loaded anti-Semitic signifiers.  That these particular chains of association are articulated 
in Nietzsche’s Der Fall Wagner is no coincidence, I argue, as Wagner’s theatricality is 
both the source and the consternation of Freud’s larger cultural concern.    
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 Chapter four directly addresses first Wagnerian and then Freudian theatricality, 
examining Freud’s relationship to the Wagnerian Cultural Politics of his Vienna, 
especially during his university years.  The first important intervention of this chapter 
has to do with Freud’s views on theatrical representation, which I examine through his 
work together with Max Graf; the second is the importance Freud attaches to the role of 
identification in the theatrical process.  I propose that Freud’s “Psychopathic Characters 
on the Stage” is written for Graf with not only opera, but in particular, Wagnerian opera 
in mind in an attempt to articulate a holistic representational model that is pointedly 
anti-Wagnerian.  Indeed, Freud’s introduction of identification into the theatrical 
process radically distances him from Wagnerism and the theatricality of what in 1906, 
Graf calls “Massenherrschaft”:  “Der Dramatiker [Wagner] kennt nur ein Ziel: [die] Menge 
unter seinen Willen zu zwingen” (110).  At stake for Freud is thus the relationship between 
theatrical representation and the building of community.  Freud’s own “theater of the 
future” should be read less as a statement about the aesthetics of the theater than as an 
aesthetics related to the crisis of modernity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE OPERATIC SCANDAL OF THE SINGING BODY: 
VOICE, PRESENCE, PERFORMATIVITY 
 
Vocal Impasse: The “Ventriloquist’s Dummy” 
 In her book Unsung Voices, arguably the strongest musicological 
consideration of voice in opera, Carolyn Abbate has shown that in Rousseau’s 
Essay on the Origin of Languages and Paul de Man’s critique thereof,  “both writers 
revert to music at a moment of crisis in the argument, a moment when proof fails 
and the discussion becomes a performance (18).  “Music” becomes a refuge for 
theoretical arguments that have reached a logical impasse. In a “linguistic 
universe,” Abbate states, music is turned into a “ventriloquist’s dummy, who can 
be made to speak any interpretation.”  In other words, discourse molds music to 
serve a particular purpose dictated not by the attributes of music, but by the 
structural necessity of theory.  Abbate’s work points towards the cleft not only 
between language and music, but also between language and the non-linguistic, 
those entities that can be heard but that “cannot speak for [themselves] in 
language.”20  In this context, Rousseau and de Man are only symptoms of a larger 
                                                 
 20 Abbate states that music ‘ possesses a meaning that is notoriously 
indefinable’, a position that gestures towards Vladimir Jankélévitch’s description 
of music as ‘ the ineffable’. I think of this somewhat differently, for the task, it 
seems, is not to provide a definition of what music is or what it ‘ represents’, but to 
investigate both what it does and how it produces meanings on multiple registers. 
In terms of what music does, I am thinking specifically along the lines of 
performativity, and as regards meaning production, of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s 
description of the “phenomena contributing to the constitution of meaning without 
being meaning themselves”. See Gumbrecht, “A Farewell to Interpretation,” in 
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intellectual problem in which the logic of the text is both pervasive and 
constitutive. Textuality so permeates the language of modernity—and at its core 
the ideology of European Enlightenment—that a methodological analysis of non-
textual modes of knowledge and perception is both a conceptual and linguistic 
challenge.  
 While the “literary turn” directed the attention of opera studies toward 
libretti and toward other elements of opera productions that can be read—“for 
example,” says David Levin, “the music, the stage directions, and the preparation, 
presentation, and reception of the work, in short, texts”(4-5)—in this chapter I 
propose that opera calls for a negotiation of discursive systems that fall outside the 
realm of textuality.  This proposal could hardly be called a critique of reading, for it 
is precisely the act of reading opera’s texts closely that has exposed this art form’s 
“competing modes of complicated referentiality” and their attendant difficulties 
(Levin 10). What I am after here, rather, is something that a preoccupation with 
reading as the legitimate mode of analysis and the resulting metaphysics of the text 
largely overlook because they forget to listen: how a resonant voice acts and how it 
participates in the creation, disruption or dissolution of registers of meaning 
independent of linguistic signification.  In a philosophical world that brackets 
opera as a special form of artistic production—and voice its infamous peculiarity—
it is precisely this peculiarity that scandalizes the metaphysics of the text.  I do not 
wish to denigrate analyses of referentiality or to advocate an abandonment of 
                                                 
Materialities of Communication, ed. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer 
(Stanford, 1994), 398.  See also Vladimir Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, trans. 
Carolyn Abbate (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003). 
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interpretation, but to examine how attending to a resonant voice further 
complicates those already very difficult tasks.  
 Of course, voice has long been a topic of philosophical concern, though like 
“music” in Rousseau and de Man, the term often stands in as a place-marker for 
something unarticulated or inarticulable, taking on a rhetorical task in the service 
of a theoretical argument and thus performing rather than meaning. In recent years 
scholarship outside of opera studies has become increasingly aware of the 
discrepancy between the “metaphorization of the voice” and “its material 
articulation and audibility,” especially as media theory has granted agency to 
forms of media other than the scriptural and the technological.21 As the human 
voice emerges as a philosophical problem at the very core of modernity, I want to 
remove the parentheses from opera in order to allow the operatic voice to speak to 
(or to sing to) the theoretical problem I have described.  
 In the context of opera studies, however, this move is complicated by  
problematic interpretive traditions. For one, opera studies is deeply invested in 
theories of vocal disembodiment. Furthermore, in methods of analysis that have 
been key to many post-structural readings of opera, voice, and operatic mise-en-
scène, especially (though sometimes only implicitly) Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
Derridean deconstruction, voice is less a “ventriloquist’s dummy” than a marker of 
the impasses within these theories. Both Lacan and Derrida rely on a vacillation 
between the extremes of either excess and lack or presence and absence to create a 
foundational tension between subjects and objects, and it is precisely at the hazy 
                                                 
 21 See Cornelia Epping-Jäger and Erika Linz, “Einleitung,” Medien/Stimmen, 
ed. Epping-Jäger and Linz (Cologne, 2003). 7–15.  
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limits of these extremes that “voice” comes into play. As such, the term marks a 
seemingly always inadmissible value at the cost of becoming devoid of content and 
paradoxically silent. Like the material body, historically laden with gendered and 
racial attributes, voice slips surreptitiously into a position of silent alterity, 
strangely disenfranchised from corporeality and unable to resound.  
 While fields outside of musicology have begun to take a keen interest in the 
materiality and audibility of voice, opera studies has given the idea scant attention, 
as though voice were only a minor feature of the art form. Despite the central role 
of the singer’s body in the production of opera and the production of voice, opera 
studies persists in thinking of voice as extra-corporeal. Carnal voices are either 
lacking or absent, marked by what they do not do, operative through failure or 
negativity, or envisioned as supra-objects that are off the scale, excessively loud 
(and thus impossible to register or to be perceived as material) and potentially 
“violent.”  As for the body of the singer, opera studies has tended to ignore it 
altogether unless it possesses currency as the object of desire or of a fetish. And 
when this happens, both the body and voice of the singer become secondary to the 
affect or erotic desire of the spectator.  
 The conviction that the operatic voice operates primarily on the registers of 
excess and lack and that it is both immaterial and disembodied, so widespread in 
opera studies, stems largely from the role assigned to voice in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis.22 In this chapter I take a decided step back from the Lacanian 
                                                 
 22 Space constraints preclude an exegesis here of the function of the voice in 
either Lacanian psychoanalysis or in those musicological texts that draw on Lacan 
and his readers.  In general, however, I would advocate a more critical use of the 
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tradition, turning instead towards voice as it appears in theories of performativity 
and in deconstruction’s critique of performativity.  I make this move not because 
psychoanalysis is uninteresting or irrelevant to an interpretation of opera; on the 
contrary. But it is worth remembering that what interests Lacan is the role of the 
voice in the constitution of the subject’s unconscious, a function to which the 
(material) aesthetics of the operatic voice should certainly not be reduced or 
limited.23 Indeed, it is remarkable that in Lacanian theory, voice is both a 
metaphorical and literal “gap.” In a noteworthy symbolic gesture, Dylan Evans 
omits an entry for the term in his Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 
signaling that he grants it no agency significant enough to warrant an 
acknowledgement by name.  At the same time, Evans defines “gap” as a 
“fundamental rupture between man and nature,” explaining that in French, gap 
                                                 
idea of vocal “disembodiment” in opera studies. Kaja Silverman’s The Acoustic 
Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, 1988) has been widely influential, and although Silverman was one of 
the first scholars to acknowledge the importance of voice in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, it would be productive to revisit both Lacan and Silverman’s 
reading of him taking into account the correctives of later readers such as Joan 
Copjec and Ellie Ragland. See Copjec, Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists ( 
Cambridge and London, 1994 ); and Ragland, “The Relation Between the Voice and 
the Gaze”, in Reading Seminar XI. Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink and Maire Jaanus (Albany, 1995), 
187–203.  
 
 23 What is it about voice that lends itself to the particular dynamics of excess 
and lack? Because voice is both abstract and material, it conveniently 
accommodates a task that is both elusive and concrete. Voice is like water, a 
material that can be held in hand, but never held fast. In its magical fluidity, voice 
is inextricably bound up with the condition of language, and yet is something more 
than language that is impossible to pin down or to control. Lacanian theory acts 
out the unconscious wish to bind the body to language while at the same time 
performing the impossibility of controlling voice through either language or 
theory. Somehow voice and its body always elude capture.  
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(béance), “is an antiquated literary term that means a “large hole or opening,’” but 
that it “is also a scientific term used in medicine to denote the opening of the 
larynx” (Evans 71).  Given that the larynx is the upper part of the trachea 
containing the vocal chords, Evans (after Lacan) slips, in effect, from gap (béance), 
to large hole, to vocal anatomy—a slip that for Lacan can be no accident.  When 
Ellie Ragland states that the voice operates “at the level of real impasses, 
functioning as a nodal point (or a knot of meanings) unassimilated in knowledge 
as such,” (187) her claim is broadly applicable, an important point to which I shall 
return.  
 Whether drawing from the psychoanalytic or deconstructive tradition, the 
difficult task when examining opera performance is to find a productive method 
with which to grapple with the operatic “real”: “real” voice, “real” music, “real” 
body, all those elements to which one might less problematically refer as opera’s 
material.  Abbate has consistently called for such a focus, suggesting already over a 
decade ago that voice be “embodied within the live performance of a work” 
(Unsung X).  From the perspective of performance studies, however, it seems 
contradictory to call for vocal embodiment and then to call voices “unsung.” 
Where are the spoken voices, the sung voices, the emanating voices that can be 
heard? In her more recent book In Search of Opera, Abbate reiterates that 
performance is fundamental to the operatic making of music, but then constructs 
voice as either a “dead object” that resonates with the “master voice” of the 
composer or as an excessive force that she refers to as a “violent physical 
resonance” (Search 5-6).  While Abbate has advocated for a bridge between the 
musical “work” and the materiality of performance for some time, her theoretical 
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strategies tend to relegate voice to conceptual extremes in order to avoid grappling 
with vocal material.24  The bridge between a “work” and the materiality of 
performance could well become what the field of opera studies is best poised to 
articulate, however, because opera performance calls for a critical engagement that 
both reads and listens, analyses and experiences. The impetus for this chapter 
comes, then, from the promise of opera. Although opera scholars have been 
ambitious in engaging with the theoretical interventions of post-structuralism, 
critical theory’s predominant focus on visuality and textuality has created some 
assumptions about voice and body that opera’s potential (theoretical) critique 
might both contest and undo.  
 The problem with the construction of voice as at once substantively absent 
and violently present is that it unintentionally adopts a logic parallel to the 
European Enlightenment’s construction of the “noble savage,” who is marked by 
timelessness, mysteriousness, femininity, barbarism, and an inevitable violence 
that must be contained, “mitigated through control of a superior culture” (Antliff 
and Leighton 179). Thinking of voice as possessed by the “master’s voice” takes 
away the performer’s agency to participate in the creative and interpretative 
process and neglects its material effects in anything but their most destructive 
manifestation. Of course, the suspicion that sound somehow disrupts reason is far 
older than the Enlightenment: Abbate finds it in Orpheus, whose decapitated but 
still singing head she calls a “master symbol for performance,” a “dead object” that 
“is a musical instrument, an object given life as long as a master plays it” (Abbate, 
                                                 
 24 Abbate, “Music–Drastic or Gnostic?” Critical Inquiry, 30 (Spring 2004), 505–
536. 
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In Search of Opera, 5–6). Underlying vocal resonance in opera is thus a seemingly 
always primary violence, a “savage” dismemberment and decapitation by 
unreason that is then mitigated by reason: classical music or the “master voice” of 
the composer.25 Musical resonance and especially the singing voice remain 
potentially “violent,” but are either domesticated by music or placed in a theatrical 
cage to guarantee “safe” exhibition by the distanced spectator.  
 Abbate cannot be taken to task for naming an unsavory cultural fantasy, and 
her discussions of literary, filmic and operatic instances in which voice becomes a 
“dead object” are compelling. But rather than see these examples as evidence of a 
cultural fascination with the powers and problems of voice, she conflates cultural 
fascination with reality, assuming that artistic portrayals of voice as a “dead object” 
render it a “dead object” in live performance:  
One must not forget the obverse, the persistent vision of performers 
as dead matter, subject to mortification and reanimation. This vision 
is not just an outrageous fantasy, in which anxieties about 
performers‘ real power have given rise to unpleasant falsifications. 
Certain realities of performance lend credence to its assumptions 
about deadness and artificial life. (Abbate, In Search of Opera 9) 
We are left wondering precisely which “realities of performance” reinforce this 
idea of operatic deadness, or why a “persistent vision of performers as dead 
matter” in fictional works should be equated with the voice and operatic 
                                                 
 25 Confounding these problems in Abbate’s most recent work is the fact that 
she frames her analysis as grounded in a discourse of ethics, guided specifically by 
the moral philosophy of Jankélévitch. See Abbate, “Music–Drastic or Gnostic?” and 
Carolyn Abbate, “Jankélévitch’s Singularity.” 
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performance. In a roundabout way Abbate seems to gesture towards the complex 
web of consciousness, the experience and ontology of being that is teased out by 
voice, music, and operatic performance—a very important move, to be sure—but 
stops short of conceiving of voice as a constitutive force in this web or of opera as 
an art form that can enliven debates about the ontology of being, both in and out of 
live performance.  
 Turning toward operatic performance is surely the right impulse for 
exploring ways to think about material voices that resound, though simply turning 
does not necessarily help us out of the textual conundrum I have described. 
Interpretations that set a particular operatic mise-en-scène in relief against the 
work “itself’ have become a common strategy for teasing out manifest and latent 
contents of a work and its performance. But rather than asking what a work and a 
performance are, or how a specific staging illuminates or comments on aspects of a 
work’s meaning, we might examine what a performance does; that is, how a 
performance generates or disrupts levels of meaning by doing. The two approaches 
are not mutually exclusive, although hermeneutic readings of opera have tended to 
overlook issues of performativity because they search for an ultimate truth that can 
be either represented or somehow excavated through a live staging. Being attentive 
to performativity means looking for ways that performance may expose “truth” by 
disruption as well as complementarity.  
 It is perhaps performativity’s avowal of disruption that has caused the term 
to be so over-used, the notion of “performativity” incorrectly used to stand in for 
performances and interpretations in which “anything goes.” Abbate is thus 
skeptical about the relevance of performativity to musical performance, calling it a 
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“catchword” and noting that it generally yields insights having to do with 
textuality, and thus “misses a mark not so easy to define (Abbate, “Music–Drastic 
or Gnostic?” 507–8.) She proposes attending to live performance, assuming that 
this provides direct access to the operatic “real,” as though liveness were the 
condition that creates the possibility for direct access, and as if the ontology of the 
“real” musical object were conceptually self-evident. This is an awkward stance, 
and not only because performativity is so central to discussions of liveness in 
performance studies. Abbate relies on multiply repeated phrases such as “actual 
live,” “actual performance,” “real performance,” “the event itself,” and especially 
“real music,” without once calling the status of the “real” into question. This 
circumvents several of the most prominent and unresolved philosophical debates 
of the twentieth century, including the notorious problem of the “metaphysics of 
presence.” Alive to the danger, Abbate attempts to pre-empt objections by warning 
that adopting a deconstructive apparatus and scoffing at presence like a man can 
truly seem perverse when real music is at issue. Unlike another aural 
phenomena—language or literature in oral form—real music does not propose a 
“simultaneity of sound and sense” that in thus positing a signifier and signified 
can itself be “convincingly deconstruct[ed].” Real music is a temporal event with 
material presence that can be held by no hand. So why assume that musical sound 
made in time by the labor of performance is well served by recourse to a 
philosophical tradition that indeed deconstructs presence, but does so easily 
because it traffics exclusively in metaphysical objects?  (Abbate, ‘ Music–Drastic or 
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Gnostic?’531) 26 However, it is worth recalling that deconstruction’s critique is of 
presence less than of “the metaphysics of presence.”  And while “presence” may 
have a very different valence in studies of music, music’s difference does not make 
it immune to a nuanced and differentiated post-structuralist critique. Rather than 
reject post-structuralism out of hand, it seems more productive not to yet again 
bracket music and especially opera as “special cases,” but to allow their differences 
to speak to the problems of post-structuralism: to lend an ear, so to speak, to those 
who have been less adept at listening. For the problems that listening exposes offer 
a critique that is as relevant and urgent to the materiality of language as it is to 
music. Abbate isolates music from post-structuralism because “phenomena that are 
events may not be particularly susceptible to a philosophical tradition in which the 
metaphysics of the subject or insights of Saussurean linguistics are basic 
sustenance” (Abbate on Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Jean-Luc Nancy, in ‘ Music–
Drastic or Gnostic?’ 531). But “phenomena that are events” are precisely what 
performance studies addresses without rejecting post-structuralism or cordoning 
itself off from theoretical affinities not designed with “events” in mind. Opera 
studies might gain by following this lead rather than embracing “performance” on 
the one hand while ignoring the scholarship of performance studies on the other. 
The questions that emerge are what is to be done with “the real” and what is the 
status of performance’s “material” if it is not to become reductively subjective or 
empirically deterministic.  
                                                 
 26 The passages quoted by Abbate are from Henry M. Sayre, The Object of 
Performance: The American Avant-Garde since 1970 (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 
1989).   
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Voice and Performative Utterance  
The concept of performative utterance, formulated almost half a century ago by J. 
L. Austin, describes an utterance “in which to say something is to do something; or 
in which by saying or in saying something we are doing something” (12). But 
Austin was lamentably silent on the role of the voice. How is the voice that 
resounds related to Austin’s notion of utterance, and how does it function for those 
who take up Austin’s questions about performativity? If it is possible to do 
something by saying something, then it must be possible to do something by 
singing something; but how does the status of the utterance change according to 
the register of resonance? And what exactly does the vocal utterance do if this 
doing is not a linguistic act?  
 The category of performativity opens up a space in which to interrogate acts 
of utterance as material events and to investigate the effects of those events. Simply 
put, a performative orientation potentially redirects the term “utter” from its use as 
an adjective meaning “extreme, absolute, complete, entire, total” to a verb that 
denotes, in The Oxford English Dictionary’s first definition, “to put . . . forth or upon 
the market.”  The conceptual shift from adjective to verb is crucial. As a verb, “to 
utter” indicates an agency to act, to put something of substance into circulation. 
Hence, “to utter” must happen in tandem with a medium—bodily or otherwise—
that undertakes the action of the verb, for the act requires an actor. Of course, the 
medium that utters could be a technological apparatus used to reproduce, replay, 
amplify, simulate or even distort the mode of utterance. The medium at work in 
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opera performance, however, is the carnal body, the Urmedium of the live speech 
act.27  
 The means by which this Urmedium brings forth the live speech act is the 
human voice. Although the term “voice” is generally employed without 
explanation or modification, its meanings within theoretical discourse are neither 
apparent nor stable. In theoretical language, “voice” appears to operate in three 
registers: first and most common is the first-person singular voice of the subject 
that often substitutes for identity and subjectivity. This category includes the 
individual voice, the narrative voice, and the authorial voice that reveals interiority 
and carves out distinctions between individual and collective bodies. Second is the 
voice that emanates from outside the subject, the voice that calls the subject into 
being. This appears as the voice of God, the Althusserian hail, “hey, you there!” 
that names the individual as a subject of ideology, or the voice of the Other in 
Lacan that calls the subject into law.28 For both Lacan and Althusser, voice is 
associated with a performative act fundamentally tied to the voice of ideology or 
law. Mladen Dolar likens it to the sounding of the shofar at religious ritual, 
proclaiming that, “there is no Law without the voice” (27).  
 Most important for my purposes is a third type of voice, a multiplicitous 
voice that emanates as force. The force of a performative utterance has been 
                                                 
 27 Bernhard Waldenfels calls voice an “Urmedium” in his “Stimme als 
Leitfaden des Leibes” in Epping-Jäger and Linz. 
 
 28 According to Althusser, voice names the subject and calls him into being, 
though he is interpellated into ideology specularly. See Louis Althusser, “Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, ed. 
Ben Brewster (New York, 1971), 127–86.  
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interpreted as causing effect or injury according to the impact of its meaning and 
has thus been linked to power and to violence. Force, or what one might refer to as 
simply “linguistic efficacy,” is seen as dependent on some kind of context—either 
social or linguistic—because meaning is not absolute. For Austin the force of a 
performative utterance is reliant on social context, for Pierre Bourdieu on social 
power and vested authority, and for Derrida on a break from linguistic structure.29 
But the nature of that vocal force is surely altered when the performative act is 
non-linguistic. Force thus concerns not only linguistic efficacy, but also matter and 
energy. The third type of voice can thus be heard as having two separate aspects: 
the voice that is constituted by matter and the voice that engenders material effect. 
Derrida refers to the first of these as “sonorous substance,”  “the physical voice,” 
the “body of speech in the world” (16). The second is the voice that is implicated by 
the bodily force of performative utterance in the theories of Shoshana Felman and 
Judith Butler, and, in particular, in what Felman refers to as the “scandal of the 
speaking body” (5) 
 The bodily force of performative utterance needs to be distinguished from 
the trope of “violent force” found in post-structuralist critiques of language that 
                                                 
 29 In addition to Austin, see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 
trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, 1977), and Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic 
Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, 1991); Jacques 
Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in Limited INC, trans. Samuel Weber and 
Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston 1988), 1–23. This essay first appeared in English 
translation in Glyph I (1977). It also appears, translated by Alan Bass, in Jacques 
Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (Chicago, 1982). For a discussion of “force” as it 
relates to performative utterance, see Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the  
Performative (New York and London, 1997).  
 
 36 
collapse the categories of power, force and violence.30 While a number of scholars 
have taken an interest in the potential of language to inflict violence on the body, 
all too often the “violence” associated with vocal resonance (as distinct from the 
linguistic force of “speech”) is constructed as a destructive force laden with 
“primitivist” undertones that can be traced at least to the Enlightenment, and 
specifically to the “ideological construct of colonial conquest and exploitation” 
(Antliff and Leighton 170).31 If the voice in operatic performance produces a 
material effect of the body on the body—and here I mean body in the broadest 
sense, from the body on the stage to the body politic—it remains to be seen to what 
extent this effect can be thought of as a constitutive force in the artistic process. 
Indeed, if the force of vocal resonance does violence to anything, it is to the 
absolute sovereignty of language and thus the absolute intentionality of the 
speaking subject. The undoing of absolute sovereignty is not a violently destructive 
act, an act that inflicts pain or injury, but an act that undoes pain and injury. It is a 
constructive—even revolutionary—act that hinders absolutism, an act constitutive 
of the subject coming into being. Rather than put “philosophy out of commission,” 
what opera does, ultimately, is to present philosophy with a fundamental scandal 
by calling into question the very sovereignty of reason.  
                                                 
 30 For an outline of the matrix power–force–violence, see Beatrice Hanssen, 
“The Violence of Language,” in Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and 
Critical Theory (London and New York, 2000), 158–85.  
 
 31 For works on the violent potential of language, see Butler, Excitable Speech; 
Mari J. Matsuda, et al., eds., Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory,  
Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Boulder, 1993); Elaine Scarry, The Body in 
Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York, 1985).  
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 The brilliance of Austin’s philosophy of language lies in his distinction 
between constative utterance and performative utterance. For Austin, the context 
of enunciation is what allows for the felicity of performative utterances; utterances 
can be felicitous only inasmuch as they fulfill the socially recognized conditions 
that determine their success. This is the point around which Derrida begins what 
Stanley Cavell refers to as his “virulently influential” ( ) reading of Austin in 
“Signature Event Context,” the springboard for the famously contentious debate 
between Derrida and John Searle, as well as the point Bourdieu takes up in his 
development of the concept of bodily “habitus.” Ultimately, Austin’s project is 
explicitly concerned with linguistic effect, not vocal effect: he suggests the 
possibility of acting with words, not voice. Nevertheless, voice must be wrapped up 
in achieving linguistic effect, even if Austin fails to account for its participation in 
the act of utterance. As a condition of enunciation, the manner in which an 
utterance is spoken—whether whispered, snarled, screamed, murmured, hissed or 
mumbled—must surely enter into the equation of its variability, for manner is 
ultimately part and parcel of what makes an utterance felicitous or infelicitous. 
Whereas in deconstruction and psychoanalysis the voice does not need to raise 
itself—it can remain an internal or even unconscious monologue, never needing to 
“utter” or to expose itself—in Austin it cannot stay quiet. It must say something in 
order to act.  
 Shoshana Felman’s reading of Austin in The Literary Speech Act comes much 
closer to implicating the agency of voice in the performative act inasmuch as she 
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emphasizes that a speech act is a bodily act.32 For her, in fact, the speech act cannot 
be an act without the body. Because her understanding of performativity comes as 
much from the philosophy of language as from psychoanalysis, Felman recognizes 
that the body participates in every human act, speech or otherwise, to reveal 
something other than what is revealed intentionally by the ego through language. 
In her study of Austin and the figure of Don Juan, the crux of the matter is the 
infelicitous relationship between language and body, which constantly conspire 
against each other:  
If the problem of the human act thus consists in the relation between 
 language and body, it is because the act is conceived—by performative 
 analysis as well as by psychoanalysis—as that which problematizes at one 
 and the same time the separation and the opposition between the two. The 
act, an enigmatic and problematic production of the speaking body, destroys from its 
inception the metaphysical dichotomy between the domain of the “mental” and the 
domain of the “physical,” breaks down the opposition between body and spirit, 
between matter and language. (65)   
 Thus for Felman performative language is less a speech act than an 
“encounter . . . between act and language” (66). She calls this encounter 
“scandalous” because the body always and inevitably undermines intentional 
language. That is, the unconscious inserts itself through the body’s physical 
                                                 
 32 Felman’s emphasis on the body has a noteworthy history given the recent 
reissue of her book in English under the literally translated title of the French, Le 
Scandale du corp parlant, rather than the title under which first English edition was 
published: The Literary Speech Act. Having “lost the body in its initial translation,” 
Felman’s book, according to Judith Butler, “regains its body with this publication, 
which is just, since the body is crucial.”  See Butler, “Afterword,” (113–23).  
 
 39 
comportment to do and to undo language. As Judith Butler puts it, “the speech act 
says more, or says differently, than it means to say”(10). This is absolutely crucial, 
partly because it is precisely the point that Derrida gets wrong in his critique of 
Austin.  
 When Austin defines conditions for the success of a performative utterance, 
Derrida accuses him of discovering “an exhaustively definable context, of a free 
consciousness present to the totality of the operation, and of absolutely meaningful 
speech [vouloir-dire] master of itself: the teleological jurisdiction of an entire field 
whose organizing center remains intention” (Derrida Signature 15). Derrida’s 
larger charge here, of course, is that Austin’s felicitous performatives smack of the 
“metaphysics of presence” that Derrida has struggled so hard to undo. In other 
words, Derrida thinks that Austin’s felicitous speech act is felicitous in that it 
purports to know exactly what it does and thus relies on a facetiously absolute 
foundation that makes the speaker the “master” of his aims.  
 In fact, Felman demonstrates that Austin’s discovery achieves precisely the 
opposite. Felman generously (and only indirectly) attributes Derrida’s mistake to a 
problem in translation, a “missed encounter—between English and French,” 
although she also remarks that those missing each other articulate these encounters 
“in their Donjuanian fashion” and characterizes the exchange between British and 
“continental” philosophers as a “dialogue of the deaf.” Reading Austin, Felman 
and Derrida back to back, one gets the sense that Derrida also acts with his 
language, though his is an act in the sense of “acting out.” The aggressivity with 
which he responds to Austin and the fact that this aggressive stance has for many 
years dominated the reception of Austin’s theory makes one wonder just what 
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unconscious truth lies deeply buried in Austin’s text. What is it in Austin that 
Derrida (and many of his followers) feel unconsciously compelled to repress?  
 Though they approach similar problems in markedly different ways, both 
Derrida and Austin are invested in unseating absolute philosophical foundations. 
The major difference between the two, however, is the disruption of knowledge 
through the status of the body. Felman proposes that in Austin the scandal consists 
in the fact that the act cannot know what it is doing, that the act (of language) 
subverts both consciousness and knowledge (of language). The “unconscious” is 
the discovery, not only of the radical divorce or breach between act and 
knowledge, between constative and performative, but also (and in this lies the 
scandal of Austin’s ultimate discovery) of their undecidability and their constant 
interference (67).  Here the speech act is not only tied to the body; the body 
imposes its own agency on the linguistic act. An utterance may be guided by 
knowledge, meaning and intent, but the body constantly interferes with those 
registers, inserting its own “knowledge,” “meaning” and “intent,” and thus 
tempering and tampering with the speech act. Butler explains it this way:  “Insofar 
as a speech act knows not what it does, the claim is a kind of performative, a form 
of doing, that is clearly not the product of the sovereign ‘I’, a doing at odds with an 
intending, in persistent divergence from itself” (Afterword 120-121). In Felman’s 
reading of Austin, that which causes interference, that disrupts the “sovereign I,” is 
corporeality. Derrida’s difficulty, it would seem, is not with Austin’s philosophy, 
but with his insistence that what disrupts philosophy is not of the mind at all. It is 
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corporeality out of control, awkward bodies that disrupt the priority of thought, 
and oftentimes when we least expect it.33 
 If in many ways Felman pulls out all the stops in her reading of Austin, 
Butler is much more tentative. For Butler, the scandal produced by the body in the 
speech act is what produces “the excess in speech that must be read along with, 
and often against, the propositional content of what is said” (Butler 152).  Herein, 
then, lies a crucial difference between Felman and Butler. While Butler 
acknowledges that the speech act communicates on the bodily level, for her the 
“excess” of the speech act is inevitably something non-corporeal: either desire or 
meaning. In Butler, the body remains crucial inasmuch as it participates in (the 
disruption of) signification. Thus, the body (and the voice) ultimately remain 
locked in service of the metaphysical, veering cautiously away from substance and 
immediacy. Given her concern for the subject’s negotiation of social and political 
space, it is striking that Butler avoids the very means by which the subject’s body 
negotiates these boundaries.  
 Felman, on the other hand, avows both bodily matter and the materiality of 
bodily effects, although for her, as for Butler, voice remains unattached to the body. 
Felman is right to call the body the “instrument” of speech, but what is the agency 
                                                 
 33 Julia A. Walker has argued that Derrida’s anti-performative bias is partly 
due to the negative influence of Antonin Artaud’s “Theatre of Cruelty,” which 
Derrida believed promoted an immediate form of (bodily) representation marked 
by the “metaphysics of presence.” Walker points out that Derrida fails to account 
for the differences between speech and writing, and argues, as I do, that both 
“vocal” and “pantomimic signification” can create, augment, and/or reverse the 
presumed meaning of words by calling upon bodily comportment, gesture, and 
affect.” See her “Why Performance? Why Now? Textuality and the Rearticulation 
of Human Presence,” Yale Journal of Criticism, 16/1 ( 2003 ), 149–75 
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of voice as part of this instrument? What are the effects of voice, as contained 
within or opposed to the effects of the generic category “body,” and how are these 
effects measurable? How, for example, are tone, pitch and intonation in their own 
way “scandalous”? How does the voice act performatively, apart from merely 
being the (silent) vehicle for the utterance? As anyone who has ever heard opera 
knows, the singing voice has moments where it tears language apart, or tears itself 
apart from language. Certainly the voice as well as and in addition to the body, 
says more, or says differently, than it means to say.  
 
Voice, Presence and the “Metaphysics of Presence” 
Although orthodox Derridaeans might dismiss my frustrations as guided by an 
impossible quest for a voice tainted by the “metaphysics of presence,” a careful 
reading of Derrida is required in order to ascertain to what extent this criticism 
might be valid. For Derrida, as for Lacan, the status of the voice has to do with the 
relationship between subject and object. This relationship is explored in Speech and 
Phenomena, in which Derrida criticizes Husserl’s reliance on voice as a transcendent 
category in the establishment of a theory of signs.34  In Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations, the crux of the matter is how language produces meaning through 
the “indicative” and the “expressive,” or, the status of the subject in relation to the 
object.  Derrida’s critique centers on Husserl’s insistence on “the unity of thought 
and voice in logos” (74) a.k.a. “logocentrism.” Derrida counters Husserl’s claim by 
positing that “the prerogative of being cannot withstand the deconstruction of the 
                                                 
 34 Coincidentally, a literal translation of Derrida’s title in the original French, 
La Voix et le phénomène, would read: Voice and Phenomena.  
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word,” an act that exposes “an unfailing complicity . . . between idealization and 
speech [voix]” (74). 
 According to Derrida, Husserl’s theory of signs presupposes the following 
illusion: “Phonic signs (‘acoustical images’ in Saussure’s sense, or the 
phenomenological voice) are heard [entendus = ‘heard’ plus ‘ ‘understood’] by the 
subject who proffers them in the absolute proximity of their present” (76).  David 
Allison usefully characterizes the “phenomenological voice” as “the silent speech 
[that] stands as a pure phenomenon,” not to be confused with “the actually uttered 
sound complex itself” (xl). The “complicity” between “voice and ideality” to which 
Derrida takes exception stems from the idea that “[w]hen I speak, it belongs to the 
phenomenological essence of this operation that I hear myself [je m’entende] at the 
same time that I speak. The signifier, animated by my breath and by the meaning-
intention . . . is in absolute proximity to me” (77). This sense of proximity produces 
the illusion of “auto-affection,” or, in other words, Husserl’s fallacy that “the unity 
of sound and voice . . . is the sole case to escape the distinction between what is 
worldly and what is transcendental” (79). To counter this fallacy, Derrida proposes 
that the “theme of a pure inwardness of speech,” or of the “hearing oneself speak,” 
“is radically contradicted by ‘time itself’” (86).  “Time,” Derrida states, “cannot be 
an ‘absolute subjectivity’ precisely because it cannot be conceived on the basis of a 
present and the self-presence of a present being” (86).  “Difference,” the name 
Derrida gives for “the operation of differing which at one and the same time both 
fissures and retards presence,” shatters Husserl’s illusion of the “metaphysics of 
presence.”  
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 It would be difficult to contradict Derrida’s critique of the “metaphysics of 
presence,” but, indeed, it is not necessary to do so in order to negotiate the 
immense hurdle that it places before a potential critique of what one might call 
“the logic of absence” that has emerged in its place. What Derrida critiques is the 
founding of metaphysics on the illusion of presence—that is, what Leonard Lawlor 
calls the “valorization of presence” or “presence as a foundation”—not necessarily 
the ontology of presence, a category that must be further interrogated. Lawlor 
points out that the metaphysics of presence “has decided that the meaning of being 
is presence either as subject or of object or as their unity,” but that Derrida “never 
contests the founding validity of presence: there can be no foundation without 
presence” (2-3). Although Derrida convincingly makes the case that the subject’s 
experience of an absolute presence in speech is an illusion, Derrida does not claim 
that experience is a fallacy. To claim that time is ruptured and that an event does 
not happen in an immediately present time does not deny that an event happens in 
time; one cannot throw out the concept of temporality altogether. One must 
differentiate between a “metaphysics of presence” and a philosophical analysis of 
material events, even as we acknowledge that there is no experience of material 
events in a present time that is fundamentally absolute.  
 The material event—the materiality of voice—seems to be where Derrida is 
headed when he states near the final words of his essay:  “It remains, then, for us to 
speak, to make our voices resonate throughout the corridors in order to make up for 
[suppléer] the breakup of presence” (104).  Although Derrida’s position on the voice 
has been reduced to the very theory he critiques, a careful reading of his work 
reveals a difference between Derrida and the “Derrida effect,” or even 
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deconstruction at large, which haphazardly dismisses voice in exchange for the 
primacy of literature.35  (Derrida himself at times also falls prey to such euphoria.) 
The question becomes: if absolute presence is ruptured, how do we define the 
temporality and the presence that take its place?  
 It is important to state once again that this critique of voice revolves around 
a quiet, unspoken voice directly tied to consciously intended meaning. Derrida 
states very clearly that “it is not in the sonorous substance or in the physical voice, 
in the body of speech in the world, that [Husserl] will recognize an original affinity 
with the logos in general” (16).  We have also seen that there is another resonant 
voice, a discursive voice that underscores or undermines meaning; a voice, in 
Derrida’s words, “that makes up for the break up of presence.” This (resonant) 
voice is directly related to presence, but perhaps in its non-metaphysical variety, if 
this type of presence is conceivable. It can be both silent and resonant, it can act in 
concert with language and independent of language, it can be both physical and 
metaphysical. Nor can it be split into simple dualities because it can operate on 
numerous registers simultaneously: as part of language and yet apart from or 
against language, in the service of metaphysics and yet apart from or against 
metaphysics. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Derrida calls the voice “richly and 
profoundly enigmatic” (15).  Voice’s enigma, quite simply, is that it is always 
potentially and profoundly multiplicitious.  
                                                 
 35 For example, in hi influential essay on voice, “The Object Voice,” Mladen 
Dolar has Derrida stand in for Husserl. Dolar states: “Derrida’s deconstructive turn 
deprives the voice of its ineradicable ambiguity by reducing it to the ground of the 
illusory presence, while the Lacanian account tries to disentangle from its core the 
object as an interior obstacle to self-presence” (16).  
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 If voice appears as excessive in cultural fantasies, it is likely because of this 
multiplicity, this tendency to suggest excess over and above meaning, a slippage to 
something other or something more than what is at first evident, a potential 
scandal waiting to unfold. Voice’s “more than” or “other than” is perhaps what 
inspires Doris Kolesch to identify voice as a carrier of an other, or a fundamental 
alterity, always itself and potentially something else.  As such, cultural conceptions 
about identity and cultural projections about that which constitutes self and other 
easily stick to it. This is why “finding one’s voice” is always the first move in 
identity politics: a first step of the culturally disenfranchised towards identifying 
and empowering the self by distinguishing or redrawing the boundaries between 
self and other. The cultural mappings of identity and alterity, however, should not 
be confused with voice’s ontological alterity. An ontological excess or otherness is 
by no means the same as a cultural projection of otherness or excessiveness.  
 It is perhaps because of voice’s ontological alterity that we see gestures 
towards vocal remnants or remains, traces of vocal resonance, in rare moments of 
even the most stubborn readers of texts, Derrida included. In The Production of 
Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht provides another 
unexpected example: that of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who late in his life asked the 
possible non-semantic function of poetry:  
 [. . .] can we really assume that the reading of such texts is a reading 
 exclusively concentrated on meaning? Do we not sing these texts [Ist 
 es nicht ein Singen]? Should the process in which a poem speaks only 
 be carried by a meaning intention? Is there not, at the same time, a  
 truth that lies in its performance [eine Vollzugswahrheit]. (53)  
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What is fascinating about Gadamer’s unexpected revelation is that the truth 
revealed in the poem’s performance comes not simply from its performativity, but 
from its performative singing. While for Gumbrecht what is key in Gadamer’s 
admission is that a text avails something beyond hermeneutics, this “beyond” 
(what Gumbrecht refers to as “presence effects”) is an effect that comes from the 
“force” of vocalization. If there is a certain “truth” revealed about a text through its 
performance, a “truth” revealed through the act of singing, then in opera this 
“truth” is revealed through the performance of the voice, a performative “force” 
beyond both music and libretto, beyond the hermeneutics of performance. Indeed, 
although he does not develop the idea in his book on presence, elsewhere 
Gumbrecht specifies that in opera, presence is “more obviously visible” than in any 
other art form. Opera’s particular aesthetics, he claims, demand that they be 
“experienced and analyzed” beyond the “dimension of meaning production and 
meaning identification” (63).36 
 For Gumbrecht, presence is movement “in front of us, in reach of and 
tangible for our bodies,” propulsionary rather than static. Whatever the substance 
of presence effects is, it must be extrapolated from what it does. Although 
admittedly from a very different genre than opera, The Story of the Weeping Camel, a 
very sweet “narrative documentary” film by Byambasuren Davaa and Luigi 
                                                 
 36 Gumbrecht states: “In der Oper wird diese Konvergenz von 
Sinnproduktion und Präsenzproduktion zwar deutlicher sichtbar als in anderen 
Kunstformen, aber trotzdem ist sie mitnichten ein struktureller oder medialer 
Sonderfall’; and ‘ Die Oper ist eine von jenen Formen der Kunst und einer von 
jenen Bezugsgegenständen der ästhetischen Erfahrung, denen man nicht gerecht 
wird, solange sie ausschließlich in Dimensionen der Sinnproduktion oder der 
Sinnidentifikation– interpretatorisch oder hermeneutisch also–erfahren und 
analysiert werden’.”  
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Falorni, clearly depicts one instance of a singing voice that evokes remarkable 
physical effects in ways that I am trying to describe. And while my reader may 
wonder why at this juncture I choose to discuss a film about camels rather than the 
performance of a live opera, I do so in order to demonstrate how simple it is to 
accept the profound force of vocal resonance when discussing camels and nomadic 
shepherds and how difficult when discussing “enlightened” subjects who attend 
an opera performance in the developed world. How do we account for the 
numerous theoretical hurdles that make this move so difficult?  
 The film in question tells the story of a family of nomadic shepherds in the 
Gobi Desert, South Mongolia, and their troubles with a mother camel who shuns 
her calf after a long and difficult birth. Exhausted and fed-up with the birthing 
experience, the mother will have nothing to do with her calf and refuses to let it 
suckle. She eventually wanders off and leaves the calf alone, which causes him to 
“weep” incessantly from hunger and loneliness. Despite repeated coaxing from the 
shepherds, the mother camel remains unswayed. When all options seem to have 
been exhausted and the calf has reached a critical state, the shepherds enlist the 
help of a local musician to enact a healing ritual. Accompanied by the musician on 
a horse-head violin, one of the shepherd women sings to the mother camel, 
repeating a simple melody while stroking the mother’s belly. At first, the mother 
protests, but after a while, the sounds of the shepherd’s voice and the violin pacify 
her. Eventually, the calf is led to her and she miraculously acquiesces, nuzzling her 
calf fondly and allowing him at last to drink.  
 The film’s screenwriter and co-director Davaa explains that the “musical 
ritual that is being used doesn’t have lyrics, just four letters. In our case, the four 
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letters are ‘HOOS’. . . . The word doesn’t have any meaning, just an effect. It 
doesn’t have a melody or any musical structure. Every body [sic] does it the way 
he wants or feels.”  Since the syllable ‘“HOOS” has no linguistic or musical 
significance for the mother camel, this ritual hinges on the performativity of voice: 
its effect rather than its meaning. What is sung is neither representational nor a 
process tied to cognition as we generally understand it, but a tangible physical 
effect. The mother camel is touched, literally; she is moved by the sound of voice.  
 We notice here that voice has an agency to touch, to act, to do something: 
this much is clear. But how do we explain what takes place between the voice and 
the camel? How can we move in our analytical capacities beyond even the broadest 
of musical and linguistic signification and meaning? One option would be to 
explain what happens in terms of affect and desire, but this option seems limited 
because in the end it always seems to lead to a discussion of individual 
subjectivity. It seems ridiculous to think about the mother camel in this way: does 
she coalesce to nurturing her foal because she “feels the love”? Because she is 
“moved to tears”?  In fact, in the film, the mother camel does tear up, as many of us 
do when we hear the sound of music. Given all that we have discovered about 
voice thus far, however, I wonder whether we might think of “tearing” as a 
physiological reaction to the propulsion of voice rather than merely an expression 
of emotion or affect. This seems more in line with the philosophical tradition of 
both Lacanian psychoanalysis and Derridean deconstruction, in which “voice” is 
bound up in creating a foundational tension between subjects and objects—
although admittedly these traditions seem rather far afield from the interpretation 
of healing rituals for camels. At the same time, it is indeed interesting that we can 
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clearly understand this kind of force when we see it happening to camels in 
Mongolia, but not when we imagine people in the developed world going to the 
opera. What happens to an understanding about the relationship between subject 
and object once we acknowledge that voice is a resonant operation with physical 
effects not just for camels in Mongolia?  
 In the history of metaphysics that Gumbrecht presents in order to explain 
how meaning culture comes to dominate (and to repress) “presence culture,” he 
identifies a shift from medieval thought, in which “spirit and matter were believed 
to be inseparable” to modern thought, in which the two are bifurcated. This split 
between spirit and matter “is the origin of an epistemological structure on which 
Western philosophy would from [the Enlightenment] on rely as the ‘subject/object 
paradigm’”(25). A resonant force with physical effects has been an inconceivable 
aspect of European art forms because it shatters the dualism between subject and 
object that has governed perception and on which the logic of enlightened reason 
depends, the model that posits “recipient on the one side and art work on the 
other” (264).37  Voice emits a “knowledge” inaccessible or inadmissible to the kind 
of knowledge legitimized by meaning culture. The sense of sight and its coupling 
                                                 
 37 Kolesch argues for the ‘ development of new descriptive and analytical 
models’ to replace the binary oppositions developed by the dominance of visual 
understanding. She states: “Die kopräsente Hervorbringung und Wahrnehmung 
von Stimmen vergegenwärtigt, dass die theatrale Situation ein komplexes 
Kräfteverhältnis darstellt, dass sie aus fragilen Wechselwirkungen und Inter-
Aktionen zwischen Wahrnehmendem und Wahrgenommenem besteht. Dafür 
müssen neue Beschriegungs- und Analysemodelle entwickelt werden, die die 
Logik binärer Oppositionen prozessual ausser Kraft setzen. Dennn nicht zuletzt als 
Folge der eingangs erwähnten Dominanz visueller Erklärungsmuster sind 
ästhetische U} berlegungen noch immer stark geprägt von Dualismen wie Subjekt 
versus Objekt, Rezipient auf der einen und Kunstwerk auf der anderen Seite.” See 
Kolesch, “Aesthetik der Präsenz,” (264). Translation is mine.  
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with a detached subject has been complicit in this split; in the “metaphysical 
worldview,” vision rises to the status of  “sovereign nobility,” “supremely modern 
and Western,” one with reason,  “[w]ith its clear-eyed pursuit of detached 
observation, imperial sweep, and visual instrumentation” (Schmidt 15-16).  
 The facetious dualism between spirit and matter is partly why it is easy for 
scholars in the developed world to imagine that voice is a resonant force with 
physical effects on camels in Mongolia but not on the bodies of opera-goers. Opera 
is pegged as an (“enlightened”) art form with metaphysical properties that 
transcend the body, whereas ritual is a bodily (and thus “uncivilized”) cultural 
practice. The other piece of camel trouble has to do the “alterity” in which 
“reasoned” scholars are indoctrinated, the “alterity” constructed by the 
“mythology of modern Western visuality” which takes as its other the “’ear 
culture’ of tribal, nonliterate peoples” (20).  By default, oral cultures (such as 
nomadic Mongolian shepherds) comprise the “other” implied by deconstruction’s 
critique of Western thinking about language. While deconstruction in its Derridean 
manifestation is a critical practice, its practice in the American academy has turned 
into an (oftentimes unspoken) dogma that makes it very difficult to continue 
deconstruction’s work, i.e., to read deconstruction against the grain. As Paul Gilroy 
has pointed out, “[u]rged on by the post- structuralist critiques of the metaphysics 
of presence, contemporary debates have moved beyond citing language as the 
fundamental analogy for comprehending all signifying practices to a position 
where textuality (especially when wrenched open through the concept of 
difference) expands and merges with totality” (77). What gets blocked by this 
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move, of course, is what Gilroy refers to as “aspects of embodied subjectivity that 
are not reducible to the cognitive and the ethical” (76). 38  
 An avowal of material voice requires no less than an epistemic shift, a 
leaving behind of the distanced, all-knowing subject who analyses a “dead” vocal 
object, and finding in its stead a subject who can be both subject and the object of 
vocal force. This position requires us to open both mind and body to the wonder of 
resonance and to postpone analysis: to postpone translating voice into the pre-
determined cognitive categories the mind has at its disposal and to simply wait 
and listen, to experience what voice does. This is not to say that analysis should be 
discarded. Very simply, this type of analysis asks the subject to take leave of his 
absolute sovereignty and to acknowledge that he is both subject and object in the 
world, subject to material forces over which the mind and body do not have 
control. It requires the listener to become a mother camel: to put an end to the 
protests of the ego, to let one’s belly be stroked, and to avail oneself to the sound of 
voice.  
 Thinking of opera as a form of public spectacle might help to lead opera 
studies away from the clear-cut dichotomy between recipient (subject)/art work 
(object), because such an emphasis would muddle any clear distinction between 
who or what is the subject and who or what is the object. Of course, a spectacle is 
an object intended to be seen, but it is also a dramatic event, a theatrical mise-en-
                                                 
 38 The particular block to which Gilroy’s study refers is the musical 
expression of the African diaspora: “Music, the grudging gift that supposedly 
compensated slaves not only for their exile from the ambiguous legacies of 
practical reason but for their complete exclusion from modern political society, has 
been refined and developed so that it provides an enhanced mode of 
communication beyond the petty power of words—spoken or written.” (Gilroy 76).  
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scène that demands an audience. Opera’s precondition is an engaged subject to 
behold opera’s wonder, to receive its spectacular touch and thus become subject to 
the performative event. And though opera possesses neither individual cognition 
nor will, it is an artistic production that is phantasmagorically endowed with 
agency by those who are employed to create, to prepare and to execute it—to 
transform it into a (performative) event that acts. An operatic performance 
becomes a “subject” through the specific social relations that bring it into being, 
that give it the agency to do something. In this way, operatic spectacle disrupts the 
scopic distance of the “enlightened” observer. The observer must resign himself to 
the conditions of the production, which is exactly why some radical stagings are so 
provocative: not only do they present interpretations that unsettle the expectations 
of the beholder, they also unseat the “imperial sweep” of the scopic subject by 
acting on or unto him, making him at once both subject and object and thus 
drawing him into a dialogical relationship with the work. A vituperative reaction 
to a radical staging is then at least always in part an attempt by the spectator to 
reassert his domination over the things of the world, to rise again to the status of 
“sovereign nobility.”  
 
If in theory, “voice” marks an impasse at the extremes of presence and absence, 
excess and lack, this is because in its silent manifestation, voice is a remainder, a 
sign indicating the impasse that is caused by an untenable subject/object split. 
Thinking back to Ragland’s remark that in Lacan the voice operates “at the level of 
real impasses, functioning as a nodal point (or a knot of meanings) unassimilated 
in knowledge as such,” ( ) one can imagine that in Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
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“voice” is a sign that indicates both an untenable impasse and a fundamental 
problem with epistemology.  This is not a new proposition; it is the very “scandal” 
revealed by psychoanalysis that led Felman, and Butler after her, to propose that 
the speech act undoes meaning, that it disrupts intentional knowledge through a 
bodily act.  
 Of course, the problem of how to get at the operatic “real” without being 
reductively materialistic remains. If the presence of the “real” can be held in hand 
but never held fast, if it cannot be known directly and absolutely, what 
methodology do we employ to tease it out? Although Gumbrecht grounds his 
reading of presence in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, beginning with 
Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, Henri Bergson’s essay of the same name 
directly addresses the matter of temporality and its relationship to an 
epistemological shift that complements the one I have proposed.   
 Bergson argues that philosophers “agree in distinguishing two profoundly 
different ways of knowing a thing”: one by means of “analysis,” the other by 
means of “intuition” (21).  Whereas analysis is “the operation which reduces the 
object to elements already known,” a method of translation that ascribes symbols 
to objects according to an always preconceived “knowledge,” intuition, in the 
words of Gilles Deleuze, “is neither a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly 
sympathy, but a fully developed method, one of the most fully developed methods 
in philosophy” (13). At the heart of this method is Bergson’s concept of duration, 
something that he calls multiplicitous (Deleuze: heterogeneous), and in a state of 
“perpetually becoming” ().   For Bergson time is not a static event, but “continuous 
progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances,” 
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a concept of duration that holds for both a subject and an object’s movement 
through time (Creative Evolution 7).  
 Bergson’s conception of time revises Zeno’s paradox, which conventionally 
holds that a flying arrow actually does not move: “For at each instant of its flight it 
occupies one and only one point of space. This means that at each instant the arrow 
must be at rest, since otherwise it would not occupy a given point at that instant. 
But its whole course is composed of such points. Therefore the arrow does not 
actually move at all (Gouge 13).  Bergson takes issue with this proposal by 
asserting that the moving arrow never actually stops in any of the points through 
which it passes. According to Bergson, movement and immobility are logically 
incompatible. The points through which a moving object passes, “are not in the 
movement” but “projected” by our understanding of the movement’s path, points 
that would be where the arrow “would be if it were to stop”. These stopping 
points, he states, are not “positions, but  ‘suppositions,’ aspects, or points of view 
of the mind” (Bergson Metaphysics).  Bergson concludes “not that motion is 
impossible, but rather that it is impossible for the intellect to comprehend [. . .] 
Both time and motion have to be apprehended intuitively” (Gouge 13).  
 Like voice, Bergson’s intuition “involves a plurality of meanings and 
irreducible multiple aspects” (Deleuze 14). The openness to multiplicity is how 
Bergson gets at a concept of immediacy that gives up the illusion of a singular and 
unified knowledge. Rather than striving for one “truth,” intuition poses questions 
in order to problematic, differentiate and temporalise (Deleuze 35). In this way, 
Bergson challenges what he considers to be the limit of Kantian reason, which ‘ 
ends in establishing that Platonism . . . is . . . the common basis alike of thought and 
 56 
of nature.” The Critique of Pure Reason, Bergson argues, “rests on this postulate, that 
our intellect is incapable of anything but Platonizing – that is, of pouring all 
possible experience into pre-existing molds” (Metaphysics 58-59): 
If scientific knowledge is indeed what Kant supposed, then there is 
one simple science, preformed and even preformulated in nature, as 
Aristotle believed; great discoveries, then, serve only to illuminate, 
point by point, the already drawn line of this logic, immanent in 
things, just as on the night of a fête we light up one by one the rows of 
gas-jets which already outline the shape of some building. And if 
metaphysical knowledge is really what Kant supposed, it is reduced 
to a choice between two attitudes of the mind before all the great 
problems, both equally possible; its manifestations are so many 
arbitrary and always ephemeral choices between two solutions, 
virtually formulated from all eternity: it lives and dies by antinomies. 
But the truth is that modern science does not present this unilinear 
simplicity, nor does modern metaphysics these irreducible oppositions 
(Metaphysics 58-59).39  
 For Bergson, then, intuition is a process that allows one to near the inconceivable 
(which cannot be known—at least not known absolutely) without a compulsion to 
master or to contain it, to break it down into linear antinomies, to reduce the 
irreducible into directly conceivable units.  
 Like Bergson, Felman reaches beyond simple and reductive science— 
                                                 
 39 Emphasis is mine. 
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reductive materialism—towards a body comprised by matter, a body which, “in 
modern physics . . . no longer has absolute existence, but only a relative existence 
within an interaction of matter/energy relations” (109). She recognizes that “for 
Austin, as for Einstein, matter itself has ceased, above all, to be a ‘thing’: matter 
itself is an event” (109-110).  The voice that emanates from this body is one that 
carries remnants of the body with it, remnants that gain, through propulsion, a 
weight of their own. Felman calls it “the matter of language (little bits of sentences, 
phrases, signifiers, atoms of the speaking body) and energy or (illocutionary)” 
“force,’’ that space of undecidability between matter and energy, between ‘ ‘things 
and  ‘events’” (109). For our purposes, we might call this propulsionary force the 
matter of voice. Felman recognizes the significance of this move: “We are dealing, 
in the Austinian discovery (as, moreover, in the Freudian discovery), with the 
intuition of nothing less than a new type of materialism” (109):  
Contemporary physics, atomic and relativist, has in fact demonstrated that the 
unity of “matter in itself” is from now on an outdated concept, that matter exists 
not in itself but as a relation to energy, all loss of matter forming, but that very 
token, an enormous recrudescence of energy. Matter, in modern physics, thus no 
longer has absolute existence, but only a relative existence within an interaction of 
matter/energy relations (109).  Presence is fluidly material, made available through 
the questioning of a more complex rendering of space, temporality, and the body’s 
very being in the world.  
 As it appears in (the antinomies of) contemporary discourse (or precisely 
disappears), voice is thought of as fleeting ephemera: in one ear and out the other, 
or so the saying goes. It skirts around like a ghost without a body, a mystery that is 
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present and then simply gone. This rhapsody of specular logic asserts that the 
aural (like the “real”) is perpetually unknowable, for as such it sustains a hope in 
the transcendent. But voice does not simply appear on stage and then disappear. 
Voice puts matter into circulation, matter that is more or other than language, more 
or other than even performative utterance. Voice inserts itself without regard for 
cognition and will, perforating the metaphysical by weaving in and out of bodies. 
Again, I mean body in the broadest sense: the body on stage and in the theatre and 
throughout the body politic. But occlusion of the aural never quite succeeds 
because voice leaves material remainders. Aural spectacle echoes from beyond the 
beyond as opera’s specter, a specter that haunts with vocal residue. Thus, José 
Munoz might call the aurality of operatic spectacle “ephemeral evidence”; Rebecca 
Schneider might call it “performance remains.” Performance remains traverse 
temporality. They remain in the fabric of the body/body politic like a corporeal 
unconscious. Voice’s elusiveness, its ineffability as invisible remains does not 
negate its presence. Aural spectacle brings forth material ephemera that continue 
to act in and on the body long after they disappear.  
 In specular logic, aural contradicts spectacle, positioning itself as a 
paradoxical other. In the logic of theatricality, however, the scandalous aural 
becomes an integral part of spectacle’s display. Thus, aural spectacle is and is not 
an oxymoron. But there is something more important to notice here that returns us 
to what we have discerned about voice. Rather than being merely present or past, 
the vocal resonance of aural spectacle sounds in time and then sticks, upsetting the 
logic of succession. Vocal resonance seeps through porous bodies, remaining as 
haunting memories, haunting melodies.  
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The promise of opera  
When one searches for the presence of a resonant voice, what one discovers is not 
one scandal, but a series of scandals. One sees this even in Felman, who, in her own 
scandalous turn, both does and does not do what she says she will. At the very 
beginning of her analysis of Austin, she calls the act of promising “a fundamental 
contradiction which is precisely the contradiction of the human” and describes her 
text as “a meditation on promising” (4–5). For Felman “[t]he scandal of seduction 
seems to be fundamentally tied to the scandal of the broken promise. Don Juan is 
the myth of scandal precisely to the extent that it is the myth of violation: the 
violation not of women but of promises made to them” (4). Felman makes a 
promise of her own to refer to “two principal references to the Don Juan myth,” 
Molière’s Don Juan and Mozart’s Don Giovanni, but then breaks this promise, 
staging her own revenge at Don Juan and her own “fundamental contradiction” ( 
125 n.3 ). In fact, although Felman refers to Molière frequently, she takes up Da 
Ponte’s libretto for Mozart only twice, both times in passing. She discusses neither 
Mozart’s music, nor any aspects of the opera, nor even the fact that Don Giovanni is 
an opera, except in the brief footnote that names the work as a “principal 
reference.” This omission seems strangely apropos in light of Felman’s assertions 
that  “every promise promises the completion of incompleteness; every promise is 
above all the promise of consciousness, insofar as it postulates a noninterruption, 
continuity between intention and act” and that, as “the very subversion of 
consciousness,” the Don Juan myth is “the myth of the promise of consciousness 
falling flat on its face” (34). What is subverted in Felman’s discussion, what falls on 
its face, is the promise of opera. But perhaps Felman’s promise of opera is, like the 
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promises of Don Juan, a promise of consciousness, and at the same time, a 
“promise that cannot be kept,” a “scandal . . . insofar as what [she] promises is 
precisely the untenable’ (5). Perhaps, that is, Felman’s treatment of opera is not to 
be found in what she says, but in what she does, in her  “slip” or “misfire”: “The 
act of failing thus opens up the space of referentiality—or of impossible reality—
not because something is missing, but because something else is done, or because 
something else is said” (57). In other words, Felman addresses opera in the space 
between her promise and her failure. Opera in general and Don Giovanni in 
particular are not absent, but present in the scandal of the performative,  “between 
speaking bodies, between languages, between knowledge and pleasure” (5). If 
there is a methodology that proceeds by intuition to grapple with immediacy, it is 
a methodology that finds the operatic “real” in space(s) and time(s) beyond the 
referent, in the confusion between meaning and reference, and in the promise that 
falls short. Felman’s misfire is neither a “failure” in the colloquial sense nor an 
analytical shortcoming.  
 If there is an opera production that comes to mind that plays out the 
slipperiness of reference and the mobile temporality of presence I describe here, it 
is Ruth Berghaus’s brilliant 1991 production of Debussy’s Pelléas et Mélisande at 
the Berlin Staatsoper unter den Linden under the direction of Michael Gielen. 
Berghaus (1927–96)—best known in the theatre world for her work at the Berliner 
Ensemble, where she learned from Berthold Brecht and eventually served as 
artistic director after the death of Helene Weigel, and, later, in the opera world 
from productions in Berlin to Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Zürich—trained originally as 
a dancer and choreographer at the Palucca School in Dresden. Accordingly, the 
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bodies on stage are the core of this (now retired) production, physical bodies that 
less act and sing than embody the material fluidity of Debussy’s lush score and the 
taut contradiction of human emotion found in Maeterlinck’s drama. The most 
captivating innovation of Berghaus’s production is the matter of linguistic 
reference, which Berghaus stages non-mimetically. Although the production 
maintains a level of linguistic reference, what remains is a correspondence that is 
minimal, indirect, and drawn out and deferred. Although such reference could be 
thought of as appropriately Symbolist, the elongation and deferral of reference has 
another effect in that it draws the spectator’s attention away from meaning per se 
and towards the presence of sonorous bodies—vocal and orchestral—and thus 
underscores their performative force. Deferral of reference also disrupts the 
continuity of the “real” both in terms of meaning stability and the spectator’s hold 
on “real time.”  
 Because linguistic reference is deferred, gesture and bodily comportment 
take on additional weight. Through gestures that cut through and sweep above 
and over time, the bodies of these singers merge with the fabric of the orchestra; in 
slow, crescent-shaped rocking, arms and backs become vessels that float among 
sonic waves, swelling like the belly of a ship, waxing and waning like the half-
moon at sea, ebbing and flowing like the bodies of lovers and Mélisande’s rounded 
womb—a roundness that is redoubled by Hartmut Meyer’s sets and costumes.  
 The voices of these singers are no less gestural, no less material than their 
bodies. Crying forth as though asleep with the weight of truth and the 
inconsequential and obscure clarity of a dream-world (from sometimes blind-
folded singers, singers who come and go, inhabit and embody these same roles and 
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then move on, wear these very garments and repeat these very gestures even after 
Berghaus is no longer), these voices end as they begin: with a sonic lingering, a 
lingering near me, a lingering still. Though I no longer hear them in the present, I 
hear them in their presence: I (think I) feel them, feel moved by them, feel how they 
have transported me as surely as they have got under my skin and inhabited the 
space and time of my carnality.  
 Mélisande’s hair, that sign, the sign (of Mélisande, of Mélisande’s sexuality, 
of feminine sexuality), that particular referent is in this case a nondescript wig 
(lifted, perhaps from a little old lady as she chose the cauliflower for her evening 
supper). Mélisande takes it off in the fourth act and wrings it unthinkingly beneath 
her fingers until finally dropping it as one would any other item of no importance 
whatsoever. It was at that moment that I briefly emerged from this particular 
(aural) spectacle and wondered what to make of Mèlisande’s baldness, of this 
singing- woman-figure who simply leaves her referent behind. I do not remember 
what came of the wig, what came of Mélisande’s misfire, for as strangely as I 
emerged out of the music, I was swept back up into it, taken to a place where I left 
any semblance of my own referent and my own reference behind. Even still, even 
now, she carries me with her, as I her with me: the shape of her comportment, her 
sonorous soma that creeps up and down my spine and winds around my limbs, 
her resignation (and mine) to that which comes and that which is. Her promise. My 
promise. The promise of opera. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SOUND REMAINS: OF SIRENS, SONGS, AND SOMA 
They were [Proserpina’s] dear companions, 
The Sirens, skilled in singing... 
And the gods were kind, and gave them golden plumage, 
But let them keep the lovely singing voices, 
So dear to the ears of men, the human features, 
The human voice, the dower of song forever.40 
 
 In April of 2004, Friedrich Kittler led an expedition to the Gulf of Salerno to 
acoustically verify a sonic trace of the infamous Sirens found in the text of Homer’s 
Odyssey.  Equipped with a yacht and a group of media theorists from the 
Humboldt University in Berlin and the Center for Art and Media technology in 
Karlsruhe41—dubbed by Kittler the “Schliemänner der Messtechnik”42—the group 
set off to Italy to conduct an archaeological experiment in “medial philology” 
(Ernst “Resonance” 1). The point of this excursion was to recreate and to 
authenticate through sonic feedback the sound of Homer’s Sirens in the assumed 
context of its origin, among island cliffs off the Amalfi Coast.  Guided by clues in 
Norman Douglas’ Siren Land43 and Ernle Bradford’s Ulysses Found44 as well as local 
                                                 
40  Ovid, Metamorphoses, Trans. Rolfe Humphries.  Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1983. 
   
 41  The media theorists included Wolfgang Ernst, Martin Carlé, Tania Hron, 
and Peter Weibel.  
 
 42 Literally, “the Schlie-men of measurement technology,” a pun on the 
German the name Heinrich Schliemann, the famous nineteenth-century German 
archaeologist. 
 
 43 Norman Douglas, Siren Land.  London: M. Secker, 1923. 
 
 44 Ernle Bradford, Ulysses Found.  New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. 
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lore, which had called the Li Galli islands “Le Sirenusae,” and had inspired “a 
series of small antique Siren-sanctuaries along the coast from Naples to Salerno” 
(Ernst “Resonance” 2), the expedition set sail to test its hypothesis that among the 
islands’ cliffs was the potential for  “a real acoustic phenomenon”  (Ernst 
Lokaltermin 259) rather than “a mere cultural-poetical invention by the bard” (Ernst 
“Resonance” 1).  Like Schliemann, whose hunch that Homer’s Iliad was more than 
merely fable led him to successfully excavate the remains of Mycenae and Troy, 
Kittler and his media archaeologists believed that both local cultural memory and 
the Sirens episode in Homer’s Odyssey contained clues pointing toward early 
acoustic material, “pure song” (Seminar 1). 
 At the heart of this expedition lies the desire to affirm a fundamental 
materiality in the Sirens’ song, though rather than probe for this material 
hermeneutically—to read it in Homer’s text—Kittler and his cohorts attempt to 
“prove” it through a series of acoustic experiments at a physical point of origin.  
This is a curious move that demonstrates a pervasive technophilic desire to base 
medial science upon a positivist real rather than on an always ambiguous referent 
that preserves and provokes structural tensions between issues as complicated as 
subject and object, nature and culture, truth and fiction.  Significantly, however, 
Kittler’s expedition omits its positivist findings in its subsequent sirenology, 
turning instead to a broad and rigorous philological archaeology based upon a 
hermeneutics of the classics and early Greek linguistics, as if to say that in the end 
positivism is a futile means with which to engage the mysteries of a text.  This is 
especially paradoxical given that the medial shifts for which Kittler’s expedition 
argues in its post-expedition philology are, as I will demonstrate, largely legible in 
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the text of the Odyssey.  As such, the Sirens episode in Homer provokes rich 
questions about the status of sonic materiality in a supposedly silent literary text.  
In this chapter, I contend that what matters is not a fundamental ontology about 
the Sirens and their song, that is, whether or not they (or their sound) are (or were) 
verifiably real, but what the text of Homer’s Odyssey reveals about the status of 
their sonic materiality.  After discussing the Kittler expedition and its findings, I 
will turn directly to the text of the Odyssey, the Ur-repository of their sonic remains.  
Aside from questions regarding the status of the medial in Homer’s text, questions 
that revolve around the materiality of the Sirens’ song, I am interested in what a 
close reading of the Odyssey reveals about the textual status of sonic phenomena in 
general, and for this reason briefly take up Franz Kafka’s interpretation of the 
Sirens’ narrative in “Das Schwiegen der Sirenen,” translated into English as “The 
Silence of the Sirens,” in the final section of this chapter. 
 
Sexual and Textual Politics:  Sirens and The Real 
 Central to Kittler’s expedition to Italy is the assumption that what matters is 
the Sirens’ signal rather than their message.  In a line of thinking that can be traced 
back to the information theory of Claude Shannon and Marshall McCluhan, 
Kittler’s experiment prioritized “the technology of message transmission over 
interpretation of its content” (Gane 27).  In other words, what the Sirens sang per se 
was secondary to the fact that they sang.  Kittler’s expedition went looking for 
clues that in the Sirens episode Homer recorded a sonic event that happened, and 
that through re-enactment the conditions of that materiality could be documented 
as present.  Of course, not knowing the source of sonic material—or, in plain 
 66 
English, precisely who or what the Sirens were, and if found, whether they could 
be called upon to sing once more—it was necessary for the expedition to come 
equipped with a team of sonic transmitters and receivers.  The expedition covered 
all of its bases here, bringing along two female singers45 and samplings of “seagull 
clamor, waves, and wind, as well as sound beams from previously recorded 
technical signals, animal voices, and synthetic siren howls” (Ernst Lokaltermin 260).  
Karl-Heinz Frommolt, curator of the Animal Voice Archives at The Museum of 
Natural History, Berlin, came along for good measure.   
 According to Wolfgang Ernst, Professor of Media Theory at the Humboldt 
University Berlin and Kittler’s right hand man on the expedition, what they found 
was as follows: “when the sounds of Gallo Lungo are emitted they do not just 
break at the opposite rocky islands as an echo but are thrown back and forth 
among each other.  This results is an amplifier effect, a kind of acoustic différance, 
that confuses the sense of what is close and what far of a sailing navigator…”.  
Specifically, the geographical location of three small islands off the coast alter an 
“acoustic signal,” by amplifying it and changing its “timbre.”  For Ernst, these 
technologically verifiable changes are the results that he needs to draw the 
conclusion: “We can be sure that there is a trace of the real in the myth of the song 
of the Sirens” (Ernst “Resonance” 3). 
 According to Ernst, then, the landscape of Gallo Lungo amplifies and 
distorts noises that disorient the sailor, making him unsure of his location.  He 
                                                 
 45 Rumor has it that Kittler requested that the (female) singers, Louise 
Schumacher and Katie Mullins, sing the music of Richard Wagner, though I have 
been unable to substantiate this claim. 
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hears loudening voices bouncing off cliffs but does not know what direction from 
which they come, where he is in relation to them, nor who or what the source of 
this sound might be.  The implication of these findings is that disorienting sound 
waves acoustically assault the senses of the sailor, propelling him into a state 
without foundational knowledge of his place in the world.  This is a state that 
mimics psychosis; Odysseus suffers auditory hallucinations, unable to know 
whether the sounds that he hears are physiological or pathological, unable to know 
whether they come from beast or man—or rather, woman. And yet, in the case of 
Odysseus, he desires to endure the sound, to drift precariously into a realm where 
certain types of knowledge become unnecessary or even impossible, and at the 
same time, to know the source of this un-knowledge by taking possession over it.  
Through the willful act of hearing, Odysseus discovers the space of both not 
knowing and yet knowing.  By listening, he masters his desire and achieves the 
mechanism of repression. 
 Indeed, Kittler, Ernst, and Carlé, the third theorist of this crew, link 
Odysseus to a type of knowledge that is coupled with consciousness and is only 
implicitly sexual.  Linking the Sirens’ Song to the invention of the Greek alphabet 
via the work of classicist Barry Powell, Kittler et al. mark the Sirens episode as the 
beginning of the “vocal alphabet”:  “the moment the Sirens address themselves to 
Ulysses in explicitly Greek word, with no Homeric interpolation of onomatopoetic 
elements or non-semantic phonetic utterances, this is a media-reflection of the 
sound element in speech (poetry) itself” (Ernst “Resonance” 6).  For Kittler, the 
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Sirens are the origin of both music and mathematics.46   For Carlé, the Sirens 
episode marks the onset of the bicameral mind, the moment at which writing 
began to archive and organize verbal utterance.  In Carlé’s words: “sound politics 
in Homer’s time meant gaining control over authoritarian verbal hallucinations via 
the adoption of writing as a soundtechnology [sic] driven by reproducible vowels.  
As cultural techniques, acoustic writing and sound reading of the sonosphere of 
language mediated by an alphanumeric code were remodeling our bicameral mind 
so that it became conscious” (Ernst “Resonance” 1).  For both Kittler and Carlé, the 
Sirens are neither nymphs, nor muses; they are a veritable motherlode.47   
 Given that these theorists neglect any specific data interpretation when 
drawing their conclusions about the Sirens, one might wonder what motivates this 
desire to “prove,” to “know,” to locate a trace, to authenticate a positivist real and 
then resort to philology rather than data interpretation to make their case.  In 
trying to listen to the Sirens’ song itself, they place themselves in the position of a 
collective, contemporary Odysseus and a contemporary Homer at the same time, 
attempting to hear, to interpret, and to medially record the sounds that they hear.  
They come away from the expedition not necessarily “knowing” the Sirens per 
se—“it remains still under question who was the emitter of the song” (Ernst 
“Resonance” 3)—but asserting themselves as having become privy to their 
“knowledge,” like Odysseus, without falling prey.   
                                                 
 46 See Frierich Kittler, Musik und Mathematik, Band I: Hellas, Teil I: Aphrodite.  
Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2006 and „Honig Der Sirenen: Logos Der Musik,“ 
http://www.aesthetik.huberlin.de/medien/texte/honig.php 
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 Like Odysseus, and Bradford after him, Kittler, Ernst, and Carlé hear 
something, though the simple fact that they hear and that they capture this sound 
through a recording device is far more important than the sound itself.  In fact, the 
best trace of material sound that presents itself to this (male) constellation of 
listeners waiting for a sonic sign is not the data they recorded, but rather a 
telephone call “from the island” that arrives as they drink on the coast at a 
“cocktail bar of Praiano” (Ernst Lokaltermin 264).  Although Ernst intends this to be 
a tongue-in-cheek story, it is noteworthy that the sounds that the expedition set off 
to hear are either neither reproduced nor described in any literary reports on the 
expedition that I have been able to locate.  The only reference to the acoustic data 
that the group collects comes from Ernst when he vaguely states that, “the digital 
video and audio tapes that account for the scientific crop of the expedition in April 
2004 have the better memory [than those men on the expedition…].  From now on 
the tapes from Li Galli will speak” (Ernst “Resonance” 3).  Just what the tapes 
“speak,” what “knowledge” they impart, however, remains profoundly uncertain.  
If the tapes “speak,” then what do they “say,” and why can’t this be made public 
and publishable knowledge? 
 The geographical phenomenon indicated by the expedition’s sonic 
experiments suggests that the Sirens’ sound is able to become a subject that acts 
upon an (male) object, disorienting him and “leav[ing] traces in [his] bodily 
memory” (Ernst “Resonance” 6).  So despite its insistence to the contrary, it seems 
that this expedition is primarily about the subject position of its explorers who aim 
to capture a “primitive” sonic object that is omitted by female creatures, strange 
animals, or some freaky natural phenomenon.  According to Ernst, quoting 
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Bradford, women do not or cannot hear the Sirens because the Sirens “desire 
nothing from their own sex,” (Ernst Lokaltermin 265) a remark that seems strikingly 
apropos.  The (heterosexual) men at the bar in Praiano, believe themselves entitled 
to hearing because they desire the desire of women.  This desire enables the 
theorists “to decode these acoustic memory grooves: the media-archaeological 
gramophone, i.e., an archaeology of sound” (Ernst “Resonance” 6).  We readers are 
left to take them their word. 
 Employing their own self-definition, then, this set of ears claims to “know” 
an elusive and esoteric sound of the Sirens, or at least to obtain a “real trace” of its 
one-time existence.  The etymological ambivalence of “knowing,” i.e., of having 
sexual intercourse with, is certainly relevant to this attitude of male entitlement 
and possession.  Sound leaves “grooves” upon the male body like scratches on the 
back, vestiges of a “dangerously” erotic, heterosexual fantasy, making these men 
the both the possessors and the inheritors of “knowledge.”  Indeed, “[this] sound,” 
according to Ernst, “can attack the body (politic) in ways which are both seductive 
and dangerous.  This is why the ‘Siren Sound’ has been ambiguously coded that 
way from the beginning” (Ernst “Resonance” 6).  Ernst’s admission here reveals 
that it is precisely sound’s ability to take away man’s exclusive subject position that 
makes it both “seductive” and “dangerous.”  Sound’s potential power over man is 
its “danger;” this “danger” seduces man by giving him the thrill of the hunt. 
 Beyond the sexual politics of the Kittler expedition, the desire to chase after 
a material trace of the real brings to the fore an implicit tension between truth and 
fiction, and ultimately undermines the status of textual interpretation.  The one I 
just described serves only to exaggerate the gap between the acoustic and the aural, 
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or, in other words, between constructions of “truth” or a material “real” located in 
nature and a textual “fiction” that belongs to the realm of culture.  Literature is not 
about truth, however, but about possibility.  In his The Muse Learns to Write: 
Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present, Eric Havelock asks, 
“can a text speak?” (44) because when a verse on the level of primary orality is 
written down “it ceases to be what it originally was,” (Havelock 66) that is, oral.  
What is interesting in the case of the Sirens, however, is not the extent to which the 
Odyssey “sings” as an oral text, but precisely that it “sings” as a piece of literature.   
 
Of Sirens, Songs, and Soma 
The mythological figures of the Sirens, who first appear in Homer’s Odyssey, are 
perhaps the oldest and most famous Western trope for acoustic allure and 
violence.48  This figure lends its name to the sound generator developed during the 
early 19th century now used as a means of urgent public address: an audible 
warning of immediate peril, a penetrating and resonant signal that action is 
                                                 
48  Homer and Hesiod are the early mythological sources; thereafter, literary 
references to the sirens appear in texts by authors as diverse as Apollonios Rhodos, 
Ariosto, Augustine, Cicero, Clement of Alexandria, Boccacio, Boiardo, Camoes, 
Dante, Diotimos, Euripides, Eustathius, Heraclitus, Horace, Hieronymus, 
Hippolyti, Isidore of Seville, Isaiah, Lycophron of Chalcis, Ovid, Plato, Pliny, 
Plutarch, Posanias,, Sachs,,Seneca, Shakespeare, Sophocles, Spenser, Tasso, and 
Virgil.  Modern sources of the sirens include Blanchot, Horkheimer and Adorno, 
Joyce, Kafka, and Rilke.  This list is not exhaustive.  For an overview, see Eva 
Hofstetter, Sirenen im archaischen und klassischen Griechenland, (Konrad Triltsch 
Verlag, 1990).  See also Sabine Wedner, Tradition und Wandel im allegorischen 
Verständnis des Sirenenmythos, (Peter Lang 1995), and Siegfried de Rachewiltz, De 
Sirenibus: An Inquiry into Sirens from Homer to Shakespeare, (PhD Dissertation, 
Harvard University, 1983). 
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necessary because violence is imminent.49  As Renata Salecl has observed, the 
Sirens’ message conveys “ ‘Danger!’ or maybe even, ‘Death!’” (1).  As a 
technological device, the siren operates on two levels:  phenomenologically, it 
inflicts a barely tolerable acoustic force that demands action or attention; 
representationally, it signals warning of an impending emergency.  As a literary 
figure, one might assume that the Sirens’ singing operates primarily on the level of 
representation: domesticated by the literary text, their image is woven into the 
fabric of Odysseus’ verbal narrative.  The success, or rather failure, of this 
domestication illustrates how the Sirens’ song—their sonic body—troubles not 
only the conventional notion that there can be an utterly silent and purely imagistic 
text, but also and even more importantly the idea that the text is a neutral and 
distanced space in which sound does not circulate.  
In most cultural representations of the mythological Sirens, the allure and 
potential threat of violence appears under the guise of a feminine seduction so 
riveting that the Sirens’ auditory genealogy often disappears from the seduction 
scene.  Sound is drained, and all that remains is femininity with an open mouth.  
At the same time, one could say that in representation, sound is so difficult to 
sublimate that when it is crafted as representationally inaudible its vibrations seem 
to funnel into a supernatural or sexually excessive representational imagination.  
                                                 
49  Various forms of the siren were invented by Charles Caignard de la Tour 
(1827), Félix Savart (1830), Friedrich Opelt (1834), Heinrich Wilhelm Dove (1851), 
and Hermann Helmholtz (1856).  See Ernst Robel, Die Sirenen: Ein Beitrag zur 
Entwicklungsgeschihchte der Akustik, Teil 2: Die Arbeiten deutscher Physiker über die 
Sirene im Zeitraume von 1830-1856, Berlin: Gaertner, 1894, and Stephen Vogel, 
“Sensation of Tone, Perception of Sound, and Empiricism: Helmholtz’s 
Physiological Acoustics,” Hermann von Helmholtz and the Foundations of Nineteenth-
Century Science, Ed. David Cahan.  Berkeley: U of California Press, 1993.  259-287.  
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One sees this in the vast literary and iconographical trajectory in the Western 
European tradition since the Odyssey, in which the Sirens are endowed with a 
myriad of corporeal attributes and fantastic abilities depending upon the 
allegorical purpose they are designed to serve.  Under various sacred and secular 
guises, they are depicted as birds with women’s heads, winged women with 
feathered legs and clawed feet, musical species of the underworld, magical singers 
who guide souls of the dead, Christian angels, and fish-tailed women or mermaids.  
The Sirens’ supernatural haunting and sexualized excess has entered the English 
vernacular, in which sirens are defined as “one of several fabulous monsters, part 
woman, part bird, who were supposed to lure sailors to destruction by their 
enchanting singing,” “one who, or that which sings sweetly, charms, allures, or 
deceives, like the Sirens,”  (Oxford English Dictionary) or simply “a temptingly 
beautiful woman or one who sings seductively” (Bell 400).  The Sirens have become 
a ubiquitous cultural presence, though their sound has dissolved into a mere 
metaphor for seduction.   
 In the Odyssey, the story of the Sirens is embedded in an extended first-
person narrative that Odysseus tells to the Phaecian King Alcinous and his court.  
So the Sirens episode is part of a hero’s eyewitness testimony of his adventures at 
sea.  Odysseus is, in the words of Clayton Koelb, “the single mortal authority on 
the Sirens,” (302) a point that cannot be overemphasized; for under the 
circumstances in which Odysseus finds himself, this story is both a valuable 
commodity and a powerful vehicle for the task of self-invention.  In the gift 
economy that “governs all dealings between guest and host in the Odyssey,” 
Odysseus’s tales are all that he has to exchange for the objects and the hospitality 
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he stands to gain from his wealthy host (De Rachewiltz 31). Thus, the fantastic 
encounter plays a key dramatic role in Odysseus’ tale, which is crafted for a live, 
and captive audience.  In this respect, it is especially notable that the narrative of 
the Sirens’ song is the only place in the Odyssey in which Odysseus is addressed as 
the “great war-glory of the Acheans” (12:184) (Segal 101).   Pietro Pucci has 
demonstrated, in fact, that on the level of diction, formulaic expression, and 
grammatical construction, the Sirens’ song is meant to “reproduce” the text of the 
Iliad.  Although Pucci argues that it is the Sirens who construct Odysseus to be the 
hero of the Iliad, Pucci comes to this conclusion because he takes Odysseus at his 
word.  But we should keep in mind that because the Odyssey presents the episode as 
a story within a story, the Odyssey emphasizes Odysseus as the narrator of this 
song.  This emphasis invites the possibility that what Odysseus says when he cites 
his past is guided by the motivation to recreate himself through the retelling of his 
historical narrative.  Odysseus has every reason to portray himself as the great hero 
of Troy, and to utilize his encounter with the Sirens for this purpose.  As a guest-
turned-entertainer, Odysseus narrates his own epic and inscribes himself as hero. 
 Because the Siren scene has been subject to countless transformations since 
Homer, a careful look at what the Odyssey text does and does not say is fruitful in 
teasing out the nature of the Sirens’ song and Odysseus’s status as its narrator.  The 
Siren scene appears in two sections: the first in which Circe predicts Odysseus’ 
encounter with the creatures, the second in which Odysseus remembers the event.  
In the passage that follows, Odysseus impersonates Circe, who one might call a 
siren for the Sirens, as she provides Odysseus with advance warning of the Sirens’ 
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danger and specific directives as to how to pass by the enchanting songstresses 
unharmed: 
You will come first of all to the Sirens, who are enchanters of all 
mankind and whoever comes their way; and that man who 
unsuspecting approaches them, and listens to the Sirens singing, has 
no prospect of coming home and delighting his wife and little 
children as they stand about him in greeting, but the Sirens by the 
melody of their singing enchant him. They sit in their meadow, but 
the beach before it is piled with bone heaps of men now rotted away, 
and the skins shrivel upon them.  You must drive straight on past, but 
melt down sweet wax of honey and with it stop your companions’ 
ears, so none can listen; the rest, that is, but if you yourself are 
wanting to hear them, then have them tie you hand and foot on the 
fast ship, standing upright against the mast with the ropes’ ends 
lashed around it, so that you can have joy in  hearing the song of the 
Sirens: but if you supplicate your men and implore them to set you 
free, then they must tie you fast with even more lashings. (12:37-54) 
(186) 
The first thing to notice about Odysseus’ retelling of Circe’s  description is that 
Sirens act solely by singing.  They enchant and entice through singing, but other 
than that, they merely sit.  Although the reference to “boneheaps” of rotting men 
with shriveling skin suggests a relationship between the Sirens’ enchantment and 
the death of men, it is not at all clear that the Sirens play any active role in  bringing 
about this death.  In fact, it would appear that this death occurs without any direct 
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corporeal contact between those who die and the Sirens bar the somatic properties 
of the Siren’s song.  This song seems to mesmerize, to entrance, and to assert a 
magnetic force upon those who chance to encounter it, but the Sirens themselves 
commit no “deadly” act except to sing. 
 After Circe warns Odysseus about the Sirens, Odysseus says that she warns 
him of several more dangers awaiting him on his journey back to Ithaca.  Odysseus 
takes Circe’s leave, then passes along her instructions to his crew: 
First of all she tells us to keep away from the magical Sirens and their 
singing and their flowery meadow, but only I, she said, was to listen 
to them, but you must tie me hard in hurtful bonds, to hold me fast in 
position upright against the mast, with the ropes’ ends fastened 
around it; but if I supplicate you and implore you to set me free, then 
you must tie me fast with even more lashings.   (12:158-164) (189) 
Though it is briefer, Odysseus’ description of the Sirens here is largely similar to 
Circe’s.  Again, he describes them as magical singers, but does not tell his crew the 
danger that their song poses to its listeners.  Notably, Odysseus reiterates and 
embellishes the relationship between the Sirens and their “meadow,” an interesting 
move that sexualizes them.  According to Jean-Pierre Vernant, “meadow”, leimon, 
“is one of the words used to designate female genitalia” (104).  Vernant believes 
that the poet has crafted the Sirens to be “in all their irresistibility unequivocally in 
the realm of sexual attraction or erotic appeal,” but it seems a more precise 
characterization to say that the poet has crafted this crafting to take place by 
Odysseus through his narrative.  Circe has offered him the privilege of a choice: 
either he can stop up his ears along with those of his crew or he can “have joy in 
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hearing the song of the Sirens.”  Odysseus’ preference for pleasure is revealed by 
his choice, but it is precisely this choice coupled with his own desire that sexualizes 
the Sirens’ song.  Odysseus is allured not by song, but by the power he holds to let 
himself be tempted.   
 As Odysseus’ narrative of his encounters with the Sirens continues, he tells 
his audience that as he gave his men Circe’s instructions, his ship approached the 
Sirens’ island.  He states: 
  So as I was telling all the details to my companions, 
  meanwhile the well-made ship was coming rapidly closer  
 to the Sirens’ isle, for the harmless wind was driving her onward; but 
 immediately then the breeze dropped, and a windless calm fell there, 
 and some divinity stilled the tossing waters.  My companions stood 
 up, and took the sails down, and stowed them away in the hollow  
 hull, and took their places for rowing, and with their planed  
 oarblades whitened the water.  Then I, taking a great wheel of wax,  
 with the sharp bronze cut a little piece off, and rubbed it together in 
 my heavy hands, and soon the wax grew softer, under the powerful  
  stress of the sun, and the heat and light of Hyperion’s lordling.   
  One after another, I stopped the ears of all my companions,  
  and they then bound me hand and foot in the fast ship, standing  
  upright against the mast with the ropes’ ends lashed around it,  
  and sitting then to row they dashed their oars in the gray sea.   
  But when we were as far from the land as a voice shouting  
  carries, lightly plying, the swift ship as it drew nearer  
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  was seen by the Sirens, and they directed their sweet song toward us. 
  (189-90). 
As we can see from this passage, the most startling disparity between Odysseus’ 
description of the Sirens and their subsequent literary and iconographical 
representation is that, in fact, Odysseus never sees them.  He reveals that the Sirens 
catch sight of him and his ship, but the sign that marks his ship’s proximity to the 
Sirens is not a vision, but a change in the wind.  So although the Sirens have 
become a trope for wild, beastly, and feminine sexual abandon—mythological 
enchantresses who must be resisted lest they entice men into their deadly 
clutches—these excesses have been written onto the Sirens’ physical body by 
intervening history extracted from a fairly innocuous literary image.  Moreover, the 
disparity between the embellishment of the Sirens’ physical appearance after 
Homer and the absence of any visual description of them in the Odyssey presents 
an interesting interpretive problem.  For in the Odyssey the Sirens are entities or 
agents who act through sound and yet their sound is neither directly present in the 
text in real time–we cannot physically hear it emanating from the page—nor 
represented by the text.  What counts within the overall narrative is whether the 
Sirens’ sound acts or fails to act upon Odysseus.  If the song acts it deters him from 
his voyage back to Ithaca; if it fails to act it does not deter him and he sails on.  By 
binding himself to the mast and allowing himself to hear the Sirens’ song but 
withstand the force of its action, Odysseus disrupts the potential of the vocal 
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performative.50  In this way, he inserts himself as master of a representational space 
swirling with desire between the voice’s promise and its misfire.51  
 At the same time that Odysseus’ disruption of the vocal performative is 
successful in opening up a space of representation—that is, Odysseus is able to 
listen but disarm the power of the Sirens to determine his course—the narrative is 
unsuccessful in domesticating the Sirens’ song—that is, in absorbing acoustic 
presence into textual narrative and thus morphing it (and thereby obliterating it) 
into representation.  Horkheimer and Adorno argue that “the bonds with which 
[Odysseus] has irredeemably tied himself to practice, also keep the Sirens away 
from practice: their temptation is neutralized and becomes a mere object of 
contemplation—becomes art” (Horkheimer and Adorno 34).52  But the presence of 
sound, the presence of the Sirens’ song does not operate according to expectations of a 
representational economy.  Indeed, in the Odyssey, the Sirens’ song is always 
associated with an active touch that remains, remains in a sense present in the text 
                                                 
50 I use the phrase “vocal performative” to refer specifically to the resonant 
force of the live speech act as opposed to the “performative utterance,” as I flesh 
out in chapter 1.  
 
51  I am referring here, of course, to the speech act theory of J.L. Austin.  See 
Austin, How To Do Things With Words 2nd edition, (Harvard University Press: 1975). 
 
 52 In Carlé’s words, Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading of the Sirens episode 
in the Dialectic of Enlightenment  “absurdly take[s] the legend of sirens as a 
metaphorical translation for the loss of nature by logical force and technology” (3).  
The imperial sweep with which Kittler et al colonize the real, i.e., “nature” “by 
logical force and technology” is no less effacing of the siren’s song.  In both cases, 
whether the Sirens actually sang--the sound of their song--gets lost in the tadoo over 
what their song and its subvention into either culture or the body of a narrative 
means in a subsequent analysis, be it intellectual historical or philological.  
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even once the singing is disarmed.53  Presence is not domesticated, not dominated, 
not swallowed up by representation; presence is and simply remains, remains of a 
presence that had been present.  
 Bound securely to the mast and supported by his crew ready with wax-
stopped ears, Odysseus says he hears the following: 
Come this way, honored Odysseus, great glory of the Achaians, and 
stay your ship, so that you can listen here to our singing; for no one 
else has ever sailed past this place in his blackship until he has 
listened to the honey-sweet voice that issues from our lips; then goes 
on, well pleased, knowing more than ever he did; for we know 
everything that the Argives and Trojans did and suffered in wide 
Troy through the gods’ despite.  Over all the generous earth we know 
everything that happens. (12:184-191) 
The text of the Sirens’ song is brief compared to Circe’s warning and to Odysseus’ 
elaborate preparations in order for him to be able to listen.  More unusual about 
this song, however, is that indeed, it seems much more like a narration, a narrative 
text, than like a song.  Although as oral poetry the text of the Odyssey could be 
called a song, both Circe and Odysseus repeatedly emphasize the Sirens’ song, their 
singing act, and Odysseus’s act of listening.  This emphasis indicates a fundamental 
difference between the song of the Sirens and the song of Odysseus; or, in other 
words, a fundamental difference between the presentational song and the 
                                                 
 53 As discussed in Chapter 1, I borrow the idea of “performance remains” 
from Rebecca Schneider.  See her “Archives: Performance Remains”, Performance 
Research 6(2) 2001, 100-108. 
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representational word.  The text reveals that the Sirens’ song is markedly acoustic 
rather than literary and somatic rather than transcendent.   
 In English translations, the Sirens are referred to as creatures who “beguile” 
or, in the Lattimore edition, “enchant”: a word from the Latin incantre, in-upon, 
against + cantre (to sing), and related to chant and incantation; possibly also related 
to the Latin catena, chain, fetter, bond.  The magic they practice is achieved through 
the act of singing because it forges a material bond.  “Enchant” and “beguile” are 
English translations for thelgousin, from thelgô, “to stroke or touch with magic 
power.”  So indeed, here singing is primarily an acoustic act; a tactile merger of 
soma, a resonant touching of bodies.  This is why, as Charles Segal notes, 
Odysseus’s hearing is characterized as akouein, a word that indicates hearing that is 
“entirely material” (Segal 105).  Unlike Odysseus, the Sirens cannot narrate.  “Their 
power,” Segal states, “depends emphatically on hearing,” (100) which is to say that 
their song imparts a resonance that resides beyond the representational power of 
language.  In narrative terms, their song can only sing, can only do by singing.  This 
is what Todorov means when he says: “[t]he Sirens say only one thing: that they 
are singing!” (58).  In Odysseus’ narrative, their song is material remains, material 
that remains, material that sticks to representation even though it eludes the 
condition of language.  Underneath the representational excesses mapped onto the 
Sirens’ figure are acoustic and material remains of their song that stick to the 
representational narrative. 
 In his retelling of the Sirens’ song, Odysseus cannot replicate its resonant 
touch, for he can only narrate.  Faced by the impossibility of representing the 
“magic power” of the Sirens’ song in his performance, Odysseus invents a textual 
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equivalent.  But like all half-truths, Odysseus’ tall tale eventually crumbles.  
Although we can only take this narrator for his word, once again we cannot take 
him precisely at his word because of a problem that reveals itself in the final passage 
of relevant verse.  After relaying the song’s narrative, Odysseus ends the story of 
the Sirens as follows: 
  So they sang, in sweet utterance, and the heart within me  
  desired to listen, and I signaled my companions to set me free,  
  nodding with my brows, but they leaned on and rowed hard,  
  and Perimedes and Eurylochos, rising up, straightway  
  fastened me with even more lashings and squeezed me tighter.   
  But when they had rowed on past the Sirens, and we could no  
  longer hear their voices and lost the sound of their singing,   
  presently my eager companions took away from their ears the  
  beeswax with which I had stopped them:  Then they set me free  
  from my lashings. (12:192-200) 
This passage is puzzling, for if Perimedes and Eurylochos fasten Odysseus tighter 
whenever he signals to them and if Odysseus’s crew cannot hear the Sirens because 
of the wax in their ears, how can they know when it has become safe to obey 
Odysseus’s signals to set him free because the Sirens have stopped singing?  If he 
gestures, he is tied more tightly; but if the crew is actually able to hear the Sirens, 
then the entire story is merely a fantastic fabrication.  Blanchot insists that “a 
somewhat mean tendency to discredit the Sirens has always prevailed,” (60) and 
although I do not wish to simply turn the tables against Odysseus, it appears that 
in fact it is his telling of the Sirens that cannot end felicitously.  This is not a 
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discrediting of the Sirens, however, but a discrediting of that which came after, 
Odysseus’ song, and Homer’s setting of it into a written text.   
 Admittedly, it is impossible to say with certainty whether Odysseus actually 
heard something—in medial terms whether he actually detected sound, or 
something that I refer to as voice, the irrefutable materiality of sound, atmospheric 
vibrations with consequential material effects.  But whether he heard it or not, a 
trace of the Sirens voice already exists in the body of the text, is present even if it 
does not literally sound when we open up the pages of the book.  Although we 
cannot literally hear the medial voice, we know from this reading that their 
remains remain, even if these remains are only indirectly detectable.  They remain 
not in spite of the ambiguous manner in which they are rendered, but all the more 
so because of it, a point that I will elaborate further below.  The space of Odysseus’ 
infelicity suggests the possibility that the Sirens “sang” something, that they voiced 
sound or sounds that cannot be directly conveyed by words, pure voice, the 
“Urmedium” (Waldenfels 19) of the live speech act.  Somewhere later along the line, 
the story of the Sirens is woven into a song that recounts Odysseus’ travels home 
and his encounter with them, a “song” that marks a second medial shift, regardless 
of who actually “sang” the Odyssey.  Odysseus or “Odysseus” was a bard who 
sang, and Homer’s text an artifact, a “storage container” of that material.  This 
transformation from song in the literal sense to a poem set into text by a poet or 
poets referred to as Homer marks a third medial shift.   
 Although evidence of medial shifts create a difficulty for the interpreter, the 
task is to flesh out the sense in which they remain; that is, since medial shifts do not 
completely obliterate the previous form, it is necessary for the interpreter to “read” 
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for the signs that indicate other medial presence.   Havelock states that when 
primary orality is written down, what I am referring to here as the third medial 
shift, “it ceases to be what it originally was” (66).  By this, he does not mean that 
primary orality never existed, but rather that there are challenges in devising a way 
to detect it: 
  Aside from the paradox by which language has to be used to  
  understand language, that is, to understand itself, we face a   
  comparable dilemma when we undertake to understand orality.  For 
  the chief source material provided for inspection is textual.  How can 
  a knowledge of orality be derived from its opposite?  And even  
  supposing texts can supply some sort of image of orality, how can  
  that image be adequately verbalized in a textual description of it,  
  which presumably employs a vocabulary and syntax proper to  
  textualization, not orality? (Havelock 44) 
Once the content shifts medial form, the content may be what Havelock, after G. S. 
Kirk, calls  “compromised and corrupted,” (53) but this does not efface all traces of 
the prior form, as Milman Parry demonstrates in his extensive work on what he 
calls the “Homeric Problem” (Havelock 52).  In the same way, neither the “song” 
nor the text cancel out voice, even if it makes that voice inaudible, “employing a 
vocabulary and syntax” proper to a subsequent form (Havelock 44).  The great 
difficulty with hearing voice, of course, is that it could never—can never—be 
rendered through language absolutely because it does not consist of linguistic 
properties.  And by the time it has morphed into text, it has gone through at least 
two phases of “compromise and corruption. “     
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 It is fascinating that despite their sexual and textual politics, the Berlin 
media theorists intuit the first medial shift that I describe, even if they are reluctant 
to publicly recognize it as such before attempting to make it data on tape. The 
reluctance to avow phenomena that cannot be seen is symptomatic of a larger 
cultural problem in which phenomena that are not immediately perceptible are 
doubted and dismissed.  It is important to remember, however, that the material 
effects of sound may be even acutely present yet not immediately perceptible. The 
danger in listening, I would guess, comes from a fear of performing not only 
flimsy, but possibly even pathological scholarship.  If we “hear voices,” we are 
more likely to be aligned with Daniel Paul Schreber, Freud’s famous psychotic 
patient, than other figures who heard voices such as Pythagoras, Socrates, St. 
Augustine, or Hildegard von Bingen.54  Of course, I am not advocating that we 
actually place our ear to the written page, but rather, that we read keeping in mind 
the possibility that traces of sound are somehow present—looking and reading for 
them, even, or perhaps especially, in places where the text seems “compromised 
and corrupted.”  These moments—perhaps we might call them aporias—where the 
narrative reaches a breaking point, may well be the place where traces of voice are 
trying to be heard.  
 Carlé suggests that in addition to signaling the beginning of the “vocal 
alphabet,” the Sirens episode marks the beginning of what Julian Jaynes calls, in 
his book by the same name “the origin of consciousness and the breakdown of the 
bicameral mind”.  Although I am not prepared to unreservedly subscribe to Carlé 
                                                 
 54  See Ivan Leudar and Philip Thomas, Voices of Reason, Voices of Insanity: 
Studies of Verbal Halucinations.  London and Philadelphia: Routledge, 2000. 
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or Jaynes, I find it compelling that in a literary text, sound is the register that, like 
the unconscious, must be inferred through markers or symptoms because it cannot 
be known directly.  It must be teased out and deciphered, perhaps because it has 
been “compromised and corrupted,” or, in Freudian terms, “condensed and 
displaced.”  If the Sirens episode marks the beginnings of Odysseus’ 
consciousness, then perhaps the Sirens are a literary figure or trope for the 
unconscious, hence their association with animal instincts, uncivilized urges, 
danger, and desire.  Here, then, the only place in my analysis where voice gets 
linked to subjectivity in the first person, though it is not the voice of the ego, but of 
the id.55   
 Strangely, Kittler’s crew has difficulties with readings of the Sirens that do 
not correspond with their own, as though their medial innovation can cancel out 
alternate interpretations that perhaps rely upon other medial phases. About 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading of the Sirens in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, for 
instance, Carlé argues that Horkheimer and Adorno “looked at the Odyssey as if it 
was somewhat like the first ‘novel’ in ‘literature’ so that their only ‘left’ perspective 
could absurdly take the legend of sirens as a metaphorical translation for the loss of 
natur[al] biological force and technology” (Carlé Psychoacoustics 3).  What strikes 
me, however, is that Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading is compatible with an 
interpretation of a shift from the first to the third medial phases that I describe, in 
which the “force” of the vocal utterance is subsumed by a cultural object.  That 
they do not account for the second medial shift may have only to do with the 
                                                 
55 In medial terms, the unconscious itself might be viewed as a “storage 
container”.  
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metaphorical lens with which they viewed Homer.  I do not feel that culture can 
erase all forms of natural force—on this point I disagree with Horkheimer and 
Adorno—but in the context of their study I can logically follow why they would 
make this claim.  One cannot fault them for finding metaphorical value in a potent 
cultural myth, and for their disinterest in deciphering medial code.  Just as 
Adorno’s reading of Wagner has less to do with Wagner’s music specifically than 
with the dangerous aesthetics of Nazi politics, Horkheimer and Adorno are less 
concerned with the status of nature than with the dangers of man under the 
condition of enlightenment.56 Bringing them into dialogue with the medial shifts I 
have described, I would probe Horkheimer and Adorno for a reflection upon an 
untenable nature/culture split.  Though culture has come to dominate nature, it 
surely has not obliterated nature.  Nature “remains” in the fabric of culture—
indeed, it constitutes culture—although culture repeatedly strives to assert and 
reassert its domination.  
 
Undermining Sonic Ontology   
 As well known as the Horkheimer/Adorno and Blanchot texts regarding the 
Sirens is Franz Kafka’s short piece, “Das Schweigen der Sirenen“ [“The Silence of 
the Sirens“].  Similar to his dismissal of those previous other readings, Wolfgang 
Ernst is so determined to prove an originary act of resonance that Kafka too must 
be somehow mistaken to suggest that the Sirens did not sing (“Resonance” 3).   In 
his fable, which I will quote below at length, Kafka portrays the Sirens as pure 
                                                 
56 See Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner, Trans. Rodney Livingstone.  
London and New York:  Verso, 2005. 
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sound, capable of deadly sonic affliction, and Odysseus as a man who listens but 
does not or perhaps cannot reason: “Der Sang der Sirenen durchdrang alles, und die 
Leidenschaft der Verführten hätte mehr als Ketten und Mast gesprengt.”  Daran aber 
dachte Odysseus nicht, obwohl er davon vielleicht gehört hatte” (305).57  According to 
Kafka, those who hear the Sirens long so unmistakably, that they forsake all else to 
hear them; no earthly restraint could hinder that desire.  In the case of Odysseus, 
however, the Sirens did not sing:  “Und tatsächlich sangen, als Odysseus kam, die 
gewaltigen Sängerinnen nicht, sei es, daß sie glaubten, diesem Gegner könne nur noch das 
Schweigen beikommen, sei es, daß der Anblick der Glückseligkeit im Gesicht des Odysseus, 
der an nichts anderes als an Wachs und Ketten dachte, sie allen Gesang vergessen ließ” 
(305).58  Had Odysseus actually heard the Sirens, he would not live to tell about it.  
In Kafka’s version, song does not obliterate Odysseus, but only because the Sirens 
do not sing.  Either the sight of Odysseus or the Siren’s forgetfulness allows 
Odysseus to catch a glimpse—a glimpse that signals the Siren’s failure rather than 
Odysseus’s cunning. Odysseus sees the Sirens and the Sirens see him, lines of site 
that supercede, indeed—nullify—sound.  Odysseus is not a hero, but a bearer of 
good fortune.  
                                                 
57 “The song of the sirens could pierce through everything, and the longing 
of those they seduced would have broken far stronger bonds than chains and 
masts.  But [Odysseus] did not think of that, although he probably heard of it 
(248).“ 
 
 58  “When [Odysseus] approached them the potent songstresses actually did 
not sing, whether because they thought that this enemy could be vanquished only 
by their silence, or because the look of bliss on the face of [Odysseus], who was 
thinking of nothing but his wax and his chains, made them forget their singing“ 
(249).  
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 According to Kafka, Odysseus, the egotistical man, was so captured by the 
sight of the Sirens that he did not hear their silence.  Caught up in his own gaze, he 
thought they were singing and the he alone did not hear them:  “Odysseus aber, um 
es so auszudrücken, hörte ihr Schweigen nicht, er glaubte, sie sängen, und nur er sei 
behütet, es zu hören.  Flüchtig sah er zuerst die Wengungen ihrer Hälse, das tiefe Atmen, 
die tränenvollen Augen, den halb geöffneten Mund, glaubte aber, dies gehöre zu den Arien, 
die ungehört um ihn verklangen“ (305).59  At the same time, the sight of Odysseus 
captures the Sirens’ gaze, and makes them forget everything.  It makes them 
unable to act, which, in their case, is both to sing and to engage in the economy of 
desire.  In Kafka’s words, “Sie aber—schöner als jemals—streckten und drehten sich, 
ließen das schaurige Haar offen im Winde wehen und spannten die Krallen frei auf den 
Felsen.  Sie wollten nicht mehr verführen, nur noch den Abglanz vom großen Augenpaar 
des Odysseus wollten sie so lange als möglich erhaschen“ (305).60  In that moment in 
which their eyes were transfixed upon Odysseus, Kafka tells us, “they would have 
been annihilated” had they “possessed consciousness” (250):  “Hätten die Sirenen 
Bewußtsein, sie wären damals vernichtet worden.  So aber blieben sie, nur Odysseus ist 
ihnen entgangen” (305).  Aurality is thus mistakenly integrated into narrative, while 
man, his sight, and the failure of his other senses create a split subject in which 
failed “knowledge” becomes the condition of consciousness. 
                                                 
 59 “Caught up in his own gaze, he thought they were singing and that he 
alone did not hear them. For a fleeting moment he saw their throats rising and 
falling, their breasts lifting, their eyes filled with tears, their lips half-parted, but 
believed that these were accompaniments to the airs which died unheard around 
him” (249).  
 
60 They had no longer any desire to allure; all that they wanted was to hold 
as long as they could the radiance that fell from [Odysseus’s] great eyes” (250). 
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 The astuteness of Kafka’ reading of the Sirens lies in his tacit recognition 
that the Siren’s sound is compromised and corrupted in Odysseus’s story, that in 
fact, Odysseus is foolish to think that he can “know” a knowledge uncorrupted by 
his own desire.  This is what I meant when I said that the presence of the Sirens’ 
voice is not domesticated, not dominated, not swallowed up by linguistic 
representation.  Odysseus may think that he captures the Sirens’ “knowledge,” but 
their “knowledge” is of a completely different nature altogether.  Odysseus 
becomes the master of representational space, swirling with desire, but not master 
of the Siren’s song.  Kafka, for his part, detects sound remains even when they are 
silent, by finding points at which human technologies of “knowing” fail.   
 Although Kafka’s text portrays a missed event, a “failure” on the level of 
reading, it succeeds in getting so much right about the Sirens and their legacy, for 
what it signals is precisely the rhetoric of failure that surround the song of the 
Sirens.  This failure has to do with the schism between seeing and hearing, between 
reading and listening, between song and narration, gaps whose presence take 
away the possibility of Odysseus’s and Homer’s narrative to ever end felicitiously.  
Again and again, this seems to be sound’s legacy—its indication that ephemera is, 
after all, evidence; evidence that sound remains.  But that it should remain in a 
quiet medium tells us something about both the practice of reading and the divide 
between nature and culture.  In terms of the former, reading is ultimately not about 
truth, but about the possibility to interpret every possible reading borne out of the 
text and for all of these interpretations to be, if not equally, than at least 
simultaneously plausible.  As for the latter, it seems almost trite to say that man’s 
desire to “know” oftentimes distorts the clarity of the enigma directly before him.  
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Ultimately, the gap between seeing and hearing is not so much about the 
privileged development of one sensory apparatus over another, but about a certain 
need that makes man hungry to possess.  Disappearing sound, also known as 
becoming quiet, may not be “failure,” but ingenious subterfuge.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FREUD’S SCRIPTURAL RHETORIC 
 
 As the developer of the art of the “talking cure,” Freud is clearly one of the 
most adept listeners in modern history.  Why, then, does he disavow his ability to 
listen when the sounds that he hears are musical?  What trouble does Freud 
associate with music?  As many scholars have examined at length, Freud was a 
master of the art of close reading, an extraordinarily rigorous and creative 
interpreter of human behavior whose insight one could only hope to emulate.  In 
much of his work, however, the “text” that he “reads,” his “object” of 
psychoanalysis, is both the body and the speech of the patient.  He is a close reader, 
but in the most general sense of the term.   
 If psychoanalysis is a science of interpretation, the procedure that “brings 
out the latent meaning in what the subject says and does” (Laplanche and Pontalis 
227), careful listening is the technique that makes interpretation of the analysand’s 
speech possible.  Indeed, “The central condition of Freud’s therapy is, of course, his 
insistence on the spoken word, which is saturated with meaning for him” 
(Bruzelius 195).  In the psychoanalytic setting, the spoken word would be mute 
without close reading and careful listening operating in tandem.  Since Freud 
forever changed the way that we listen, then what to we hear when we listen 
carefully for Freud? 
 In the analytic setting, “the ‘instrument’ that the therapist needs is the talk, 
the voice of the patient himself, who will display for the therapist the underlying 
conflicts that give birth to his symptoms” (Bruzelius 194).  What interests me, 
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however, is not Freud’s “talk,” but rather his rhetoric, the language he chooses to 
employ in his writing in order to persuade his readers.  I am not placing Freud on 
the couch, not inviting him to talk in order assist in the relief of a set of symptoms; 
my goal here is not the “talking cure.”  Rather, my goal is to carefully listen to 
Freud in the context of his culture and history.  I am in search of Freud’s language 
and behavior that is saturated with meaning, Freud’s voice as it is bound up in the 
rhetoric of his writing. 
 My example for this kind of interpretation comes in part from Freud, who in 
much of his work, considers his object the vast domain of Western culture.  As 
Louis Rose states, for Freud and his followers, “their calling belonged as much to 
culture as to psychology, and not only because that early circle included writers 
and critics, as well as medical practitioners.  From the founding of the [Vienna 
Psychoanalytic] Society at the turn of the century to its forced disintegration under 
the Anschluss in 1938, Freud and his followers defined the comprehensive 
exploration of culture as one of their fundamental pursuits (Rose 11).  For Freud, 
culture is fascinating not because it is ill (though some of his contemporaries 
certainly thought that) but because it is a tangled web of curious discourses that 
have meaning. 
 In my work here, I want to listen carefully to Freud as a cultural analyst.  
Here, I am invoking the practice coined by Mieke Bal, who states that cultural 
analysis is a rigorous interdisciplinary practice that “problematizes history’s silent 
assumptions in order to come to an understanding of the past that is different ”(1).  
This is entirely similar to Freud’s methodology.  By listening carefully to the past, 
Freud excavates meaning hidden in the silent assumptions that have formed our 
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understanding of the world.  My intention is to listen, paying close attention to 
what is said and what is not said, to listen while questioning the process of 
listening.61  My practice attends to reading while attempting to become cognizant 
of what lies beyond the text.  What voices, what truths might be silently lurking in 
Freud’s rhetoric?   
 In the same way that “reading” has been constructed as a sober and rational 
method of examination that makes the interpretive operation scientifically credible, 
the act of listening is oftentimes constructed as an infinitely subjective exercise that 
threatens the subject who listens to become the object of scrutiny, especially when 
the topic involves psychoanalysis.  As I show below, this political insight is more 
relevant to the project at hand than I had at first realized.   
 In an essay on Freud reading, Sander Gilman explains that the threat of 
“subject” becoming “object,” was especially tangible for Jewish physicians (like 
Freud) since the Enlightenment, who “saw science as the path of the escape from 
the darkness of the ghetto into the bright light of modern culture” (Gilman 152).  
“For the late nineteenth-century Jewish scientist,” Gilman continues, “especially 
those in the biological sciences, the path of social and cultural acceptance […] 
entailed, more than in any other arena of endeavor, the acceptance of the 
contradiction between being ‘subject’ and ‘object,’ as one of the basic premises of 
nineteenth-century biological science was the primacy of racial difference” (152).  
Freud was acutely aware of this dilemma and, according to Gilman, attempted to 
                                                 
 61  For a philosophy of listening, see Peter Szendy’s Listen: A History of our 
Ears, Trans. Charlotte Mandell, New York: Fordham UP, 2008, and Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s Listening, Trans. Charlotte Mandell.  New York: Fordham UP, 2007. 
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resolve it through rhetorical means.  Because Jewish physicians could not meet 
“the demands of ‘scientific objectivity’,” placed upon them by the non-Jewish 
academic culture, Gilman argues, they “were forced to undertake complex 
psychological strategies to provide themselves with an ‘objective’ observing voice” 
(153).  In the chapter that follows, I pursue the argument that Freud’s trouble with 
music has less to do with aesthetic properties of the musical art form than with 
cultural anxieties about the reception of “scientific objectivity,” anxieties directly 
related to discourses about race, gender, and sexuality at the fin-de-Siècle.  
 
Freud Listening (To Music) 
Although psychoanalysis has been employed as a hermeneutic tool with which to 
interpret the representational content of an operatic work, the influence of operatic 
culture upon Freud and the development of psychoanalysis is a topic that has been 
virtually unexplored.  An historical and cultural analysis of psychoanalysis and 
opera as mutually constitutive has yet to be written.  This is due partly to the fact 
that for many years, the study of opera has belonged to the academic discipline of 
musicology.  Until roughly the past two decades, most musicological scholarship 
considered opera to be an essentially musical rather than dramatic art form, and 
thus drew fairly superficial conclusions about Freud’s relationship to it based upon 
the albeit contradictory evidence of his seemingly fraught relationship to music.   
 Given Freud’s fascination with classical drama, however, his appeal for 
opera should come as no surprise.  Freud scholars have generally accepted the 
assumption that because of Freud’s troubled relationship to music, opera could not 
have played much of a role in Freudian thought, except in those who mention 
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Freud’s particular operatic taste or biographical details such as how many times he 
visited this or that opera—rather confusing bits of information, since he is not 
generally believed to have cared about it.  Exceptions to the generally prevailing 
attitude about Freud and opera come from a small number of biographers and 
critics who point out that despite his seemingly troubled relationship to music in 
general, Freud appears to have been particularly interested in and drawn to opera.  
Richard Sterba, who had been a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society from 
1928-1938, distrusts Freud’s alleged disinterest in music and the general acceptance 
of this disinterest in biographical sources, and draws attention to Freud’s 
knowledge of and captivation for Mozart’s Don Giovanni and Le Nozze di Figaro, as 
well as Bizet’s Carmen, concluding it “doubtful whether music was so foreign to the 
founder of psychoanalysis” (Sterba 96).  Kurt Eissler reaches the same conclusion 
precisely because of Freud’s relationship to opera, calling Freud a “deeply musical 
man” (97).  And André Haynal states: “contrary to the prevailing image of him, 
Freud was a lover of music, especially opera” (xxi).  In addition to Mozart and 
Bizet, Freud was well versed with Wagner’s operas, as Cora Díaz de Chumaceiro 
has painstakingly documented (De Chumaceiro 1993). 
 In the literature that addresses Freud’s relationship to music, two related 
issues arise:  first, Freud’s musicality (or lack thereof), and second, Freud’s 
hypersensitivity to sounding phenomena.  Freud’s contemporaries confirm that he 
did not have the constitution of a musician and that he had difficulty grasping the 
internal structure of the art form.  Max Graf said that Freud was “a man of great 
artistic sensibilities, but to his great regret...quite unmusical,” (1942 474) and 
Eduard Hitschmann, that “music did not interest him, because he regarded it as an 
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unintelligible language” (qtd. In Roazen 270).  Hence, Ernst Jones’s influential 
assessment that “Freud’s aversion to music was one of his well known 
characteristics.”  But Jones misunderstands the composition of musicality, 
conflating an inability to create music and to intuit its structural design with an 
inability to sympathetically listen to the art form.  Jones grossly exaggerates 
Freud’s ambiguity toward music, a position many have been inexplicably eager to 
confirm.  Even nephew Harry reported that uncle Freud  “despised music and 
considered it solely as an intrusion,” (Jones; Ruitenbeek 313) a rather polemical 
assessment of someone who involuntarily hummed Mozart and off-handedly cited 
Wagner.   
 Misunderstandings about music and musicality mark much of the early 
biographical literature about Freud that later examinations attempt to undo.  For 
example, although Freud admits that he is unable to carry a tune, there is no 
substantiation for Peter Gay’s report that Freud “virtually boasted about his tone 
deafness”(168).62  As de Chumaceiro points out, the inability to carry a tune is a 
marker neither for tone deafness nor for musical ability (1990).  Even accomplished 
instrumentalists can be hopeless singers.  What seems clear is that Freud admitted 
and sometimes even exaggerated his lack for musical talent, and at the same time 
demonstrated a profound sensitivity toward listening.   
                                                 
62 Gay draws his conclusion from Freud’s remarks about his dream that is 
referred to as “Revolutionary Dream of Count Tune,” which Freud analyzes in The 
Interpretation of Dreams.  Freud states: “I had been humming a tune to myself which 
I recognized as Figaro’s aria from Le Nozze di Figaro.”  Freud goes on, “It is a little 
doubtful whether anyone else would have recognized the tune,” presumably 
because Freud could not carry a tune.  The Interpretation of Dreams.  In other words, 
Freud heard the tune in his head, but was apparently unable to reproduce it in a 
manner in which it might be recognized by someone else.  
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 Indeed, if Freud demonstrates a vexed and complicated relationship to 
music, it is likely because of this same sensitivity.  One finds this conclusion in 
most literature that has given careful thought to Freud’s relationship to music.  For 
instance, André Michel argues that Freud’s behavior indicates an acute sensitivity 
rather than disinclination (Leader 90).  And Neil M. Cheshire believes that in 
addition to a “powerful auditory memory” Freud demonstrated a “pervasively 
auditory ‘cognitive style’ such as Charcot had identified as a distinct personality 
characteristic marking off the temperamental auditifs from the contrasted visuels 
and ‘motorics’” (1128).  Psychoanalyst David Abrams speculates that Freud’s 
sensitivity to sound may be a sign of “some auditory-related trauma in [his] early 
life,” but I am unaware of evidence to support this claim (Abrams 281). 
 Some critics have sensationalized the intolerance Freud displayed towards 
the sound of his sisters—and later his own children—repeating their etudes on the 
piano.  Freud’s elder sister Anna recalls:  
  When I was eight years old, my mother, who was very musical,  
  wanted me to study the piano, and I began practicing by the hour.   
  Though Sigmund’s room was not near the piano, the sound disturbed 
  him.  He appealed to my mother to remove the piano if she did not  
  wish him to leave the house altogether.  The piano disappeared and 
  with it all opportunities for his sisters to become musicians.  Nor did 
  any of [Sigmund’s] children ever receive musical instruction where he 
  would have to hear it. (Abrams 281) 
This story is a wonderful anecdote, to be sure, but what it confirms is Freud’s 
extraordinary responsiveness to music, his hypersensitivity.  Of course, it also 
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illustrates the will with which Freud realized his own needs and desires, and his 
family’s capitulation to them, but that is not the topic of this study.   
 Freud’s own words demonstrate a clear ambivalence toward music.  
Although in his personal correspondence Freud reports to Marie Bonaparte that he 
finds music “foreign, incomprehensible and inaccessible,” (Ernst Freud 430) and to 
Deszo Mosonzi that he is “a completely unmusical person” (Michel 52)63 in an early 
letter to Wilhelm Fliess, he insightfully praises a performance of Wagner’s 
Meistersinger:  “Die ‘Morgentraumdeutweise’ hat mich sympathisch berührt, zum 
Paradies und Parnaß hätte ich gerne die ‘Parnosse’ hinzugefügt.  Es sind übrigens wie in 
keiner Oper sonst wirkliche Gedanken in Musik gesetzt, die dem Nachsinnen anhaftenden 
Gefühlstöne.”64  Such a statement hardly creates the impression that Freud was an 
unsympathetic audience.  Not only does it shed doubt upon the validity of his later 
statements to the contrary, it also suggests that for some reason Freud was 
motivated to distance himself from an early musical affinity, or perhaps that his 
later dismissive statements seek to conceal another underlying conflict.  
 
Freud’s Gesture toward Plato 
 Freud characterizes his relationship to music as one that he approaches with 
distance and reserve.  His most famous statement on the matter comes from his 
1914 essay, The Moses of Michelangelo, in which he confesses: 
                                                 
63 For a discussion these two letters, see Leader, “Freud, Music, and Working 
Through,” Freud’s Footnotes (London: Faber and Faber, 2000), 88-119. 
 
64 Letter 151, 12. December 1897.  Sigmund Freud. Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess 1887-
1904.  Ed. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson.  Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1985.  
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Aber Kunstwerke üben eine starke Wirkung auf mich aus, insbesondere 
Dichtungen und Werke der Plastik, seltener Malereien.  Ich bin so 
veranlaßt worden, bei den entsprechenden Gelegenheiten lange vor 
ihnen zu verweilen, und wollte sie auf meine Weise erfassen, d. h. mir 
begreiflich machen, wodurch sie wirken.  Wo ich das nicht kann, z. B. in 
der Musik, bin ich fast genußunfähig.  Eine rationalistische oder 
vielleicht analytische Anlage sträubt sich in mir dagegen, daß ich 
ergriffen sein und dabei nicht wissen solle, warum ich es bin, und was 
mich ergreift. (1914 172)65 
Although it is tempting to take Freud at the level of his literal word, surely 
Freud himself would press the meaning of the ambivalent phrase “fast 
                                                 
 65  Freud’s statement is possibly an allusion to Heinrich Heine’s essay on 
Paul Delaroch:  “Zu meinem Thema zurückkehrend, hätte ich hier noch manche 
wackere Maler zu rühmen; aber trotz des besten Willens ist es mir dennoch 
unmöglich, ihre stillen Verdienste ruhig auseinanderzusetzen, denn da draußen 
stürmt es wirklich zu laut, und es ist unmöglich, die Gedanken 
zusammenzufassen, wenn solche Stürme in der Seele widerhallen. Ist es doch in 
Paris sogar an sogenannt ruhigen Tagen sehr schwer, das eigene Gemüt von den 
Erscheinungen der Straße abzuwenden und Privatträumen nachzuhängen. Wenn 
die Kunst auch in Paris mehr als anderswo blüht, so werden wir doch in ihrem 
Genusse jeden Augenblick gestört durch das rohe Geräusch des Lebens; die 
süßesten Töne der Pasta und Malibran werden uns verleidet durch den Notschrei 
der erbitterten Armut, und das trunkene Herz, das eben Roberts Farbenlust 
eingeschlürft, wird schnell wieder ernüchtert durch den Anblick des öffentlichen 
Elends. Es gehört fast ein Goethescher Egoismus dazu, um hier zu einem 
ungetrübten Kunstgenuß zu gelangen, und wie sehr einem gar die Kunstkritik 
erschwert wird, das fühle ich eben in diesem Augenblick. Ich vermochte gestern 
dennoch an diesem Berichte weiterzuschreiben, nachdem ich einmal unterdessen 
nach den Boulevards gegangen war, wo ich einen todblassen Menschen vor 
Hunger und Elend niederfallen sah. Aber wenn auf einmal ein ganzes Volk 
niederfällt an den Boulevards von Europa - dann ist es unmöglich, ruhig 
weiterzuschreiben. Wenn die Augen des Kritikers von Tränen getrübt werden, ist 
auch sein Urteil wenig mehr wert.”  See Heine, Französische Maler. 
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genußunfähig” [almost incapable] and propose that its utterer is far more 
influenced by music than he wants to admit or is capable of consciously 
recognizing, hence the statement that he is almost incapable of its enjoyment.  
This is the position taken by Theodor Reik, a member of the Vienna 
Psychoanalytic Society from 1911-1933:  “It is likely that [Freud’s] turning 
away...was the more energetic and violent, the more the emotional effects of 
music appeared undesirable to him.  He became more and more convinced that 
he had to keep his reason unclouded and his emotions in abeyance.  He 
developed an increasing reluctance to surrendering to the dark power of 
music.”  Reik believes that Freud’s posturing toward music is act of “self-
defense” that suggests a relationship loaded with affect rather than devoid of 
it.  Clinging to reason rather than affect, Freud distanced himself from music 
on purely cerebral grounds, reluctant to admit and to avail himself to the effect 
music has upon him.66  
 Surely Freud knew that by distancing himself from representation and 
clinging to reason, he makes a grand gesture toward the philosophy of Plato, for 
whom both artist and poet are “by nature third from the king and the truth“ (Plato 
268) due to the corrupting influence of mimesis.  Because of what Plato interprets 
to be the dangerous gulf between imitation and the truth, he states that the moral 
subject should resist imitation.  Mimesis, Plato insists, “consorts with a part of us 
that is far from reason” (274).  Freud seems aware of this danger, which is why he 
lingers long before a work, attempting to discover a rational and rigorous truth.  
                                                 
66 Such behavior is not uncommon for musical individuals who are overly 
sensitive to sound and to noise.  See Michel. 
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 Plato insists that perception cannot be trusted because the senses are 
inevitably flawed by the human condition.  He states: 
  Something looked at from close at hand doesn’t seem to be the same 
  size as it does when it is looked at from a distance […] And    
  something looks crooked when seen in water and straight when seen 
  out of it, while something else looks both concave and convex  
  because our eyes are deceived by its colors, and every other similar  
  sort of confusion is clearly present in our soul.  And it is because they 
  exploit this weakness in our nature that trompe l’oeil painting,  
  conjuring, and other forms of trickery have powers that are little short 
  of magical. (273) 
While perception is susceptible to corruption, the critical faculties of the rational 
mind are significantly more trustworthy:  “don’t measuring, counting, and 
weighing give us most welcome assistance in these cases, so that we aren’t ruled by 
something’s looking bigger, smaller, more numerous, or heavier, but by 
calculation, measurement, or weighing?” (273).  Whereas the errant senses play 
tricks on the mind, rational assessment cuts through the fuzziness of perception, 
offering reliable means of accounting—mathematics rather than subjective 
estimation.  Like the jar on the dime store counter filled with multi-colored gum 
balls, guessing the number those sweet little candies by merely eyeballing it can be 
only speculative.  But if one dumps out the contents of the jar and actually counts 
them piece by piece, or weighs their total content, one can make an accurate 
assessment aided by the rational faculties.  Beware of the information gleaned 
through the senses because it will always be untrustworthy, Plato insists.  Rely 
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instead upon “calculating, measuring, and weighing,” for these tasks “are the work 
of the rational part of the soul (273). 
 Plato believes that artists are guided primarily by passion, which is precisely 
why they are so dangerous.  In Jonas Barish’s reading of Plato, “instead of helping 
us master our passions [artists] inflame them.  They pour fuel on the most 
combustible part of  our nature” (9).  So not only do artists lead one astray, their 
representational objects are treacherous, “For they aim not to discover the truth but 
only to please” (9).  And as weak and susceptible creatures, “ nothing is easier than 
to follow the line of least resistance, to imitate the passions, which lend themselves 
to vivid mimetic enactment, and which seduce by their very variety and 
variability” (9).  Freud seems acutely aware of this danger, which is why his 
reading is so careful.  He takes great pains to establish scientific method and to 
read thoroughly and carefully.    
 There is a certain irony here, however, for no matter how closely and 
carefully he “reads,” Freud’s (scientific) method is almost entirely about 
interpretation rather than measurement.  While the troubled patient can be 
observed for symptoms, and those symptoms can be evaluated, the mathematical 
dimensions of, say, psychosis, can be hardly quantified.  Contemplating a text or a 
painting gives one time to unscramble unintentional or unconscious meaning 
embedded in that object.  By placing that object in context, by providing it with a 
history, one might read latent meanings that exceed the literal surface dimensions.  
After Freud, we have learned to decipher significance that lies beyond the concrete, 
beyond the mathematical, beyond the purely physical dimensions of a work.  So 
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although Freud gestures to Plato, he also distances himself from Plato, for he 
recognizes the significance of interpretive meaning latent in a work.   
 In the passage cited from the Moses essay above, Freud says that he achieves 
pleasure from works of art when he is able to contemplate them at length, when he 
can “spend a long time before them trying to apprehend them in my own way”  
(“bei den entsprechenden Gelegenheiten lange vor ihnen zu verweilen”).  Through 
lengthy contemplation, this act of “verweilen,” (literally “stay,” “rest,” “dwell on”), 
he strives to discover aesthetic properties that stir him.  He does not let his 
passions get carried away because they are always under the watchful eye of the 
intellect.  Interestingly, when Freud says, “Wherever I cannot do this,”  (“Wo ich das 
nicht kann”), his referent is verweilen, the act of dwelling on the artwork, not the act 
of being moved.  Freud is able to be moved, it seems, but unwilling to allow 
himself to quietly dwell upon the musical object.  His resistance, his “sträuben,” is 
an intellectual act that preemptively rejects the act of contemplation.  But what is 
Freud’s motivation for this rejection?  
 Whereas the information gleaned through the sense of sight is 
untrustworthy, information gleaned through listening is even more suspect, for it 
involves capturing an abstract object.  How should that object be calculated, 
measured, or weighed?  With a text or a piece of visual art, one can dwell quietly in 
front of it, but with sounding music this is impossible; the aural object itself is 
ephemeral.  If rational contemplation is untrustworthy, Freud fears (or feigns the 
fear, perhaps) that music poses a greater threat to those rational faculties upon 
which he staunchly depends—his learned, knowledgeable, and rational position—
hence his “increasing reluctance to surrendering to the dark power of music.”   
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 Not surprisingly, Plato feels that as an art even more abstract than poetry, 
music poses the most significant threat to the passions.  For that reason, it should 
be banished from the city entirely except for those musical forms that are most 
simplistic and utilitarian (Plato 74-75).  Barish explains,  
  […] only those rhythms and harmonies are to be permitted which  
  foster resolution and temperance, not those expressive of conviviality 
  or grief which might enervate the soul.  “Corrupting” harmonies and 
  rhythms must be purified.  Flutes three-cornered lyres, and complex 
  scales are to be banned; only the simple lyre and harp are to be  
  allowed for urban use and the shepherd’s pipe for the country, along 
  with the basic scales. (25)     
By capitulating to Plato’s injunction against music, Freud demonstrates his 
preference for the less corruptible.  His psychoanalytic method might operate 
beyond representation, which is all the more reason to keep his passions in check.  
Perhaps music poses too great a possible threat to a scientist already prone to 
criticism for straying from the purely quantifiable.  His choice of words is no 
accident, and his position no coincidence.   
 But more than signal the disciplined control of his rational faculties, Freud’s 
statement about music indicates his allegiance toward something far more 
important, namely, his allegiance to texts (including visual texts) that can be 
studied in private.  In the context of the Moses essay, this gesture is noteworthy not 
only because it indicates Freud’s proclivity, but precisely because it indicates his 
distrust of the theatrical.  For in addition to possessing the ability to inflame the 
passions, the simplistic and utilitarian music espoused by Plato is decisively 
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solitary.  It is safe because it can be controlled and contained, unlike its 
counterpart, which can potentially “corrupt” the masses.  Freud’s nod to Plato is 
thus a very decisive nod toward anti-theatricality.  For Freud, maintaining affectual 
self-control and resisting the theatrical are complementary gestures.  
 Indeed, Freud’s gesture toward Plato is all the more reason to pick up this 
clue about anti-theatricality, for Plato was, according to Martin Puchner “the 
founder of anti-theatricalism” (14).  According to Jonas Barish, Plato first 
articulated what Barish calls the “antitheatrical prejudice,” (18), “vestiges of a 
prejudice against the theater that goes back as far in European history as the 
theater itself can be traced” (Barish 1).  Whether Freud enjoyed the theater itself is 
irrelevant; anti-theatricalism, following both Barish and Puchner, is the very 
resistance to the theatrical.  Resistance here is a remarkable word, since it precisely 
describes Freud’s own statement that he resists music, being almost incapable of its 
enjoyment.   As I demonstrate in the following section, Freud’s resistance is less to 
music than to theatricality.  
 
Freud and Michelangelo’s Moses 
 Whether Freud actually enjoys music or not, one of the things that is 
interesting about his statement about music in his Moses essay is why, particularly 
in this essay, Freud does not wish to be perceived as someone who might let go of 
his critical faculties and succumb to musical seduction/theatricality.  Why does 
Freud go to the trouble to fashion himself as unable to quietly contemplate music 
in the preface to his discussion of Michelangelo’s Moses?  What is the relationship 
between his confession and his interpretation of the sculpture?   
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 Other than in the passage cited above, Freud does not discuss music in this 
text, but it is striking that his interpretation of Moses is contingent upon a 
disturbance caused by the noise of those singing and dancing around the golden 
calf, the  “Lärm des Volkes und den Anblick des goldenen Kalbes” (188). According to 
Freud, Michelangelo renders Moses at the moment that he is interrupted 
contemplating the word of God:  “Er hört Lärm, das Geschrei von gesungenen 
Tanzreigen weckt ihn aus dem Träume” (Fritz Knapp, qtd. by Freud, 181).  This 
interruption is imperative to Freud’s interpretation because it is the circumstance 
that causes the awkward, upside-down position of the stone tablets at Moses’ side 
that nearly slip from his grasp when he hears the ritual frenzy, as well as the 
placement of Moses’ hand upon his beard.  In Freud’s interpretation of the 
sculpture, the movement indicated by these two elements captures “the moment in 
which the quiet is disturbed by noise”  (“der Moment, in dem die Ruhe durch das 
Geräusch gestört wurde”) (190).  Freud’s identification with Moses is well 
documented (McGrath 1986 50-52 and fn 26),  and is a matter that continues to 
provoke contemplation and debate by contemporary scholarship.67 What interests 
                                                 
67  Freud’s last completed work, Moses and Monotheism, has been taken up in 
a number of recent studies.  See Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of 
Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997). Richard J. Bernstein, 
Freud and the Legacy of Moses (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), Daniel Boyarin, 
Unheroic conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A 
Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, Freuds Moses-Studie als Tagtraum: Ein biographischer 
Essay (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1994), Eric Santner, “Freud’s Moses and the 
Ethics of Nomotropic Desire,” October 88 (Spring 1999) 3-41, Yosef Hayim 
Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991).  For a reading of Freud’s The Moses of Michelangelo, see 
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me here specifically, however, is the link between Freud’s issues with music and 
his identification with Michelangelo’s representation of the Moses who, according 
to Freud, does not drop the tablets.  Able to come to his senses as the tablets begin 
to slip, Michelangelo’s Moses “gedachte seiner Mission und verzichtete für sie auf die 
Befriedigung seines Affekts” (194).  In other words, Moses demonstrates precisely that 
same level-headedness at the roar of the delirious crowd that Freud demonstrates 
through his reluctance to listen to music, keeping his “reasons unclouded and his 
emotions in abeyance”.  Rather than become distracted by listening, Moses remains 
contemplative of the written word of God—an ideal Platonic subject.  
 Indeed, like the ideal Platonic subject, Freud’s turn from sensuality is 
strikingly similar to the Moses Freud discusses in Moses and Monotheism whose 
discipline stems from the self-restraint brought on by the Bilderverbot.  Freud states: 
Wir vermuten, daß Moses [...] die Strenge der Atonreligion überboten hat 
[...] sein Gott hatte dann weder einen Namen noch ein Angesicht, vielleicht 
war es eine neue Vorkehrung gegen magische Mißbräuche. Aber wenn man 
dieses Verbot annahm, mußte es eine tiefgreifende  Wirkung ausüben. Denn 
es bedeutete eine Zurücksetzung der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung gegen eine 
abstrakt zu nennende Vorstellung,  einen Triumph der Geistigkeit über die 
Sinnlichkeit, strenggenommen einen Triebverzicht mit seinen psychologisch 
notwendigen Folgen. [...] Es war gewiß eine der wichtigsten Etappen auf 
dem Wege der Menschwerdung. ( ) 
                                                 
Jean-Joseph Goux, Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud, trans. Jennifer Curtiss 
Gage (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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Moses (and Freud after him) resists sensuality in favor of spirituality, by reigning 
in his affect, his drive, his corporeal desire.  In the context of the Viennese fin-de-
Siècle, Freud’s identification marks him as an “Enlightened” Jew, a rational scientist 
in bourgeois civil society.  
 Furthermore, that Freud, as a Jewish scientist, should want to distance 
himself from the discourse of music in the context of the Viennese fin-de-Siècle is 
also not surprising given the changing and important role of music in Viennese 
culture.  According to Leon Botstein, “in the era of Metternich in the period of 
reaction after 1815, coincident with the gradual withdrawal of the aristocracy as 
primary patrons, music assumed a potent wider role as a force of civic discourse 
for Vienna” (Social History 54).  This discourse, Botstein explains, is constituted by 
a musical language infused with hidden political messages: 
Precisely because of its privileged status in the context of political 
authoritarianism, music assumed a new role as a secret civic language 
capable of sustaining a forbidden discourse.  It dominated the shared 
culture of the city alongside popular satirical and farcical comic 
theater (which in turn had a musical component).  Music, like humor, 
appeared at once overtly harmless and largely personal; the Vormärz 
utilized this veneer and with the rhetorical gestures of Romanticism, 
music became internally coded, possessed of more dangerous 
meanings.  (Social History 54).   
Freud’s theories were grounds enough to mark him as “dangerous” even if he 
weren’t a Jewish scientist.  It seems reasonable that he would not want to further 
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mark himself as a participant in the “internally coded” and “dangerous” discourse 
of music.   
 Moreover, as Botstein argues, by the turn-of-the-century, discourses 
regarding racial and cultural identity were intertwined with music and musicality 
in complicated ways; music itself, especially music involving themes and practices 
perceived to be especially “noisy,” i.e., modernist, became a trope for 
“Jewishness.”68  By then, music itself, whether “noisy” or not, had become a 
signifier for Jewishness itself.  Moreover, “noisyness,” was a racist stereotype 
attached to both Jews and “Jewish” music.  As Ruth HaCohen indicates, 
“Christians regarded the synagogue as a locus of noise and nausea, fearing that 
their harmonious music—especially the new genres of hymns and polyphony—
would be coveted by Jews or, God forbid, that they, the Christians, would be 
influenced by noise, Jewish music” (262).  According to Richard Wagner, the Jew 
was the “man that hath no music in himself,” a stereotype largely based upon 
Shakespeare’s Shylock “and, together with him, other real and potential Jews—that 
is, Christians who behave ‘Jewishly’” (HaCohen 252).  In turn-of-the-century 
Vienna, the music that was most “Jewish” was the music that most upset bourgeois 
subjectivity by disrupting the audibly perceptible stability of tonality—Western 
music’s “Heimat,”—namely modern music.69  Thus, Freud’s trouble with music, as I 
                                                 
 68 There is no question that in modernity, the ever increasing noise of the 
crowd and the roar of the industry in the metropolis became the dangerous other 
to the sanctimonious art of both volkisch and classical music.  
 
 69 For an elaboration on this point, see my “Music and Memory: 
Schoenberg’s Second Chamber Symphony and History.” Journal of the Arnold 
Schoenberg Center 4:2001. (173-181) 
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have stated, has less to do with properties of the musical art form than with 
cultural anxieties that transformed music into a “noisy,” “dangerous” and 
ostensibly “Jewish” cultural form.    
 In his Moses essay, Freud—like Moses—channels the energy of his 
contemplation into the written word.  Although Freud off-handedly remarks that 
he is not sufficiently well-read to gauge the uniqueness of his aesthetic claims, “Ich 
bin nicht belesen genug, um zu wissen, ob dies schon bemerkt worden ist [. . .]” (173) he 
goes on to display that he is more than well read on the subject of the statue, and 
that his interpretation is grounded squarely in the close reading of textual material.  
In fact, Freud draws his first example from Shakespeare, and follows this with an 
exegesis of over twenty specialized commentators who have discussed 
Michelangelo’s sculpture.70  Thus, his interpretation is by no means merely casually 
informed, but painstakingly scholarly.  Freud goes so far as to justify his 
interpretation based upon an exegesis of the Luther translation of the  “heiligen 
Schrift,”(195) arguing “unter dem Einfluß der modernen Bibelkritik,” that the Biblical 
passage that is the source of Michelangelo’s Moses is blended from multiple source 
materials that engender a degree of textual ambiguity.   According to Freud, in fact, 
this textual ambiguity is what justifies Michelangelo’s divergence from the Biblical 
script, in which Moses drops the tablets.  In this precise manner of philological 
reasoning, Freud justifies Michelangelo’s rendering: by not smashing the tablets 
                                                 
70 In the course of his exegesis, Freud refers to the following: Camillo Boito, 
Jakob Burkhardt, Ascanio Condivi, Dupathy, Herman (Friedrich) Grimm, 
Guillaume, Carl (Nicolaus Heinrich) Justi, Knackfuß, Fritz Knapp, Ivan Lermolieff, 
W. Watkins Lloyd, Wilhelm Lübke, Ludwig Münz, Max Sauerlandt, Anton 
(Heinrich) Springer, Ernst Steinmann, Henry Thode, Heath Wilson, Heinrich 
Wölfflin, and to “an editorial in the Quarterly Review.” 
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but exhibiting affectual self-control, Michelangelo’s Moses stays faithful to the 
(ambiguous) script, if not to the Biblical narrative.  
 That Freud and Freudian psychoanalysis display a particular affinity toward 
the textual is nothing new; it is a matter that has played a pivotal role in the 
theories of post-structuralism, most prominently in the work of Jacques Lacan and 
his readers.  But that Freud’s orientation around the textual is in some cases less a 
structural tenet of psychoanalytic theory than a conscious self-fashioning meant to 
avoid the chain of negative association linked with theatricality harkening back to 
Plato has been too little recognized, especially in post-structuralist theory, which to 
no small extent has constructed itself upon Freud’s explicit orientation around 
textuality—in some cases more accurately than in others.   
 Whereas Foucault plausibly argues that “Freud more than anyone else 
brought the knowledge of man closest to its philological and linguistic model,” 
(361) and Derrida that Freud’s “Mystic Writing Pad” is a dramatic mise-en-Scène—a 
“Scene of Writing”—in his essay, “Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious,” Lacan 
posits: “how could we forget that to the end of his days Freud constantly 
maintained that [a literary] training was the prime requisite in the formation of 
analysts, and that he designated the external universitas literarum as the ideal place 
for its institution” (147).  According to his footnotes, Lacan comes to this 
conclusion based upon the following passage in Freud’s Die Frage der Laienanalyse 
in which Freud states:  
Wenn man, was heute noch phantastisch klingen mag, eine 
psychoanalytische Hochschule zu gründen hätte, so müßte an dieser vieles 
gelehrt werden, was auch die medizinische Fakultät lehrt: neben der 
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Tiefenpsychologie, die immer das Hauptstück bleiben würde, eine 
Einführung in die Biologie, in möglichst großem Umfang die Kunde vom 
Sexualleben, eine Bekanntheit mit den Krankheitsbildern der Psychiatrie.  
Anderseits würde der analytische Unterricht auch Fächer umfassen, die dem 
Arzt ferne liegen und mit denen er in seiner Tätigkeit nicht 
zusammenkommt:  Kulturgeschichte, Mythologie, Religionspsychologie und 
Literaturwissenschaft. (XIV: 281-283) 
As we see from this passage, however, contrary to Lacan’s claim, Freud does not 
identify literary studies as the privileged domain for psychoanalytic training.  
Rather, Freud proposes that literary studies, or what one might more accurately 
refer to in this context as philology and the humanities at large should be taken up 
in tandem with a larger medical training.  Indeed, this is precisely the move that 
Freud made in the founding of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, which I discuss 
in the following chapter.    
 The innovation of developing a method based upon an interdisciplinary 
discourse between the sciences and the humanities was certainly not unique to 
Freud.  As John Forrester has argued, while in the 19th century, “biological or 
organic terms came to dominate many of the theories of society, of language, of 
psychology—either as guiding metaphors or as working models,”  “it is less 
widely recognized that the sciences of language—philology, exegetical sciences, 
comparative linguistics, historical linguistics, call them what we will—played a 
parallel and sometimes opposed role in the development of the human sciences” 
(167).  In Freud’s case, the philological sciences “acted as a source and inspiration 
for Freud’s and psychoanalysis’ preoccupation with language,” (167-168) 
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influencing the analytic method that Sandor Ferenczi would later call “the method 
of the tedious philologist” (qtd. in Forrester 198). What is important for this 
discussion is to think about why philology was important to Freud, and to keep in 
mind that a possible degree of distortion of Freud’s work has been brought about 
by its filtering through the highly influential lens of literary criticism, which has 
also ignored or misunderstood Freud’s relationship to art forms other than the 
literary.  
 Grounding his psychoanalytic writings in the science of philology seems to 
have been an attempt to lend Freud’s work academic legitimacy and thus to make 
Freud less vulnerable to the dismissive charges of his critics.  According to 
Forrester, Freud was motivated to take up the methodology of philology precisely 
because it “offered [Freud] a support in external reality to which he could turn 
when plagued with doubt as to the value of the discoveries he was making in 
mental reality” (168)..  Forrester explains: “it seems that Freud was half-afraid [...] 
that this ‘childish play with words’ [...] was too ‘crazy’ [...] to be valuable as a 
scientific finding: it evoked the fear, perhaps, of being accused of putting words 
into other people’s mouths—or worse places” (196).  Indeed, at the turn of the 
century, Freud was infamous for his revolutionary theories and at the same time 
ridiculed.  In his 1956 interview with Kurt Eisler, Max Graf states that Freud was, 
[...] eine Figur, über die man gelacht hat, ohne dass man seine Theorien 
genauer gekannt hat.  Aber man hat gewusst, dass diese Theorien auch mit 
der Bedeutung von der Erotik zu tun haben und man hat etwas von den 
erotischen Symbolen gewußt und das hat zur Folge gehabt, dass wenn man 
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in einer Gesellschaft den Namen Freud genannt hat, haben die Leute 
gelegentlich Witze gemacht, und die jungen Mädchen sind rot geworden. (4)  
Of course, Freud was motivated by more than an unfounded fear of rejection, for in 
addition to the moral charges leveled at Freud for his unconventional views, what 
his critics saw as the  “confessional” nature of Freud’s analysis caused many to 
dismiss his findings as “unscientific” (Mack 4).  These motivations seem a 
particularly plausible explanation for Freud’s turn to the textual in his essay on 
Michelangelo’s Moses and to a philological rhetoric more generally.  Although 
Freud first published the essay in 1914, it was during 1901 that Freud took his first 
trip to Rome and saw the statue in question, and, according to a postcard to his 
wife, Martha, “suddenly understood” it.  Of course, this was only a year after 
Freud published his Interpretation of Dreams, in which he publicly outlined his 
theory of the unconscious aided by interpretations of highly personal and often 
intimate dream material of both his patients and himself.   
 Moreover, as I have suggested, couching his analysis in the sciences around 
the textual helped to buffer Freud’s work from a larger charge that Forrester only 
hints at, namely that of “degeneracy,” or what Gregory Moore calls “chain of 
associations linking hysteria, histrionics and the Jew,” in which both “modern 
music” and “theatricality” were highly loaded anti-Semitic signifiers. Although 
Wagner’s Das Judentum in der Musik played no small role in cultivating this chain of 
association, it was Wagner himself who, urged on by the vitriolic attacks of Eduard 
Hanslick and Friedrich Nietzsche, came “to be regarded as the century’s ultimate 
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‘Nervenkünstler’” (249).71 Vis-à-vis Der Fall Wagner in particular, Nietzsche co-
opted Wagner’s discourse of degeneracy to encode Wagner himself as both 
“hysterical” and “Jewish” and his music as having “deteriorated into mere 
theatricality” through an “invocation of an allusive language of race and disease” 
(248).  Though of course Freud was not directly involved in the modernist music 
circles of Vienna, by overtly repudiating music and retreating into the textual, 
Freud removed himself from an anti-Semitic chain of association that linked 
“Jewishness,”  “theatrics,” and “modern music”.  Instead, Freud constructed 
himself as late-Nietzsche’s Wagner’s opposite, a Moses figure who deplores the 
“Lärm des Volkes und den Anblick des goldenen Kalbes,” i.e., Wagnerism, in a discourse 
removed from anti-Semitic association.  
 Although much has been made of Freud’s struggle to achieve professional 
success relative to the brilliance of his achievements in anti-Semitic Vienna, the 
extent to which this struggle influenced Freud’s self-fashioning as a contemplative, 
learned, and particularly textual figure in the manner of Michelangelo’s Moses 
deserves more serious attention.  Given Freud’s swing from musically receptive to 
musically distant if not abhorrent, it is plausible to assume that the relationship 
between the two most salient features of fin-de-Siècle opera, musicality and 
theatricality, and a potent and explosive anti-Semitic Viennese discourse 
influenced Freud’s self-fashioning as unmusical and anti-operatic.  Like 
Michelangelo’s rendering of Moses, Freud maintains affectual self-control through 
                                                 
71 See Eduard Hanslick, and Friedrich Nietzsche Der Fall Wagner. 
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reverence of the textual all the while that, awash in Wagnerian cultural politics, 
“die Ruhe durch das Geräusch gestört wurde. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FREUD CONTRA WAGNER 
 
Die ersten Töne, die an unser Ohr schlugen, waren die der Musik Wagners.  Augen und 
Ohren haben jene Welt aufgesogen, unser ganzes Wesen war von ihr bestimmt.  Sie wuchs 
uns an, wie Hände und Füße, wie der Athem und der Herzschag.  
Max Graf 
 
 In an essay on theatrical representation in the Freudian unconscious, Jean-
Francious Lyotard states that upon seeing a performance of Richard Strauss and 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Der Rosenkavalier at the Paris Opera, Lyotard suddenly 
apprehended “a contrario just how much the Freudian conception of the 
unconscious and even desire depends upon a particular aesthetic, that of official 
late-nineteenth-century Viennese theater and opera” (171).  According to Lyotard, 
Der Rosenkavalier illustrates how occasionally Freud gets “carried away by [a] 
vertigo of representation” that influences his understanding of representation in 
the unconscious (169). The theatricality of opera—or at least this particular opera—
is, for Lyotard, paradigmatic of a Freudian shortcoming.  
 Lyotard states: “If I have taken my example from the operas of Richard 
Strauss, it is only to remain in the cultural context which was Freud’s,” (164) as if 
this choice were culturally and historically obvious.  Lamentably, however, 
Lyotard’s successive analysis neglects any cultural or historical factors that might 
explain how this particular opera and its aesthetics are relevant to Freud’s work.  
Although the offering of operas from this time period is both plentiful and diverse, 
Lyotard offers no explanation as to why or how representation in Freud is 
particularly operatic or Viennese, nor any hints as to why or how Der Rosenkavalier 
 119 
(which premiered in 1911, the early twentieth-century) is representative of the 
“particular aesthetic” of the nineteenth-century.  Which “particular” aesthetic 
might that be?  Without any indication why Lyotard chooses a work by 
Hofmannsthal and Strauss, and why, of all the collaborative projects between that 
creative duo, Lyotard chooses Der Rosenkavalier, one is left feeling that Lyotard 
plucked this example from a seemingly random visit to the Paris opera. 
 Except, of course, that in musical and theatrical terms, Der Rosenkavalier 
could be thought of as both neo-classical and neo-baroque.  Though Strauß’s 
orchestration is lush, musically the opera strives to be a twentieth-century tribute 
to Mozart.  And as the composer “fancied a lusty Renaissance scenario,” 
Hofmannsthal delivered a libretto derived from Louvet de Vouvray’s Les amours du 
chevalier de Faublas of 1787, and Molière’s Monsieur de Pouceaugnact of 1669, in 
which he “confabulated a marvelous, untranslatable lingo out of Viennese and 
provincial dialects, frenchified gentility and earthy idioms, antique formal address 
and pure linguistic fantasy” (David Murray).  For Lyotard, one can assume that the 
metaphor he intends works this way:  Freud comes up with his model of the 
unconscious because he unwittingly internalizes Viennese opera aesthetics, 
strangely caught up in the totality (the “vertigo of representation”) and naiveté of 
Viennese theatricality.  Der Rosenkavalier becomes a sign for fin-de-Siècle opera and 
a trope for excessive theatricality; Freud’s model of representation in the 
unconscious becomes faulty by association. 
 Although Lyotard only vaguely hints at the underlying recrimination, his 
selection of Der Rosenkavalier gestures toward a discourse that evokes a 
fundamental prejudice about opera as an art form, namely, that it is on all counts 
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“excessive,” or, in the vernacular of the history of the Viennese fin-de-Siècle, 
“baroque.”72  In cultural and historical context, Lyotard’s critique of Freud’s 
(unconscious) relationship to both Vienna and theatricality is confusing at best, 
given that historians have aligned early-twentieth-century Austrian theatricality 
with political aestheticism—which is to say, fascism—rather than the complicated 
fragmentation of subjectivity espoused by Freud.  If, in the Austrian context, 
“theatricality serves power,” how can the “theatrical” strains of Freud’s work be 
reconciled with “the common denominator between the baroque [theatrical 
ideology] and the fascist [theatrical ideology]” (Steinberg x)?  Although the 
subsuming of “theatricality” in the Austrian historical context as a signifier for the 
aestheticization of politics, i.e., fascism, might seem to be largely a semantic issue, I 
would argue that its effects make it enormously difficult to bracket the concept so 
that it can be examined without the baggage of National Socialism.  This is not to 
argue against the devastation of the aestheticization of politics, but to argue for a 
conceptualization of theatricality in the historical context that is not beleaguered by 
the weight of fascism.  The paradoxical problem in the Viennese context is that 
theatricality is profoundly bound up in Viennese (and subsequent) modernism(s), 
even if it has been explicitly repudiated by those same modernisms on the grounds 
that the merger of aesthetics and theatricality tread dangerously close to the 
precipice of fascism.  Although modernist innovators in Vienna such as Adolf Loos 
damned excessive theatricality, as seen both in his essay “Ornament and Crime,” 
                                                 
 72 If anything, a Strauss and Hofmannsthal collaboration in at least one 
instance illustrates a negative aesthetic model for the holistic type of theatrical 
representation that Freud promotes in his Psychopathic Characters on the Stage, a 
matter I take up below. 
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and in his Viennese architecture, many left-leaning and avant-garde strands of 
Viennese modernism subscribed to explicitly theatrical innovations, while at the 
same time repudiating theatrical ideology.  Even Arnold Schoenberg was broadly 
interested in the aesthetics of both theater and theatricality, as his Expressionist 
work and intellectual collaboration with Wassily Kandinsky demonstrates.  Given 
the validity of “theatrical ideology” in the context of fin-de-Siécle, then, how does 
one detach the theatricality of the modernist avant-garde from the theatricality of 
the conservative neo-baroque?  And where does Freud’s theatricality (or anti-
theatricality) fit given the contours of this problem?  
 Although various aspects of the theatricality of psychoanalysis have been 
examined by a number of key thinkers of this century, crucial questions about the 
nature of this theatricality remain unsolved:  first, what is the theatrical nature of 
the psychoanalytic scene, and to what extent is Freud influenced by theatrical 
models in his careful construction of that scene?  Second, and more important to 
my work here, how did the increasingly theatrical nature of the public sphere 
associated with modernity influence Freud’s articulation of psychoanalysis as a 
cultural science?  How can the theatricality of psychoanalysis be contextualized 
within the history of German and Austrian drama including opera and in the 
cultural context of fin-de-siècle Vienna—both for which the theatrical innovation of 
Richard Wagner plays a key role? 
 While comments upon the obvious strains of the theatrical in Freud’s work 
are generally treated as exempt from the political problems that theatricality poses 
to Austrian historians, representational issues cannot be exempt from political and 
historical implications, as the work of Austrian historians has made abundantly 
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clear.  Freud’s relationship to opera aesthetics is thus a historical problem as much 
as it is a representational issue. 
 Of course, one obvious explanation for the huge disciplinary gulf in how 
theatricality enters into competing discourses (representational, psychoanalytic, 
theatrical, and historical) is that, like voice, theatricality is a slippery term that 
indicates multi-dimensional spheres with several disparate meanings: on the one 
hand, the term may indicate a dangerous aesthetic display that has the power to 
seduce throngs of irrational spectators, i.e., fascism.  It may, on the other hand, 
indicate a broad and intrinsic value having to do with both theater and the 
formation of identity.  Even within theater and performance studies, the term has 
multiple valences that are beleaguered by competing historical and cultural strains 
that make the concept particularly difficult to employ, compounded by what 
scholars such as Jonas Barish and Martin Puchner have called the “anti-theatrical 
prejudice” in modern Western culture.  While the constitutive role of theatricality, 
i.e., theatrical structures central to the formation of both subjectivity and cultural 
identity have been central concerns in the critical thought of many key twentieth-
century thinkers, within European history and cultural studies, theatricality 
remains a concept, that, like “sound,” has become aligned with the dangers of 
totality and excess.  Thus, in the intellectual history of Central Europe, the 
historical reference points for theatricality remain the baroque and the Fascist.  In 
the context of twentieth-century Viennese history, these references resound more 
treacherously than in any other.   
 I would contend that in order to contextualize Freudian theatricality, one 
should look—first—to neither Hugo von Hofmannsthal nor Richard Strauss, but to 
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Richard Wagner, for it was Wagner rather than Strauss or any of his early 
twentieth-century contemporaries whose dramatic reforms sparked a “Theater of 
the Future” literally and figuratively, inspiring nothing less than a cultural 
revolution by demanding an engagement with theatricality both on the stage and 
in the staging of a body politic and a rapidly emerging mass culture—even  as 
Wagnerian ideology and Wagnerian aesthetics were being revised and even 
rejected.  Nowhere were Wagner’s reforms and cultural reactions to them more 
salient than in Freud’s Vienna, where Wagnerism and post-Wagnerism infiltrated 
not only the literal theater, but also the theater of the culture and body politic.  
Strangely, or possibly aptly, there is perhaps no opera more self-consciously 
steeped in opera historicism than Der Rosenkavalier, in which Hofmannsthal and 
Strauss sought to enliven the drama of Mozart through revisions of Wagnerian 
theatrical innovation (Borchmeyer).  If, as Lyotard states, Freud’s conception of the 
unconscious “depends” upon the aesthetics of Der Rosenkavalier, it is in the sense 
that like Hofmannsthal and Strauss, Freud engaged the unavoidably rich 
theatricality of Wagnerian aesthetics and then attempted to reorient his own mise-
en-scene toward a project of the future while placing Wagner firmly into the past.  
Lyotard’s suggestion is thus richly provocative, even if his subsequent analysis 
seems to miss the very brilliance of his claim: Freud’s development of 
psychoanalysis coincided with the pinnacle of operatic culture in modernist 
Vienna.  This was no mere coincidence, for strains of a psychoanalytic discourse 
around a complex rendering of theatricality that gestures to the dramatic reforms 
in opera during the nineteenth-century are prominent in Freud’s work especially 
during the first decade of the twentieth-century, up through to the publication of 
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Totem and Taboo in 1913 and “The Moses of Michelangelo” in 1914.   It was during 
this time period that Freud and his circle occupied themselves with psychoanalytic 
scenes in a number of configurations, conceiving of these scenes around a complex 
apprehension of theatricality—devising, as it were, their own “Theater(s) of the 
Future”.  This is not to say that Freud was a Wagnerian, for he clearly distanced 
himself from both music and Wagner.  Freud was a post-Wagnerian contra 
Wagner: someone who engaged the theatricality inconceivable before Wagner 
while largely repudiating both music and opera.  For what follows in this chapter, I 
proceed with the assumption that Wagner’s dramatic reforms are imprinted upon 
Freud’s understanding of the unconscious, though my task here is largely to 
explain why both music and Wagner became taboo themes in Freud’s work.  My 
primary goal is to re-think Freud’s (operatic) mise-en-scène in the context of the 
“Wagnerian cultural politics” (McGrath) that permeated fin-de-Siecle Vienna.  This 
is a project that is relevant to both the history of psychoanalysis and to the history 
of modernity, for Wagnerism has been as influential to the development of 
conceptions of modernity as Wagner’s aesthetic innovation has been to the history 
of representation.  For this reason, I wish to scrutinize an ambiguous tension that 
arises in Freud’s (explicit) anti-musical and (implicit) anti-Wagnerian ideology, 
further identifying several motivations for Freud’s self-fashioning as a primarily 
scriptural thinker that augment my discussion in the last chapter.  
 When read in context of fin-de-Siecle Vienna, Freud’s invocation of the 
“rational” in his protest that I discuss in chapter 3—not of music, we should note, 
but of the effects music has upon him—is an appeal against the Wagnerian 
emotionalism that took Vienna by storm during the late nineteenth century.  
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Although Freud’s friend and colleague, Max Graf, resorts to hyperbole in 
explaining the pervasive influence of Wagner on his generation as seen in the 
epigraph above, this rhetorical declaration demonstrates the degree to which 
Wagner’s influence cannot be underestimated in Freud’s Vienna.  Regardless of 
how well he was familiar with Wagner’s work—and there is no doubt that he was, 
as I discuss below—it would have been impossible for him to have not 
encountered Wagner’s opera and the Wagnerian fervor that swept through late-
nineteenth-century Vienna.  One can safely say that at the very latest, Freud was 
directly exposed to Wagnerism in his activity in the Leseverein der deutschen 
Studenten Wiens during his early university years.  As William McGrath explains, 
the Leseverein, an organization of University students from 1871-1878, which “had 
as its central purpose the stimulation of a strong sense of German nationalism,” 
(Discovery 97) took up the aesthetic theory of Wagner and early Nietzsche as a 
philosophical alternative to the economic, social, and political shortcomings of 
liberalism and its rationalist foundations.  Its early members included individuals 
who later formed what McGrath has called the “Pernerstorfer Circle,” a group 
including Victor Adler, later founder of the Austrian Social Democrats, that went 
on to implement broad social and cultural changes in early twentieth century 
Vienna.  Indeed, it was Wagner’s ideology of an aesthetically-driven revolution in 
particular that informed the direction of Adler’s Socialism, which, according to 
Wolfgang Maderthaner, “aimed for an intuitive and emotional bond of the 
working masses to a firmly outlined, ritualized canon of ceremonies and 
celebrations, grounded in the practical realization of the Wagnerian ideology of a 
radically-democratic, pan-German and largely Jewish leadership” (773). 
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 Though it is difficult to pinpoint the extent to which Freud subscribed to the 
particular ideologies in circulation among the members of the Leseverein during his 
University days, there is no question that he must have been at least very well 
familiar with them.  According to McGrath, Freud joined the Leseverein in 1873, his 
first year at the University of Vienna, and stayed a member for five years until the 
organization was dissolved by the Austrian parliament, which felt threatened by 
the Leseverein’s increasingly blatant political character (McGrath Discovery 97 and 
Wagnerianinsm 84).  Records indicate that Freud was very active in this group at 
least during his first year of membership, and that he enjoyed important personal 
relationships with several individuals who had central ties to Leseverein and to the 
Pernerstorfer Circle both then and long thereafter:  Freud’s boyhood friend, 
Heinrich Braun, joined the Leseverein together with Freud and later entered into the 
echelons of the Pernerstorfer Circle, becoming close to Viktor Adler and eventually 
his brother-in-law; Freud’s esteemed professor Theodor Meynert, named an 
honorary member of the Leseverein, inspired the organization with teachings on the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer; Siegfried Lipiner, who overlapped with Freud at the 
Schottengymnasium and later became a University friend, was a leader of both the 
Leseverein and the Pernerstorfer Circle, and enjoyed significant currency in these 
groups for the direct personal ties he cultivated to Wagner, Nietzsche, and Mahler; 
and the medical student Joseph Paneth, who studied with Brentano together with 
Freud, and who also became personally acquainted with both Nietzsche and his 
philosophy.73  
                                                 
73 Lipiner was also the librettist for two operas by the Hungarian composer 
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 Most historians agree that Freud must have come into contact with 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s ideas through his activity in the Leseverein and his 
personal relationships to the aforementioned individuals whether or not he made a 
close study of their work, and even if he later insisted that his own ideas were 
utterly autonomous from Nietzsche’s influence (Gödde 464).  By now an 
accumulating body of literature has thoroughly examined specific points of 
conjunction between Freud, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer.  Although Freud denied 
any particular familiarity with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, in Frank Sulloway’s 
words, “It is simply inconceivable that Freud...was as totally uninfluenced by 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as he liked to think” (468).  Interestingly, however, 
within these discussions, the possibility that Freud may have been acquainted with 
or somehow influenced by the aesthetic theory of Richard Wagner receives barely a 
word.  In fact, throughout this literature, the Wagnerian pole of the Schopenhauer-
Nietzsche-Wagner constellation curiously vanishes, as though Wagner is merely a 
nineteenth-century sideshow to the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.  
While Wagner’s talent clearly resided in the realm of the artistic rather than the 
philosophical (not to mention the fact that his forays into that realm are both 
unconvincing and politically abhorrent), it is a mistake to allow him to disappear 
from the larger cultural movement for which he alone was predominantly 
responsible.  McGrath’s omission of Wagner in his appendix “Possible Influences 
in Freud” to his dissertation Wagnerianism in Austria is especially striking.  That 
Nietzsche’s tragedy is born out of the spirit of music must not be forgotten.  That 
                                                 
Karl Goldmark (also known as Károly Goldmark as well as Carl Goldmark):  Die 
Königin von Saba (1875) (in English, The Queen of Sheeba), and Merlin (1886).   
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Wagnerian dramatic and musical reforms belong to the culture—not cult—of 
Wagnerism also must not be forgotten, though it appears much easier to 
marginalize Wagner from intellectual history and to polemicize his influence upon 
twentieth-century culture and politics than to address his complicated, 
contradictory, and indeed pervasive influence.  Wagner’s cultural legacy has been 
especially difficult to address, first, because it cannot be contained within the 
academic discipline of musicology to which the composer Wagner has been 
historically assigned, and second, because of the service Wagner’s mythology and 
ideology has paid to right-wing German nationalist and anti-Semitic causes.  Work 
on Wagner from outside the discipline of musicology has been especially strong in 
its analysis of the latter.  As pertinent and necessary such studies have been, 
however, one should be careful not to assume a teleology between Wagner, racial 
anti-Semitism, and National Socialism, as a number of prevailing cultural critics 
have been prone to do.  Furthermore, one should not overlook the importance of 
Wagnerian dramatic reforms—indeed, the importance of operatic reforms in 
general—in the trajectory of German dramatic and literary theory from the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century onward. 
 As Louis Rose makes clear in his book, The Freudian Calling: Early Viennese 
Psychoanalysis and the Pursuit of Cultural Science, which Rose dedicated to his 
teacher Carl Schorske, Freud and his early followers explicitly understood 
psychoanalysis to be a science of culture as much as a science of psychology.  
During the first decade of the twentieth century, these thinkers examined not only 
the individual, but also the collective in its social, cultural, and historical 
configurations in order to develop an understanding of the “universal drama of 
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community” (Rose 14).  Roses’ conceptualization of the non-medical aspect of 
psychoanalysis as a general science of culture is extremely useful in that it captures 
the larger focus and framework of early psychoanalysis in the theatrical culture of 
early twentieth century Vienna.  Freud and in his early circle certainly did not grant 
music and or music drama a privileged status in the “universal drama,” i.e., did 
not propose as had Nietzsche that this drama originated out of the spirit of 
(Wagnerian) music, but they clearly considered music and opera to be every bit as 
relevant to their examination of culture as were literature and the visual arts, even 
if Freud himself viewed music with the reserve of Michelangelo’s Moses.  To be 
sure, a number of esteemed musical figures counted as some of the very first 
figures that Freud convened during the first years of psychoanalysis to probe the 
origins of creativity and to develop this “cultural science.” Most important among 
them were Max Graf and David Josef Bach, two notable personalities who 
exercised considerable cultural influence in early-twentieth-century Vienna and 
who were early members of the Wednesday Society, a small group that began 
meeting weekly at Freud’s home in 1902, and that in 1908 became known as the 
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. 
 For the purposes of this study, I am particularly interested in Freud’s 
relationship to Max Graf, professor of musicology, music aesthetics, and music 
history at the Wiener Musikakademie from 1902-1938, and a well known a music 
critic frequently published in Viennese Press.  Outside of musical circles, Max Graf 
is best known today not as a musicologist, but as the father who, under the 
guidance of Freud, undertook a psychoanalytic treatment of his son, Herbert Graf, 
to whom Freud famously referred as his patient “Little Hans.”  This case, which he 
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published in his path-breaking analysis, “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old 
Boy” was pivotal for Freud’s understanding of sexual development.  Of course, 
Freud kept  “Little Hans’” true identity confidential, as did Max Graf, who, in his 
“Reminiscences,” states that “Freud took the warmest part in all family events in 
my house,” but does not mention Freud’s psychoanalytic treatment of either 
Herbert or Herbert’s mother, Olga Hoenig, who was also an early patient of 
Freud’s (Graf Reminiscences 474).  
 Herbert Graf outed himself to the world as “Little Hans” in a 1972 interview 
with Francis Rizzo published in Opera News, for in a coincidence of Freudian 
proportions, he eventually became a highly successful stage director of opera, 
collaborating with Bruno Walter at the New York Metropolitan Opera and Arturo 
Toscanini at the Salzburg Festival, and later becoming general manager of the 
opera house in Zurich.  Inspired by Max Reinhardt’s influence on Berlin theater, 
Herbert Graf studied stage design with Alfred Roller at the School of Arts and 
Crafts, music under his father and Joseph Marx at the Vienna Academy of Music, 
and Guido Adler at the University of Vienna.  His dissertation, Richard Wagner als 
Regisseur (1925), based in part upon his father’s work on Wagner, was dedicated to 
Siegfried Wagner, who congratulated Graf by inviting him to be his guest at the 
Bayreuth Festival.  There, Graf saw the Ring from the Wagner family box.    
 As I have stated, Max Graf became acquainted with Freud already in 1900, 
the year that Freud published his landmark study The Interpretation of Dreams.  
Their meeting came about through Hoenig, who was in psychoanalytic treatment 
with Freud at the time.  1900 was also the year that Graf published Wagnerprobleme 
und andere Studien, a book he dedicated to Gustav Mahler, whom Graf greatly 
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admired (Rizzo; Graf Reminiscences 1132).   Herbert Graf has claimed that Mahler 
was his Godfather, but this is unlikely given that he was not born until 1903 when, 
according to his father, Max Graf and Mahler were already estranged.  The 
correspondence between Mahler and Max Graf over the dedication of Graf’s book 
in 1900 seems to be the source of this confusion.  Graf reports this exchange in his 
“Recollections of Gustav Mahler,” which states that in Mahler’s reply to Graf’s 
request to bear the book’s dedication, Mahler mentions having the honor “of being 
invited to stand as sponsor to one of your children.”  But Mahler means this 
metaphorically, as Graf makes clear: “Mahler...repeated his wish to be the book’s 
godfather.”  
 Interestingly, it was this same book that was the catalyst for Graf and 
Mahler’s estrangement.   In it, Graf had discussed the conducting of both Mahler 
and Hans Richter, who had became rival public figures spurred on by the political 
nature of their roles as successive chief conductors at the Hofoper and the 
incendiary racist stoking of the differences between the two men by the anti-
Semitic press.  According to Graf, “it was not my intention to play off Mahler 
against Richter, or Richter against Mahler, as was customary in Vienna,” but 
rather, “to portray the individual quality of both great men, so at one in their 
humble service to art, but in character so opposed”.  But Graf’s “recognition of 
Richter’s virtues affected Mahler as a red cloth does a bull,” and thereafter, their 
“personal relations soon ceased to be friendly,” a turn of events that was 
“shattering...for a young and idealistic admirer of genius”.   After that time, Graf 
spoke to Mahler again only once, in 1907, upon the death of Mahler’s daughter.  
Cheshire states that while “the little boy [Herbert Graf] was being treated ‘at arm’s 
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length’ by Freud, he was being watched over by his godfather, Gustav Mahler 
himself . . .” but there is no evidence that supports this claim.  Given Max Graf’s 
own account, it is quite possible that Herbert Graf and Mahler never met.  In fact, 
Freud seems to have played a much more significant role in Herbert Graf’s early 
upbringing.  As the family’s resident analyst and friend, Freud advised Max Graf 
against raising his son Catholic, telling him,  “’If you do not let your son grow up 
as a Jew . . . you will deprive him of those sources of energy which cannot be 
replaced by anything else.  He will have to struggle as a Jew, and you ought to 
develop in him all the energy he will need for that struggle.  Do not deprive him of 
that advantage” (Graf Menorah 473).  And at some point in Herbert Graf’s early 
youth, Freud presented him with a curious gift given the famous problem the boy 
developed around that same age or shortly thereafter: a neurotic fear of horses.  
According to Max Graf, “Freud brought him a rocking horse which he himself 
carried up the four flights of steps leading to my house” (Reminiscences 474).  
Freud’s treatment of Little Hans’ mother made Freud startlingly intimate with the 
entire family.  It would be a diversion to extensively speculate here about Hoenig's 
role in her son’s neurosis and treatment, but it is interesting to note that Freud and 
Graf forego all but very vague discussions of her in their case notes of Little Hans, 
mentions of her neurosis notwithstanding. 
 According to a recently derestricted 1952 interview with Max Graf 
conducted by Kurt Eissler, the then Director of the Freud Archive at the Library of 
Congress in Washington, D.C., Hoenig’s Viennese family was both highly 
creative—one sister an actress at the Volkstheater, and another a concert pianist—
and also deeply troubled.  Hoenig’s two eldest brothers commit suicide, and at 
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least one sister suffered a suicide attempt.  According to the Eisler Interview, 
suicide was also the cause of Herbert’s sister’s death as a young woman living in 
the United States.  Graf states that his first wife was “zweifellos eine Hysterikerin,” 
which he, as a young man, found “anziehend und interresant” (19).74  Graf suggests 
that Hoenig’s illness affected the entire family:  she suffered sexual difficulties, 
rejected her baby daughter at a young age, and suffered from agoraphobia.  
Whether Hoenig appears in any of Freud’s case studies under a different name is 
unknown.  
 Besides being the conduit between Freud and his son, reporting Little Hans’ 
behavior and discussing it in detail, Max Graf participated in an impressive 
intellectual exchange with Freud regarding psychoanalysis, creativity, and 
theatricality.  Graf participated in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society from 1904-
1913 (Mühlleitner 119), and appears to have been especially active during the years 
that he conversed with Freud about Herbert’s troubles, 1906-1908.  Beyond their 
work together on the case of “Little Hans,” their intellectual exchange during this 
period is documented in a number of essays that bear striking similarities in both 
theme and content, addressing the relationship between artist psychology and 
creativity, the psychology of dramatic representation, and the relationship between 
                                                 
74 Graf states: “Nicht wahr, meine erste Frau war ein sehr, oder ist eine sehr 
interessante, sehr geistvolle und sehr schöne Frau.  Sie war zweifellos eine Hysterikerin, 
nicht wahr, was ich als junger Mensch ja gar nicht beurteilen konnte; für mich war sie 
auch in den hysterischen Momenten, die sicher hysterisch waren, anziehend und 
interessant” (19).  “You know, my first wife was a very, or is a very interesting, very 
brilliant and very beautiful woman.  She was undoubtedly a hysteric, you know, 
which I, as a young person, could not judge; for me, she was also attractive and 
interesting in the hysterical moments—which were certainly hysterical.”  
(Translation mine)  
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fantasy and the structure of the unconscious.  These essays are Graf’s “Richard 
Wagner und das dramatische Schaffens,” (1906) “Probleme des dramatischen Schaffens,” 
(1907) and “Methodik der Dichterpsychologie” (1907), and Freud’s “Psychopathische 
Personen auf der Bühne” (late 1905 or 1906) and “Der Dichter und Phantasieren” 
(1907).  The intellectual overlap between these essays seems to have gotten lost, in 
part, because of problems with translation.  Apart from the translation of Graf’s 
“Methodik der Dichterpsychologie” in the English edition of the Minutes of the Vienna 
Psychoanalytic Society, most of Graf’s works before 1912 do not appear in English, 
including the other two essays mentioned above.  This is one reason, perhaps, that 
readings of the Freud essays to which they closely correspond generally ignore 
them.  Furthermore, the translation of Freud’s “Dichter” into English as “creative 
writer” or “poet” camouflages the topical similarities between these essays by 
creating the false impression that Freud is particularly concerned with a writerly 
act.  
 As the Grimms Deutsches Wörterbuch makes clear, however, dichten denotes, 
in its first definition:  “eine geistige tätigkeit ausüben wie abfassen, erfinden, reflektieren, 
erstreben, entscheiden, fingieren, ersinnen,”  (“to execute an intellectual activity such 
as to formulate, to invent, to reflect, to strive after, to decide, to fabricate, to 
devise”).   A Dichter is thus primarily an, “erfinder, verursacher, urheber von etwas”  
(inventor, originator, author of something), someone who engages in a practice 
that might include but is in no way limited to a literary act.  In English, translating 
“Dichter” as “poet” is preferable to “creative writer,” though “creative artist” more 
accurately captures the broad sense of the word, and directs attention toward the 
creative act  (Graf: “dramatsiches Schaffen,”) that is the object of Freud’s study.  The 
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Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society document the range of dichten, or 
“intellectual activities,” that interest Freud and his colleagues. As Rose indicates, in 
Graf’s 1906 and 1907 articles he “declared psychoanalysis to be the first science of 
creativity” and “identified the study of culture with the study of artists and their 
work” (Rose 67).   In fact, the study of artistic creativity and the relationship 
between art and culture is one of the most prominent areas of focus of The Vienna 
Psychoanalytic Society in its first decade.  This organization’s discussions 
demonstrate a fascinating development in the understanding of the relationship 
between art and culture, beginning with an analysis of the creative process in the 
individual artist via representational content, and progressing to an analysis of 
representation in culture and community, up through and including Freud’s Totem 
and Taboo (1913).  This trajectory in itself is indicative of an increasingly theatrical 
methodology of psychoanalytic inquiry, a methodology advocated especially by 
Graf and Freud.  
 Sparked by disagreements that arose from Isidor Sadger’s December 4, 1907 
presentation to the Wednesday Society on the Swiss writer, Konrad Ferdinand 
Meyer, Graf retorted one week later with “Methodik der Dichterpsychologie,” which, 
for the sake of clarity I translate as “Methodology of the Psychology of the Creative 
Artist” rather than “Methodology of the Psychology of Poets.”  In his presentation, 
Graf names as examples of dichten the literary work of Shakespeare, Schiller, and 
Goethe, the creations of Raphael and Michelangelo, and the musical compositions 
of Mozart, Beethoven, and Wagner.  In direct response to Graf’s presentation, 
Freud puts forth another example, Wilhelm Jensen’s Gradiva, which becomes the 
subject of Freud’s study,  “Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens Gradiva.”  Hence, 
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the methodology proposed by Graf and Freud, the “methodology of creator 
psychology,” to borrow Graf’s phrase, becomes the methodology of applied 
psychology, and Freud’s subsequent article on Jensen’s Gradiva, the first issue of 
the Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde, the Papers on Applied Psychology.  Graf’s 
Richard Wagner im “Fliegenden Holländer”: Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie künstlerischen 
Schaffens followed as part of this same series in 1911. 
 Apart from the interlocking conceptual issues in Freud and Graf that have 
been blurred because of problems in translation, the overlap between them has also 
been overlooked because the cultural and political motivations that drove this 
early circle too often are divorced from the methodological concerns of applied 
psychoanalysis.  Such a split is perhaps encouraged by the example of the Vienna 
Psychoanalytic Society itself, which under Freud’s leadership diffused the highly 
charged political character of its work by focusing primarily on structural issues.  
One sees this in their discussions on the relationship between art, creativity, and 
psychology, in which Freud and Graf decisively reject pathologizing art and 
artistry.  In contrast to another school of thought—to which Isador Sadger’s 
presentation belonged—that sought to characterize / pathologize an individual 
artist’s personality, Freud and Graf represent the more holistic approach that 
artists “could best be known through their works” (Rose 69).   Sadger’s method, on 
the other hand, had its roots in both nineteenth-century psychiatry and German 
Romanticism, both of which adhered to the idea that genius is coupled with 
madness, and later, that genius tends toward the pathological.  Freud and Graf 
were opposed to this assumption and the reductive thinking to which it led, as 
their reaction to Sadger’s aforementioned presentation indicates.  
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 In his response to Sadger, Graf takes pains to distance Freud’s 
psychoanalytic method from Sadger’s pathography.  Freud agrees: “Es sei jedoch gar 
keine Nötigung, solche Pathographien zu schreiben.  Die Theorien können nur Schaden 
leiden, und für den Gegenstand schaut dabei nichts heraus” (Minutes 242).75  Neither 
Freud nor Graf state explicitly what damage such an approach might inflict and 
how, but it is not difficult to discern the larger problematic implicit to this 
discussion.  For Sadger’s methodology relies on the same assumptions that drove a 
contemporary discourse linking the modern with cultural degeneracy and hysteria, 
a discourse fueled most notably by Max Nordau’s Entartung, published in 1892 and 
dedicated to the Italian psychiatrist Cesare Lombroso.   In fact, in his rejection of 
Sadger’s methodology, Graf unflatteringly mentions both Lambroso as well as the 
“French school of psychology”: 
Sie wissen, daß es modern geworden ist, Psychologie der Künstler zu treiben.  
Neuere Forschungen haben hierzu ein bequemes Handwerkszeug geliefert.  
Lombroso hat, wenn auch verzerrt und dilettantisch, auf die pathologischen 
Grundlagen des dichterischen Schaffens hingewiesen.  Die französische 
Psychologenschule hat einige Modebegriffe geprägt, wie z. B. dégenéré 
superieur, die auf einige Künstler anwendbar gewesen sind.  Man hat also 
begonnen, Dichteranalysen auf Grund pathologischer Erfahrungen zu 
verfassen. (Minutes 245) 
Graf points out, in other words, that Freud’s approach differs radically from both 
the French school and Lombroso because it runs against the grain of the discourse 
                                                 
75 “There is no need to write such pathographies.  The theories can only 
cause harm, and bring to light nothing regarding the subject”(Minutes 242). 
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that suggests a fundamental relationship between creativity, genius and 
degeneracy, hysteria.  Fundamentally, Freud is not interested in the representation 
of pathology in cultural objects, but in the investigation of pathology in cultural 
objects as a means to understanding its origin and its cure.  For Freud, the latter is 
the purpose of healthy psychology.  As Graf puts it:   
“was Freud von den Kranken gelernt hat, hat ihm erst das Verständnis der Gesunden 
ermöglicht . . . Lombroso betrachtet Dichter so, wie er einen besonders interessanten 
Verbrechertypus betrachtet; die französischen Psychologen sehen im Dichter ausschließlich 
Neurotiker; Professor Freud interessiert die Menschenseele, der psychische Organismus.”76 
 In contrast to Sadger, Graf proposes that a psychology of the creative artist 
must examine the structure of an artist’s personality by comparing an artist’s life 
and his creative production rather than reducing certain personality or artistic 
traits to pre-formulated pathological categories.  In Graf’s view, the psychologist 
must turn toward what Graf refers to as the “work,” and the goal of applied 
psychoanalysis should be the development of a methodology for an analyses of 
this “work,” a project that Freud fully supports and expands upon both directly 
and indirectly in his essays “Der Dichter und Phantasieren” and “Der Wahn und die 
Träume in W. Jensens Gradiva”.   
 What is striking is that the methodology proposed by Graf develops along 
the lines of an expressly theatrical conception of representation. Similar to the 
                                                 
76 “What Freud learned from the ill made possible his understanding of the 
healthy. . . Lombroso considers the poet as though he were considering an 
especially interesting criminal type; the French psychologists see the poet as 
exclusively neurotic; Professor Freud is interested in the human soul, the psychic 
organism.” (Minutes 245). 
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concept of representation that Freud develops already in The Interpretation of 
Dreams, the act of psychoanalytic interpretation that revolves around the “work” is 
less an act of “reading” than of observing / inferring the motivations that pulse 
through the creative process as it is revealed in the interaction between (the life of 
an) artist and his creative output.  Thus, what Graf and Freud refer to as “work” in 
this context is less like “text,” than with something more akin to praxis, for it 
indicates a turn away from a categorization of the analogically legible details of 
either an artist’s personality (or in Sadger’s case, away from character 
pathography), and toward the multiplicitious dimensions of an artist’s and his 
work’s history, action, and practice.  In this sense, “work” seems strikingly similar 
to what Aristotle refers to in the Poetics as prattontes.  
 As Samuel Weber explains in his article entitled “Psychoanalysis and 
Theatricality,” in which he links Freud’s representational aesthetics to those of 
Aristotle on Greek tragedy, he argues that Aristotle’s use of prattontes, which is 
praxis in its substantive form, indicates not only the “representation of a single, 
complete and meaningful action on the stage,” but also “actors, or, as Aristotle says, 
rendered literally, actants, and even more literally, acting” (34).  But these actings, 
Weber clarifies, “need not refer to a person or thing at all”:  “Persons are doubtless 
involved, but qua individuals they need not be the principle of whatever unity may 
be attributed to the representation. .. . What distinguishes [Aristotle’s] conception 
of tragedy from that which has become familiar to us over the past 400 years is 
precisely Aristotle’s refusal to place character at the center or fundament of 
tragedy”. 
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 Instead, what is at the center of Aristotle’s concept of tragedy is, to quote 
Aristotle directly, “a representation of an action which is serious, complete, and of a 
certain magnitude” (Halliwell 89).  As evidenced here, the laws of representation 
outlined by Aristotle on tragedy and those espoused by Graf and Freud as 
fundamental to the practice of applied psychology, which emphasizes the action 
revealed in the “work,” the praxis of both the artist and the artistic object, bear a 
striking similarity; the laws of representation outlined by Aristotle on tragedy are 
mirrored by the laws of imitation espoused by Graf and Freud as fundamental to 
the practice of applied psychology.  By taking up Aristotle, Weber opposes Freud’s 
concept of theatricality to that of many contemporary critics, as exemplified for 
Weber by Joyce McDougal.  Weber turns to Aristotle’s Poetics, “not because either 
Freud or McDougall explicitly refer to this text, but because the very different and 
indeed conflicting conceptions of theatricality to which they respectively appeal 
are forcefully articulated in Aristotle’s treatment of the subject” (Weber 31).  Freud 
does refer explicitly to Aristotle, however, and not coincidentally in the first lines 
of his aforementioned essay, “Psychopathische Personen auf der Bühne:” 
Wenn der Zweck des Schauspiels dahin geht, “Furcht und Mitleid” 
zuerwecken, eine “Reinigung der Affekte” herbeizuführen, wie seit Aristoteles 
angenommen wird, so kann man dieselbe Absicht etwas ausführlicher 
beschreiben, indem man sagt, es handle sich um die Eröffnung von Lust- oder 
Genußquellen aus unserem Affektleben [geradeso] wie beim Komischen, Witz 
usw. aus unserer Intelligenzarbeit, durch welche [sonst] viele solcher Quellen 
unzugänglich gemacht worden sind. (Freud 656) 
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Of interest to Freud here is neither theatrical representation in general, nor even 
the theatricality of the unconscious, but rather the representation of psychopathic 
characters that are crafted by the playwright to represent pathology/psychosis.  
That is, Freud takes the same stand as Graf in Graf’s discussion of Sadger a year or 
two later, that the identification of pathology (or its depiction on the stage) is not 
psychoanalytically interesting unless it has a holistic function for the audience.  
Freud states: 
[…] das psychologische Drama wird zum psychopathologischen, wenn nicht 
mehr der Konflikt zweier annähernd gleich bewußten Regungen, sondern der 
zwischen einer bewußten und einer verdrängten Quelle des Leidens ist, an 
dem wir teilnehmen und aus  dem wir Lust ziehen sollen.  Bedingung des 
Genusses ist hier, daß der Zuschauer auch ein Neurotiker sei.  Denn nur 
ihm wird die Freilegung und gewissermaßen bewußte Anerkennung der 
verdrängten Regung Lust bereiten können anstatt bloß Abneigung; beim 
Nichtneurotiker wird solche bloß auf Abneigung stoßen und die Bereitschaft 
hervorrufen, den Akt der Verdrängung zu wiederholen, denn diese ist hier 
gelungen—der verdrängten Regung ist durch den einmaligen 
Verdrängungsaufwand voll das Gleichgewicht gehalten. Beim Neurotiker ist 
die Verdrängung im Mißlingen begriffen, labil und bedarf beständig neuen 
Aufwandes, der durch die Anerkennung erspart wird.  Nur bei ihm besteht 
ein solcher Kampf, der Gegenstand des Dramas sein kann, aber auch bei ihm 
wird der Dichter nicht bloß Befreiungsgenuß, sondern auch Widerstand 
erzeugen. (Freud 659-660)  
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On the manifest level, Freud states that his discussion of psychopathic characters is 
a discussion about modern theater.  By modern, he does not mean Moderne, as he 
makes clear from his first example, Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Freud 660).  The 
theatricality of the Moderne is a likely subtext, however, insofar as Freud takes 
pains to spell out the type of representation of psychological illness that is 
aesthetically effective along the lines of classical theater, and to frown upon the 
mere theatricalization of psychological illness for gratuitous dramatic ends.  Freud 
makes this argument at least once more in 1909 during a discussion at the 
Wednesday meetings concerning representation in Hofmannthal and Strauß’ 
Elektra after its first Viennese performance, which Freud views with critical 
disregard: 
Die Kunst des Dichters bestehe nicht darin (wie Bach vor wenigen Tagen in 
einem Feuilleton [.. .] sehr richtig bemerkte), Probleme zu finden und zu 
behandeln.  Das soll er den Psychologen überlassen.  Sondern seine Kunst 
besteht darin, dichterische Wirkungen aus solchen Problemen zu gewinnen, 
und die Erfahrung zeigt, daß diese Probleme, wenn sie solche Wirkungen 
hervorbringen sollen,  verkleidet sein müssen und daß die Wirkung nicht 
darunter leidet, wenn man die Probleme nur bloß ahnt und sich keiner der 
Leser oder Hörer darüber klar werden kann, worin die Wirkung besteht.  Die 
Kunst des Dichters besteht also wesentlich in der Verhüllung. [. . .] Wir 
haben wohl das Recht, ein Dichterwerk zu analysieren, aber es ist  vom 
Dichter nicht recht, unsere Analysen zu poetisieren. 
When Freud and his followers focus their attention on the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and artistic representation, they begin to develop an understanding 
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of representation as a process that is both theatrical and performative, a process 
constitutive of subjectivity in both culture and community.  Freud’s “Psychopathic 
Characters” is momentous in that it documents this shift in thought.   
 In a highly unusual measure, Freud gave his manuscript of “Psychopathic 
Characters” to Graf, who eventually published it in 1942 in the Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly along with his “Reminiscences of Professor Sigmund Freud”.  In his 
“Reminiscences,” Graf states that “Psychopathic Characters” was written in 1904, 
but because in it Freud refers to Hermann Bahr’s play Die Andere, which first 
premiered in Vienna in November 1905, it is more likely to have been written in 
late 1905 or 1906.  The the historical footsteps of this manuscript are significant, for 
they suggest that Freud wrote the essay during conversations between Freud and 
Graf preceding Graf’s 1906 article on Wagner.  As such, one can read 
“Psychopathic Characters” as an essay that situates Freud’s thoughts on 
theatricality to the drama of Wagnerian opera in particular; that is, to the 
theatricality of the community as it is conceived in the Wagnerian “Theater of the 
Future”.  This may well be one of the reasons that Freud curiously “forgot” about 
it.   
 Admittedly, conceiving of Freud as concerned with Wagnerian opera 
requires an orientational shift on a number of levels.  On the most basic level, it 
seems important to realize that Freud provides no indication that his remarks in 
“Psychopathic Characters” are limited to the Schau-spiel or speaking theater rather 
than the Sing-spiel or opera.  But because in the German tradition opera is 
understood as primarily a dramatic rather than strictly musical art form, there is no 
reason to suggest that Freud was thinking specifically about spoken theater when 
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he wrote it.  In fact, Freud reveals that he considers opera to be a dramatic art form 
indistinct from speaking theater when, in his discussion of dramatic plots in this 
very text, he mentions the “struggle between ‘love and duty,’” a theme, he states, 
that is “famous from the opera,” which “provides a point of departure for an 
almost infinite variety of conflict situations” (659).  If from the outset we do not 
exclude the possibility that Freud’s “Psychopathic Characters” essay addresses the 
theatricality of opera, it becomes difficult to ignore this possibility at the very latest 
when he discusses the role of tragedy in modernity.  Already in his collection of 
essays, Wagnerprobleme und andere Studien from 1900, Max Graf had addressed the 
psychological forces behind Wagner’s Musikdrama and Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, 
the fraught relationship between Nietzsche and Wagner, and the role of Wagner in 
modern culture.  It is impossible to know how well Freud knew Graf’s earliest 
book, but given that their subsequent collaboration relates to many of the same 
topics that arise in Graf’s earlier study, it is difficult to imagine that he could not 
have known Graf’s views on these subjects.  
 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s comparison of Freud’s “Psychopathic 
Characters” to Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy in his essay “This Scene is Primal” is a 
strong indication that my proposal is not far-fetched.  For Lacoue-Labarthe, placing 
the two side by side is “not an entirely random comparison,” because, “in fact, the 
question raised by Nietzsche concerning tragedy...is exactly the same as the one 
Freud, by way of Aristotle, poses in the very two paragraphs of ‘Psychopathic 
Characters’”:  “how is it that the spectacle of suffering, of annihilation and death, 
can lead to pleasure [jouissance]—and a pleasure superior to that aroused by any 
other spectacle?”  In Freud’s words, “Alle Arten von Leiden sind also das Thema des 
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Dramas, aus denen es dem Zuhörer Lust zu verschaffen verspricht, und daraus ergibt sich 
als erste Kunstformbedingung, daß es das erregte Mitleiden durch die dabei möglichen 
Befriedigungen zu kompensieren verstehe . . .” (658).  Two lines earlier, Freud states 
that “masochistische Befriedigung” arises out of the “Prometheus-stimmung des 
Menschen,” choosing a mythological example that also likely gestures toward 
Nietzsche vis-à-vis Siegfried Lipiner’s Der Entfesselte Prometheus, a poetic version of 
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy enormously popular not only with Nietzsche himself, 
but also among the members of the Leseverein.  Lacoue-Labarthe finds Freud’s 
essay especially intriguing not only because Freud “relinquished” it, but also 
because it is Freud’s most important text on theater, which poses “the decisive 
question (on which is focused a whole contemporary critique of Freud) of the 
relationship of psychoanalysis to theatricality, or more generally, to representation”.  
Lacoue-Labarthe does not indicate why Freud may have parted with the essay, but 
the curious fact that the “whole contemporary critique of Freud” including that of 
Lacoue-Labarthe has relinquished Freud’s motivation for writing (and parting 
with) the essay (as well as Graf’s subsequent essay on Wagner) reveals that the 
repressive mechanism may be alive and well not only in Freud, but also in 
contemporary criticism.  
 As I have suggested, whether Wagner and Wagnerism were revered, 
reviled, or rejected, his dramatic reforms demanded an engagement with 
theatricality both on the stage and in the staging of the body politic, an engagement 
with theatrical forms of political, social, and anthropological dimensions of culture.  
In the genealogy of Freudian thought, one sees such engagement very clearly, 
despite the obvious fact that Freud’s material is radically different from Wagner’s 
 146 
on many counts.  Whereas Lacoue-Labarthe generalizes Freud’s concept of 
theatricality and turns his attention primarily to the role of the spectator’s desire in 
the role of representation, I prefer to stress the fundamental theatrical problem that 
frames Freud’s argument, namely, the boundary between psychological 
representation and psychopathic representation.  For when this essay is read in the 
context of Wagnerian theater reform and Wagnerian cultural politics, it becomes 
immediately evident that what is at stake is not only the question of the role of 
individual desire in the function of theatrical representation, but also the 
relationship between theatrical representation and the building of community—
and in particular, the relationship between representation and the conditions for 
the enjoyment of the psychopathic.  In other words, by thinking about which 
representational aesthetics are healthy and which are psychopathic, Freud 
addresses an issue central to intense contemporary debates not only regarding the 
aesthetics of the theater, but—on an even more urgent level—regarding the 
aesthetics of modernity.  Thus, Freud’s cursory little essay operates on a highly 
charged political level.   Lacoue-Labarthe suggests this when he states that for 
Freud, modern dramaturgy “presupposed the cultural or social establishment of 
neurosis:” “A quarter of a century later (which is to say fairly late), ruminating 
once again the same hypothesis, Freud asks himself exactly to what extent, and 
above all how, one can speak of a neurotic society or civilization” (113).   Here, 
Lacoue-Labarthe is referring to Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, written in 
1929 and published in 1930.  Lacoue-Labarthe notes, “it is not too hard to imagine 
what such a text might have meant in 1930” (113).  Clearly, however, the potential 
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neurosis of society or civilization was a problem that Freud was forced to 
contemplate well before that time.   
 Already in 1900, Max Graf identified what he viewed to be a generational 
shift in the reception of Wagner.  Unlike the older generation, which idealized both 
the man and his work, the younger generation, according to Graf, approached it 
with a critical distance in which “the image of the ideal shifted”: 
   The force which Wagner attempted to place his work at the core of  
  German cultural life, as home to all spiritual forces of this time  
  --musical, philosophical, religious—is a monster [...]  it is precisely  
  this force which proves that the art work of Richard Wagner does not 
  stand, like Greek tragedy, at the beginning of an age,  a civilization, a 
  people, but at the end, as a grandiose resumé. . . . It rests on the ruins 
  of an old culture and attempts to dissolve its highest conscious forces 
  once again into unconscious forces. (Graf 21).  
Similarly, the work that resulted from the collaboration between Graf and Freud 
illustrates a self-conscious striving in the opposite direction, a labor toward a 
“Theater of the Future” that picks up the pieces of an old culture in an endeavor to 
draw out from it the forces of the unconscious.  By the turn-of-the-century, Wagner 
was no longer “the singer of heroic feeling, but rather the great musical sorcerer of 
all wounds and spiritual suffering” (Graf).   
 This is a theme Graf takes up once more in “Wagner und das dramatische 
Schaffen,” though this time with Freud’s notes on hand.  Employing the 
methodology of psychoanalytical praxis, Graf pinpoints a startling “inner 
agitation” alive in the composer:  
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  Diese innere Erregung läßt ihn in keinem Momente ruhen, sie gibt der  
  Natur des Künstlers das Expansive, die nach außen drängende Kraft, das  
  Agitatorische.  Das Theater will lebendige Wirkung, will Massenheerrschaft.  
  Der Dramatiker rechnet nicht, wie der Lyriker oder Epiker mit der   
  Bewunderung des einzelnen Lesers; er braucht die unruhige neugierige,  
  innerlich so verschiedenartige Menge, die er zu einer Masse    
  zusammenschweißt.  Er kennt nur ein Ziel: Diese Menge unter seinen  
  Willen zu zwingen.  Ein Stück von einem Eroberer steckt in jedem   
  Dramatiker und dieser Eroberungsdrang erfüllt Richard Wagner mit  
  mächtigster Energie. (Graf 1906 110).  
In 1906, surely neither Freud nor Graf could have imagined the “Massenherrschaft” 
of National Socialism with which Wagner’s opera and Wagner’s anti-Semitism 
would later come to be affiliated.  It is fascinating, however, that here Graf 
forcefully links theatrical representation with the formation of community, and 
with the potential political domination of the masses.  
 For Graf, all tragedy, including that of Wagner, “entsteht an einer 
Weltenwende, in jenen Zeiten, wo die Menschen gleich stark von den Leidenschaften und 
Kräften einer alten Zeit und den Empfindungen einer neuen Zeit im tiefsten bewegt 
werden” (114).  For both Freud and Graf, the “world-turn” indicated by Wagnerian 
tragedy marks the beginnings of a new, psychoanalytical Theater of the Future that 
strives to unlock the ancient mysteries of the unconscious, that returns to classical 
forms in order to discover what has been left hidden.  In operatic terms, I would 
say that this would be less like reflecting of the aesthetics one finds in an opera 
such as Rosenkavalier, as Lyotard suggests, and rather like returning to an older, 
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classical form to take a fresh look.  Indeed, before the relationship between Freud 
and Graf dissolved sometime around 1911 as a result of the strife caused by 
Freud’s split with Adler, Freud encouraged Graf to write a psychological study of 
Mozart’s Don Giovanni, which Freud believed to be the “greatest opera there is,”a 
task that Graf did not execute. 
 Although I will not offer a psychoanalytic analysis of Mozart and Da Ponte’s 
Don Giovanni as an addendum to this chapter, it is worth remarking if only in 
closing why the opera likely would have appealed to Freud’s sensibilities.  For one 
thing, (similar to Shakespeare’s Hamlet) the plot of the opera begins with a scene of 
patricide and ends with a revenging ghost of the father-turned-statue; for another, 
it is predominantly erotic forces that drive the dramatic action of our hero.  But 
more than that, Don Giovanni embodies the forms of both comedy and tragedy, and 
as such beholds the dynamics that shaped Freud’s universe.  In his forceful break 
with (paternal) tradition and authority, Freud believed that his science would both 
grasp the enigmatic structure of the mind and reduce human suffering.  At the 
same time, faced with the menace of a number of potentially revengeful ghosts, 
Freud constantly developed strategies to ward them off.  Becoming as disaffected 
as a statue himself—that is, inventing himself as the double of Michelangelo’s 
stone was one of them.  
 
 150 
WORKS CITED 
"Lokaltermin Sirenen."  (2006). 
Abbate, Carolyn. In Search of Opera. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001.  
Abbate, Carolyn. Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth 
Century. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991.  
Abrams, David M. "Freud and Max Graf: On the Psychoanalysis of Music." 
Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music 2nd Series. Ed. al, Stuart Feder et. 
Madison: International Universities Press, 1993. 279-307.  
Adorno, Theodor W. In Search of Wagner. Trans. Livingstone, Rodney. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1981. 
Allison, David B. "Translator's Introduction." Speech and Phenomena. 1973. xxxi-xlii.  
Antliff, Mark and Patricia Leighton. "Primitive." Critical Terms for Art History. Ed. 
Nelson, Robert S. and Richard Shiff. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1996. 
Aristotle, and Stephen Halliwell. The Poetics of Aristotle : Translation and 
Commentary. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987.  
Austin, J. L. . How to Do Things with Words. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1962.  
Bach, David Josef. ""Elektra" Von Richard Strauss." Arbeiter-Zeitung 26. März 1909. 
Bal, Mieke. "Introduction." The Practice of Cultural Analysis: Exposing 
Interdisciplinary Interpretation. Ed. Bal, Mieke. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. 1-
14. 
Barish, Jonas. The Antitheatrical Prejudice. Berkeley: U of California Press, 1985.  
Bell, Robert E. Women of Classical Mythology. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993.  
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Trans. Mitchell, Arthur. Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1984. 
 151 
Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Hulme, T. E. New York: 
Macmillan PUblishing, 1949. 
Bernays, Jacob. Grundzüge Der Verlorenen Abhandlung Des Aristoteles Über 
Wirkung Der Tragödie. Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1970.  
Blanchot, Maurice. The Sirens' Song. Trans. Rabinovitch, Sacha. Brighton: The 
Harvester Press, 1982. 
Borchmeyer, Dieter. Das Theater Richard Wagners.  Idee-Dichtung-Wirkung. 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reklam, 1982. 
Botstein, Leon. "Social History and the Politics of the Aesthetic: Jews and Music in 
Vienna 1870-1938." Vienna: Jews and the City of Music 1870-1938. Ed. Botstein, 
Leon and Werner Hanak. Annondale on Hudson: Wolke Verlag, 2004. 43-63. 
Botstein, Leon and Werner Hanak, ed. Vienna: Jews and the City of Music 1870-1938. 
Annondale on Hudson: Wolke Verlag, 2004.  
Bruzelius, Margaret. "What to Say When You Talk to Yourself: The Tower of 
Psychobabble." Talk, Talk, Talk: The Cultural Life of Everyday Conversation. 
Ed. Salamensky, S. I. . New York and London: Routledge, 2001. 191-202.  
Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech. New York: Routledge, 1997.  
Carlé, Martin. "Psychoacoustics and Simulation: Breakdown and Reconstruction of 
the Bicameral Mind." Sound Politics:  An Acoustic Turn in Cultural Studies.  
10th Transatlantic Dialogue. 2005. 
Cavell, Stanley. "Foreward to the Scandal of the Speaking Body." The Scandal of the 
Speaking Body. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 2003. 
Cheshire, Neil M. "The Empire of the Ear: Freud's Problem Witih Music." The 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 77.6 (1996): 1127-68.  
Die Geschichte Vom Weinenden Kamel. 2003. 
 152 
Davaa, Byambasuren, and Luigi Falorni. "Pressbook: "The Story of the Weeping 
Camel"." 
De Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: U of California Press, 
1984.  
De Chumaciero, Cora L. Diaz. "Richard Wagner's Life and Music: What Freud Knew." 
Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music. Ed. Feder, Stuart et al. Madison: 
International Universities Press, 1993. 249-78.  
De Chumaciero, Cora L. Diaz. "Was Freud Really Tone Deaf?  A Brief Commentary." 
The American Journal of Psychoanalysis 50.2 (1990): 199-202.  
De Rachewiltz, Siegfried. "De Sirenibus: An Inquiry into Sirens from Homer to 
Shakespeare." Harvard, 1983.  
Deleuze, Gilles. Bergsonism. Trans. Tomlinson, Hugh and Habberjam, Barbara New 
York: Zone Books, 1991.  
Derrida, Jacques. "Freud and the Scene of Writing." Writing and Difference. Chicago: 
U of Chicago Press, 1978. 
Derrida, Jacques. Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of 
Signs. Trans. Allison, David B. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973.  
Derrida, Jacques. "The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation." Writing 
and Difference. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1978. 232-50.  
Dolar, Mladen. "The Object Voice." Gaze and Voice as Love Objects. Ed. Salecl, Renata 
and Zizek, Slavoj. Durham: Duke UP, 1996. 
Dolar, Mladen. A Voice and Nothing More. Short Circuits. Ed. Zizek, Slavoj. 
Cambridge: MIT University Press, 2006. 
Eissler, Kurt. Interview with Max Graf. Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. 
 153 
Eissler, Kurt. "Über Freuds Freundschaft Mit Wilhelm Fließ Nebst Einem Anhang 
Über Freuds Adoleszenz U. Einer Historischen Bemerkung Über Freuds 
Jugendstil." Aus Freuds Sprachwelt Und Andere Beiträge. Ed. Eissler, Kurt et 
al. Bern, Stuttgart, Vienna: Hans Huber, 1974. 39-100. 
Ernst, Wolfgang. "Lokaltermin Sirenen Oder Der Anfang Eines Gewissen Gesangs in 
Europa." Ed. Felderer, Brigitte. Phonorama. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Stimme 
als Medium.: Mathes & Seitz, 2004. 257-66.  
Ernst, Wolfgang. "Resonance of Siren Songs." Sound Politics: An Acoustic Turn in 
Cultural Studies.  10th Transatlantic Dialogue. 2004.  
Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996.  
Felman, Shoshana. The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J. L. Austin, or 
Seduction in Two Languages. Trans. Porter, Catherine. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 
2003.  
Forrester, John. Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis. London and 
Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980.  
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. London: Travistock, 1970. 
Freud, Ernst, ed. Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1873-1939. London: Hogarth, 1960.  
Freud, Sigmund. Zur Auffassung Der Aphasien. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1992.  
Freud, Sigmund, et al. "The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi." 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1993.  
Gane, Nicholas. "Radical Post-Humanism: Friedrich Kittler and the Primacy of 
Technology." Theory, Culture & Society 22.3 (2003).  
Gay, Peter. Freud: A Life for Our Times. New York: Signet, 1988.  
 154 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1993.  
Gödde, Günter. "Eine Neue Interpretation Von Greuds Verhältnis Zu Nietzsche." 
Nietzsche Studien 27 (1998): 463-80.  
Goudge, Thomas A. "Editor's Introduction." An Introduction to Metaphysics. 1949. 9-
20.  
Graf, Herbert. "Richard Wagner Als Regisseur: Studien Zu Einer 
Entwicklungsgeschichte Der Opernregie." University of Vienna, 1925.  
Graf, Max. Die Innere Werkstatt Des Musikers. Stuttgart: Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, 
1910.  
Graf, Max. "Probleme Des Dramatischen Schaffens." Österreichische Rundschau 10 
(1907): 326-37. 
Graf, Max. "Recollections of Gustav Mahler: With a Head of Mahler by Rodin." The 
Menorah Journal XXIX.1 (1941).  
Graf, Max. "Reminiscences of Prof. Sigmund Freud." Psychoanalytic Quarterly 11.4 
(1942): 465-76. 
Graf, Max. Richard Wagner Im "Fliegenden Holländer". Ein Beitrag Zur Psychologie 
Künstlerischen Schaffens. Schriften Zur Angewandten Seelenkunde. Ed. Freud, 
Sigmund. Vol. 9. Leipzig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1911.  
Graf, Max. "Richard Wagner Und Das Dramatische Schaffen." Österreichische 
Rundschau 9 (1906): 111-21.  
Graf, Max. Wagner-Probleme Und Andere Studien. Vienna: Wiener Verlag, 1900.  
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich. Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey. 
Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 2004.  
 155 
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich. "Produktion Von Präsenz, Durchsetzt Mit Absenz.  Über 
Musik, Libretto Und Inszenierung." Ästhetik Der Inszenierung. Eds. Früchtl, 
Josef  and Jörg Zimmermann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001.  
HaCohen, Ruth. "Between Noise and Harmony: The Oratorical Moment in the 
Musical Entanglements of Jews and Christians." Critical Inquiry 32 (2006): 250-
77.  
Haynal, André. "Introduction." The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor 
Ferenczi. Ed. Brabant, Eva. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard UP 1993. xxx.  
Homer. Odyssey. Trans. Lattimore, Richmond Alexander. New York: Harper & Row, 
1991.  
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. 
Cumming, John: The Seabury Press, 1972.  
Janik, Allan, and Stephen Toulmin. Wittgenstein's Vienna. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1973.  
Jones, Ernst. Life and Work of Freud. Vol. 1. New York: Basic Books, 1953.  
Kafka, Franz. "Das Schweigen Der Sirenen." Beim Bau Der Chinesischen Mauer. 
Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994. 168-70.  
Koelb, Clayton. "Kafka and the Sirens: Writing as Lethetic Reading." The Comparative 
Perspective on Literature: Approaches to Theory and Practice. Eds. Koelb, 
Clayton and Susan Noakes. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988. 300-14.  
Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Trans. Fink, Bruce. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 
2006.  
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. "This Scene Is Primal." The Subject of Philosophy. Ed. 
Trezise, Thomas. Minneapolis: U of Minn Press, 1993. 99-115.  
Laplanche, J., and J.-B. Pontalis. The Language of Psycho-Analysis. Trans. Nicholson-
Smith, Donald. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973. 
 156 
Lawlor, Leonard. Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 2002.  
Le Rider, Jacques. Modernity and Crises of Identity: Cultre and Society in Fin-De-
Siècle Vienna. New York: Continuum, 1993.  
Leader, Darian. Freud's Footnotes. London: Faber and Faber, 2000.  
Levin, David. Opera through Other Eyes. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 1994.  
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "The Unconscious as Mise-En-Scène." Mimesis, Masochism, 
Mime: The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought. Ed. 
Murray, Timothy. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan Press, 1997. 163-74.  
Mack, Michael. "Freud's Other Enlightenment: Turning the Tables on Kant." New 
German Critique 85.Winter (2002): 3-31.  
McGrath, William. Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in Austria. New Haven and 
London: Yale UP, 1974. 
McGrath, William. Freud's Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of Hysteria. 
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986. 
McGrath, William. "Wagnerianism in Austria: The Regeneration of Culture through 
the Spirit of Music." U of California, Berkeley, 1965. 
Moore, Gregory. "Hysteria and Histrionics: Nietzsche, Wagner and the Pathology of 
Genius." Nietzsche Studien 30 (2001): 246-66. 
Mühlleitner, Elke. Biographisches Lexicon Der Psychoanalyse.  Die Mitglieder Der 
Psychologischen Mittwoch-Gesellschaft Und Der Wiener Psychoanalytischen 
Vereinigung, 1902-1938. Tübingen: Diskord, 1992.  
Munoz, José Esteban. "Ephemera as Evidence: Introductory Notes to Queer Acts." 
Women & Performance 8.2 (1996).  
 157 
Murray, David.  "Strauss, Richard."  The New Grove Dictionary of Opera. Ed. Stanley 
Sadie. (London: 1992).   
Nordau, Max. Degeneration. Lincoln: U of Nebraska Press, 1993.  
Nunberg, Herman, and Ernst Federn, eds. Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic 
Society. Vol. 1-3. New York: International UP, 1962.  
Pucci, Pietro. The Song of the Sirens: Essays on Homer. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1998.  
Puchner, Martin. Stage Fright: Modernism, Anti-Theatricality & Drama. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 2002.  
Ragland, Ellie. "The Relation between the Voice and the Gaze." Reading Seminar Xi. 
Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Eds. Feldstein, 
Richard, Bruce Fink and Maire Jaanus. Albany: SUNY Press, 1995. 187-203.  
Rand, Nicholas. "The Talking Cure." Talk, Talk, Talk: The Cultural Life of Everyday 
Conversation. Ed. Salamensky, S. I. New York and London: Routledge, 2001. 
181-90.  
Rizzo, Francis. "Memoirs of an Invisible Man: A Dialogue with Frank Rizzo." Opera 
News 1-4 (1972).  
Roazen, Paul. Freud and His Followers. New York: Knopf, 1971.  
Rose, Louis. The Freudian Calling: Early Viennese Psychoanalysis and the Pursuit of 
Cultural Science. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1998.  
Ruiteneed, Hendrik, ed. Freud as We Knew Him. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1973.  
Salecl, Renata "The Sirens and Feminine Jouissance." Differences 9.1 (1997): 14-35.  
Schmidt, Leigh Eric. Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American 
Enlightenment. Cambridge and London: Harvard UP, 2000.  
 158 
Schneider, Rebecca. "Archives: Performance Remains." Performance Research 6.2 
(2001): 100-08.  
Segal, Charles. Singers, Heroes, and Gods in the Odyssey. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994.  
Steinberg, Michael P. Austria as Theater and Ideology: The Meaning of the Salzburg 
Festival. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000.  
Sterba, Richard. "Psychoanalysis and Music." American Imago 22.Spring-Summer 
(1965): 96-111.  
Sulloway, Frank J. Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend. 
New York: Basic Books, 1993.  
Todorov, Tzveton. The Poetics of Prose. Trans. Howard, Richard. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
1977.  
Vernant, Jean-Pierre. "Feminine Figures of Death." Mortals and Immortals: Collected 
Essays. Ed. Zeitlin, Froma I. Princeton: Princeton UP 1991.  
Weber, Samuel. Theatricality as Medium. New York: Fordham UP, 2004.  
Wickes, Lewis. "Schoenberg, Erwartung, and the Reception of Psychoanalysis in 
Musical Circles in Vienna until 1910/11." Studies in Music XXIII (1989).  
 
 
 
 
